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Many venture capitalists (VCs) use the ―VC method‖ of valuation where they use judgment to 
estimate a probability of successful exit while determining the ownership share to demand in 
exchange for investing in a venture. However, prior models are not aligned with the ―VC 
method‖ because they do not consider private information about entrepreneurial characteristics, 
the primary drivers of the above probability, and consequently do not model judgment. The 
three main chapters of this thesis—one theoretical, one simulation, and one empirical study—
examine the venture capital deal process in sync with the ―VC method.‖  
Chapter 2 is theoretical and develops a principal-agent model of venture capital deal 
process incorporating double-sided moral hazard and one-sided private information. The VC is 
never fully informed about the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort in spite of due diligence 
checks, so takes on a belief about the latter‘s performance in the funded venture to determine 
the offer. This study suggests that there exists a critical point in the VC‘s belief—and 
correspondingly in the VC‘s ownership share—that maximizes the total return to the two 
parties. It also uncovers optimal revision strategies for the VC to adopt if the offer is rejected 
where it is shown that the VC should develop a strong advisory capacity and minimize time 
constraints to facilitate investment.  
Chapter 3 simulates venture capital deals as per the theoretical model and confirms the 
existence of critical points in the VC‘s belief and ownership share that maximize the returns to 
the two parties and their total return. Particularly, the VC‘s return (in excess of his or her return 
from an alternate investment) peaks for a moderate ownership share for the VC.  Since private 
information with the entrepreneur would preclude the VC from knowing these critical points a 
priori, the VC should demand a moderate ownership share to stay close to such a peak. Using 
data from simulations, we also generate predictions about the properties of the venture capital 
deal space—notably: (a) Teamwork is crucial to financing; and (b) If the VC is highly 
confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance, it would work to the latter‘s advantage. 
Chapter 4 reports the results from our survey of eight seasoned VCs affiliated with seven firms 
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Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in this thesis concern the venture capital deal process and the properties 
of the deal space under private information—specifically, about the entrepreneur‘s disutility 
of effort. Venture capitalists (VCs) most often use the ―VC method‖ of valuation while 
considering investing in a venture. In that method, the VC has to judge the probability of 
successful exit—namely, the probability that the venture would attain certain valuation in a 
given time-frame. With that probability, the VC can compute the ownership share he/she 
should demand from the entrepreneur in exchange for investing in the venture the amount the 
entrepreneur demands. After investing the required amount, the entrepreneur puts in effort 
and the VC advises and monitors the entrepreneur in order to make the venture a success. 
Given that the primary factors in the control of the two parties that would influence that 
probability are the anticipated levels of the entrepreneur‘s future performance (effort level) 
and the VC‘s advisory support to that entrepreneur and that the entrepreneur seeking 
financing may be a first-time entrepreneur who lacks a verifiable track-record (e.g., a 
graduate student with a technological idea), the valuation exercise—specifically, judging the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level and thereby the above probability—may often be challenging to 
the VC who may consequently demand too high or too low of an ownership share. If that 
share is too high, the entrepreneur may lose some of his/her motivation and not perform to 
the best. If too low, the VC may receive a lower return than otherwise possible. In other 
words, the VC needs to carefully judge the entrepreneur‘s effort level and thereby the above 
probability, and demand an appropriate ownership share.  
 Though seminal, the models in the venture capital contracting literature—focusing on 
security design and the protective clauses part of VC contracts—do not study the VC‘s 
ownership share in line with the ―VC method.‖ Neither is the VC‘s first offer always 
accepted by the entrepreneur in practice as predicted by those models. Because those models 
assume that the bargaining power rests with the entrepreneur, private information about 
entrepreneurial characteristics does not matter and the VC (who is only permitted by the 
entrepreneur to break-even) merely has to accept the offer the entrepreneur determines. 
Though those models have successfully explained VCs‘ preference for special securities 
(such as convertible preferred) instead of common equity, their significant disconnection 
from the ―VC method‖ limits the extent to which they can inform practitioners. 
 We strive in this thesis to fill the gap in the literature by departing from those models 
in a major way. We assume that the deal process is iterative where the incompletely informed 
VC holds the bargaining power and determines the offer by taking on a belief about the 




entrepreneur‘s effort level (equivalently, the probability of successful exit in the ―VC 
method‖). Because of the information mismatch, the offer may be unattractive and hence 
rejected by the entrepreneur. However, the VC‘s belief may be hazy and belong to an 
interval; so he/she may improve that belief and consequently may be able to put forth a more 
favorable offer to the entrepreneur if the original offer is rejected. While in the rest of this 
chapter we present a detailed overview of the entire thesis, we model the above iterative 
process in Chapter 2 using a double-sided moral hazard framework where we also consider 
private information with one party—namely the entrepreneur, to study how the deal process 
may unfold and also to derive the conditions under which the VC may revise a rejected offer.  
Chapter 3 reports the simulation study of that model that we carried out to study the 
properties of the venture capital deal space under private information. In that study, (1) we 
scrutinized the impact on deal outcomes of changes in the VC‘s belief and (2) we simulated 
deals to generate synthetic data which we then used on regression analyses to make 
predictions about how different model parameters influence various deal outcomes 
(predictions could not be derived algebraically for some deal outcomes, hence this approach). 
In Chapter 4, we report on the survey of a small set of seasoned VCs we administered to 
assess the empirical validity of those predictions. Finally, having presented a detailed 
overview of the thesis in the introductory chapter, we give a brief summary of the thesis in 
Chapter 5 and also identify in that chapter possible directions for future research. A detailed 
overview of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 follows. 
Chapter 2 titled Venture Capital Investment: Initiating and Revising the Deal presents 
a theoretical model of the venture capital deal process. Specifically, the model assumes 
private information available with the entrepreneur on his/her disutility of effort and 
bargaining power with the VC (a situation especially applicable to first-time entrepreneurs in 
early stages of their venture). Disutility of effort depends on multiple factors—economic and 
behavioral—such as human capital related competence, commitment, and preference for 
work that are all necessary for the entrepreneur to turn a technological idea into a successful 
venture. To elaborate, an entrepreneur who has the capacity to turn his/her idea into a 
successful venture, is committed to that goal, and is willing to suffer stressful effort in 
realizing that goal would have a low disutility of effort. However, when a VC carries out a 
due diligence on the proposal of an entrepreneur who does not have a verifiable track-record, 
it may not always be possible for the VC to assess those entrepreneurial characteristics—and 
consequently, that disutility—correctly. Since the entrepreneur‘s performance (effort level) 
will depend on that privately known disutility, the VC in practice uses ―gut feelings‖ to judge 
that effort level (and thereby the probability of successful exit from the investment, in the 
―VC method‖) for determining the ownership share he/she should demand. If that is the case, 
what are the consequences of a misjudgment? How may the deal process unfold and what are 




the strategies available to the VC if the entrepreneur rejects the offer? Since the optimal 
contract models in the literature assume complete information, we cannot use those models to 
answer these questions; hence the need for a new model. 
 We use a double-sided moral hazard framework that also incorporates one-sided 
private information where the VC chooses the offer terms that maximize the value of his/her 
portfolio of investments such that the investment in question is at least as attractive as an 
alternate investment opportunity. While doing so, the VC takes on a belief about the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level. Using the private information on his/her disutility of effort, the 
entrepreneur evaluates the offer at the optimal effort level that maximizes his/her return to 
decide on that offer. If he/she rejects the offer and if there is room for the VC to improve 
his/her belief, the VC may be able to revise the offer; specifically, we derive the conditions 
under which the VC would be able to revise the offer and depict the strategies available to 
the VC in a two-dimensional space defined by ownership share and the sensitivity of the 
VC‘s service (advising and monitoring) with respect to his/her belief.  
Our illustrative example suggests that there may be critical values for the VC‘s belief 
(and corresponding ownership shares) that maximize the returns to the two parties. We also 
analyze the impacts of changes in the base salary paid to the entrepreneur (an aspect of VC 
financing largely ignored in the literature) and find that a higher base salary is not necessarily 
good for the entrepreneur or bad for the VC. The findings imply that making entrepreneurial 
characteristics transparent to the VC can benefit the entrepreneur (because with better 
information the VC may not underestimate the entrepreneurial effort and consequently 
demand a large ownership share) and that the VC‘s ownership share should neither be too 
high nor too low (because the illustrative example suggests that the VC‘s excess profit—
namely, the VC‘s return in excess of his/her return from an alternate investment—is an 
inverted-U shape with respect to that ownership share). Since the resulting deals would often 
be sub-optimal (from the viewpoint of maximizing either the deal welfare—the sum of the 
two parties‘ returns—or the VC‘s excess profit), future research may inquire whether and 
how that inefficiency can be eliminated or minimized under private information.  
Chapter 3 titled Properties of the Venture Capital Deal Space is a simulation study of 
the above theoretical model to shed light on the properties of the venture capital deal space 
under private information. There are twelve parameters in our theoretical model, so the deal 
space is a 12-dimensional hypercube (those parameters being: the VC‘s cost of capital, 
investment amount, the VC‘s unit cost of service—i.e., the unit cost for the VC‘s time, the 
VC‘s marginal return to service—a measure of the VC‘s time constraints, base salary paid to 
the entrepreneur, the relative importance of the entrepreneur‘s solo-work and that of 
teamwork, the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work and that in teamwork, the VC‘s 
effectiveness (in teamwork), the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort—i.e., disutility of effort, 




and the VC‘s belief on the entrepreneur‘s effort level). While the first eleven of the 
parameters define a deal scenario, the twelfth is the belief that the VC facing the scenario 
takes on in order to determine the offer. Recall that our illustrative example in Chapter 2 
suggests that there may be critical values of the VC‘s belief and corresponding ownership 
shares that maximize the returns to the two parties. However, that observation was only made 
using one scenario. Though for that scenario the values for some of the parameters had been 
chosen from the literature, we decided to confirm that finding with a simulation (Simulation 
I). We also decided to simulate deals (in Simulation II) and use the resulting synthetic data 
for regressions to uncover insights about the parameter sensitivities of various deal outcomes.  
In Simulation I, we simulated 5,200 scenarios using samples drawn quasi-randomly 
from wide parameter domains and then computed various deal outcomes for 200 values of 
the VC‘s belief drawn uniformly across its domain for each of those scenarios (thus we had 
1.04 million deal computations). That simulation confirmed that indeed there exist critical 
values for the VC‘s belief and corresponding ownership shares that maximize the returns to 
the two parties and the deal welfare for each scenario. It further showed that, for scenarios 
with a possibility of deal closure, the critical value of the VC‘s belief (corresponding 
ownership share) that maximizes the deal welfare is bounded on the lower (upper) side by the 
belief (ownership share) that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit and on the upper (lower) side 
by the belief (ownership share) that maximizes the entrepreneur‘s return. This property, 
which we formally conjecture, implies that the VC needs to carefully judge the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level (equivalently, the probability of successful exit in the ―VC 
method‖) and correspondingly the ownership share to demand if he/she wishes to maximize 
the excess profit. Future research could use regression analysis to show how the eleven 
parameters of a scenario influence the critical values of the VC‘s belief and ownership share. 
We, however, note that one of those eleven parameters—namely, the entrepreneur‘s unit cost 
of effort—is unknown to the VC, so the VC can only hope to estimate the critical ownership 
shares in terms of that unknown unit cost (for the scenario in which he/she is placed) using 
the coefficients of parameters estimated in such a regression.  
Using the data from the simulation, we also graphed the distributions of the various 
critical values and found that the critical ownership share that maximizes deal welfare is less 
than 0.2 in about two-thirds of the scenarios, that maximizing the VC‘s excess profit varies 
widely but is between 0.2 and 0.5 in about 45% of the scenarios, and that maximizing the 
entrepreneur‘s return is less than 0.1 in about 80% of the scenarios. These observations 
suggest that in practice it is unlikely that maximum welfare would be realized or that 
entrepreneurs would obtain their best return as far as VCs hold the bargaining power and 
entrepreneurial characteristics are not completely known. Those observations further suggest 
that VCs would be better off not targeting certain ownership percentages to demand (e.g., 




33%, less than 50%, etc.); instead, they should demand an ownership share that is appropriate 
to that particular deal and that ownership share can be considerably low or high in a sizable 
number of cases.     
In Simulation II, we quasi-randomly chose 10,400 deals (i.e., full sets of parameters) 
and computed various deal outcomes. We then conducted regression analyses using the 
resulting synthetic data to predict the sensitivities of various deal outcomes (i.e., probability 
of VC making an offer, the VC‘s ownership share and service level, the entrepreneur‘s effort 
level, probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort, probability of entrepreneur accepting 
an offer, returns to the two parties, and deal welfare) with respect to the twelve parameters. 
From that exercise, several interesting predictions emerged; some of them are: (1) Teamwork 
is crucial to venture capital financing (i.e., deal outcomes are highly sensitive to the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork and the relative importance of teamwork); (2) If the 
VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance, it would work to the advantage 
of the entrepreneur; (3) Though the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort does not directly 
influence the VC‘s offer (because that information is not known to the VC), that unit cost is 
the factor that affects various deal outcomes the most negatively; and (4) Base salary only 
plays a minor role in influencing deal outcomes. We also conducted a simulation in a small 
hypercube (one that had narrow domains for the parameters and that surrounded the 
parameter values taken from the literature for our illustrative example of Chapter 2) and 
found qualitatively similar results when we repeated the regressions using the data from that 
small hypercube. Thus properties appear to be homogenous across the deal space. 
Chapter 4 titled Survey of Venture Capitalists concerns the survey of VCs that we 
administered for empirical validation of the key assumptions of our theoretical model, and 
the predictions from our propositions, conjecture, and regressions. Since, for empirical 
validation, it would be more practical to seek agreement on our findings from VCs who are 
experts in deal negotiation than collect data on the model parameters and the deal outcomes 
for a large number of actively considered proposals, we administered an online survey, using 
an online survey portal SurveyMonkey, to eight seasoned VCs located in Toronto, Waterloo, 
and Montreal and affiliated with firms operating in three countries—Canada, the USA, and 
the UK. We sought their level of agreement with thirty nine items that related to our 
assumptions and predictions. While thirty three of those items were supported, one was 
disagreed with, and for the remaining five we identified plausible reasons for the apparent 
lack of support and discovered new insights while doing so.     
Our sample of VCs supported our key assumptions that the VC uses judgment in 
determining the offer terms (unlike in the optimal VC contracting literature) and that a 
rejected offer may be revised (an action irrelevant to optimal contracts where one party puts 
forth an offer that is immediately acceptable to the other party). In line with our conjecture, 




the survey respondents also agreed that the entrepreneur usually likes to own a larger part of 
the venture than what the VC offers. Those respondents however disagreed that the VC‘s 
time constraints can affect whether the VC will revise a rejected offer (as we propounded in 
one of our propositions). Indeed as per the proposition those time constraints can cease to 
affect the VC‘s decision regarding revising when the VC has minimized or eliminated those 
constraints (say by engaging a team of junior analysts for assistance). The respondents agreed 
that the size of the base salary offered can affect whether the deal will close; hence it is 
conceivable that the VC may revise a rejected offer by increasing the base salary while 
maintaining the ownership share as in the original offer. Finally, the responses supported 
most of the predictions of our regressions. Particularly, the responses confirmed the 
importance of teamwork in enabling VC financing and the importance of the VC‘s belief on 
the entrepreneur‘s effort level (equivalently, the VC‘s ownership share) in influencing how 
the returns are divided between the two parties. 
Though our sample of VCs is small and non-random, the sample is of experts. The 
VCs have negotiated numerous deals, many of them with first-time entrepreneurs. They all 
sit on boards and actively advise entrepreneurs. Many of them were entrepreneurs themselves 
earlier in their career. Their firms have numerous portfolio firms under management in 
various sectors - Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), biotechnology, and 
green technology among others. Thus the evidence is credible, but future research could 
strive to survey a larger number of practicing VCs.  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 together present a coherent picture of venture capital investment 
under private information about the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort. The VC has the 
bargaining power in the deal most often and he/she uses judgment in determining the 
entrepreneur‘s future performance (effort level) and the offer terms. The entrepreneur rejects 
the offer sometimes and the VC may revise such a rejected offer. Thus indeed the deal 
process is an iterative process in practice (though many times the first offer may be 
accepted).  
Furthermore, the VC‘s excess profit is an inverted-U shape with respect to ownership 
share (though the curve is not always smooth; it can have kinks), so the VC must demand an 
ownership share that is appropriate for that particular deal to maximize his/her return from 
the investment rather than target a desired share. If the VC has the bargaining power, welfare 
is unlikely to be maximized; neither is the entrepreneur likely to obtain his/her best return (in 
a vast majority of cases, the latter would need 80% ownership share for best return). The VC 
should strive to minimize his/her time-constraints and maximize advisory capacity (so he/she 
would not exhaust that capacity even at high level of service) to be better able to finance 
ventures. 




Moreover, the entrepreneur should only ask for a minimum necessary base salary in 
consideration of his/her overall return from the venture. Though a larger base salary to the 
entrepreneur poses the risk of a bigger loss to the VC (in case the venture fails), the latter 
should actively consider paying a large salary in order not to lose an otherwise attractive 
deal, if that salary is essential to the entrepreneur and not unreasonably large relative to the 
expected returns from the venture. Base salary would not play a major role in any other 
respects. The entrepreneur must strive to be effective in teamwork especially if teamwork is 
crucial to the venture (such as when the VC‘s business skills are particularly necessary). But 
since that effectiveness depends not only on the entrepreneur‘s ability to cooperate with the 
VC but also on his/her competence and since the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work 
(that depends only on his competence) also plays a considerably large role, the entrepreneur‘s 
competence is perhaps the most important factor on which he/she should focus on in order to 
be financed.  
This thesis, intended as a contribution to the VC contracting literature, departed from 
the existing optimal contract models in a major way. Chapter 2 modeled the VC deal as an 
iterative process employing a new approach that is in sync with the ―VC method‖—namely, 
by formally modeling the VC‘s belief and studying offer revisions in the context of changes 
in that belief. While doing so, it also considered base salary—an aspect of venture capital 
financing that has only received scant attention in the literature. Chapter 3 used a simulation 
model to scrutinize the deal process under private information in microscopic details—
namely, how twelve parameters affect a variety of deal outcomes. Specifically, we are not 
aware of any past research that makes any predictions on how the returns to the two parties 
and the deal welfare would vary with the VC‘s estimation of the probability of successful 
exit (in the ―VC method‖). Neither are we aware of past research that has studied the impacts 
on VC deals of cost for the VC‘s time or his/her time-constraints. Finally, Chapter 4, by 
surveying a small but expert set of VCs, contributes to the literature by offering empirical 
evidence for our findings. We hope that this thesis will inspire thinking on VC contracting 
and steer that literature in this new direction, and thus offer a contribution to that literature in 
an intellectually demanding but practically valuable way.     
    










Venture Capital Investment: Initiating and Revising the Deal 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The need to better understand investment offers—and the actions/reactions of the involved 
parties—results from significant and consistent discrepancies between investors and 
entrepreneurs regarding firm valuation and expected performance (Mason and Harrison, 
1996).
1
 Firm valuation per share (or pricing) as well as the terms and conditions of the 
investment deal are also crucial to entrepreneurs (Valliere and Peterson, 2007). Too high a 
valuation from the entrepreneur may lead to a rejection by the venture capitalist (VC), while 
too low a valuation by the VC can discourage the entrepreneur, thereby affecting the 
performance of the funded venture (Amit, Brander and Zott, 1998).
2
  
This chapter attempts to provide a clearer understanding of VC investment offers by 
considering the level of effort to be allocated in the venture by the fund-seeking entrepreneur 
or, in other words, by considering entrepreneurial characteristics. It also attempts to identify 
the conditions under which a VC should choose to revise an offer when rejected. Since VCs 
exist because of their ability to reduce the cost of information asymmetry between 
entrepreneur and investor, and since both parties are prone to moral hazard (Amit et al., 
1998), we approach this investment deal phenomenon with a principal-agent model. In this 
model, an entrepreneur possessing private information on his/her characteristics—
specifically, disutility of effort—seeks investment and a VC decides whether or not to make 
an offer.  
The VC considers the entrepreneur‘s private information by forming a belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s level of effort to be allocated to the new venture. Both parties maximize their 
respective expected return based on their effort allocated to the venture and their ownership 
share, as well as other factors such as investment amount and cost of capital. Although the 
return to the entrepreneur only comes from his/her proposed business venture, the return to 
the VC comes from a portfolio of ventures. In addition to offering a description of how the 
investment deal might unfold when the entrepreneur possesses private information, our 
formal approach also allows us to study the impacts on the return to both parties of changes 
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 Thanks to Rod McNaughton, this chapter had its origin in a research question on venture capital for green 
technology but metamorphosed into one concerning deals soon after I started a preliminary review of VC 
literature to first understand the investment process. I thank Moren Levesque for checking for mathematical 
accuracy and intensely helping me in the general development of the chapter. I thank Brian Cozzarin for his 
advice at various times in the course of this chapter. Any errors that may remain are mine.      
2
 We interchangeably use ―VC‖ to denote both venture capital and venture capitalist, depending on the context.  




in the VC‘s belief on the entrepreneur‘s effort and of including a base salary for the 
entrepreneur as part of the investment deal. Considering a base salary is only one of many 
possible contract provisions that try to incent the entrepreneur, but one left rather unexplored.  
Extant literature suggests that entrepreneurial characteristics—the outcome of which 
being the entrepreneur‘s level of effort—represent the primary factors that affect the 
valuation of a firm (e.g., Fried and Hisrich, 1994), but also that VCs extensively use their 
―gut feeling‖ to account for these characteristics (Messica, 2008; Levie and Gimmon, 2008). 
The subjectivity of this measure (i.e., ―gut feeling‖), and resulting challenges associated with 
valuing a firm, have led to numerous studies.
3
 Yet, these studies neglect the private 
information that is possessed by the entrepreneur on these characteristics (i.e., his/her 
disutility of effort). Even optimal contracting studies (e.g., Casamatta, 2003) do so by 
assigning the bargaining power and the offer decision to the entrepreneur, not the VC; hence, 
when evaluating an offer the key role played by the VC‘s ―gut feeling‖ in considering the 
entrepreneur‘s characteristics is likely to disappear.   
We address this gap in the literature by allowing the VC to form a belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s level of effort, and investigate the sensitivity of the investment offer as the VC 
alters this belief. In the proposed model, the VC maximizes his/her expected return from a 
portfolio of ventures believing that the entrepreneur in question will at least allocate a certain 
minimum level of effort to the corresponding venture member (i.e., the entrepreneur is 
believed to at least ―perform‖ at a certain minimum level). We use this minimum level to 
more formally capture the VC‘s ―gut feeling‖ regarding the entrepreneur‘s behavior. This 
minimum level is not necessarily a ―low‖ level; in fact, it can be an overestimate of the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level.  
Contributions from this model are multifold. First, we characterize and numerically 
illustrate the investment deal process to uncover relationships between some of the key 
decision variables in initiating the deal. Among other things, this exercise suggests that a 
rejected offer can allow the VC to incrementally revise that offer in order to increase his or 
her excess profit as well as the investment-deal welfare (i.e., sum of net returns to both 
parties). Second, we derive the conditions necessary for the VC to make a revised offer if 
rejected, and show that they depend on the manner in which the offer is revised (e.g., offering 
a higher base salary to the entrepreneur), on the VC‘s ownership share, and on the change in 
the VC‘s service level as entrepreneurial effort is expected to increase. For instance, we show 
that when the VC believes that the entrepreneur‘s effort can significantly enhance his or her 
marginal productivity, that VC is increasingly encouraged to close a deal and revise the offer. 
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 For instance, Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) focus on the VC process; Amit et al. (1998) and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1994) on the raison d'être of VCs; Shepherd, Armstrong and Lévesque (2005) on VCs‘ limited 
attention and optimal proportion of venture proposals to fund; and Casamatta (2003) on optimal contracting. 




We further portray three revision strategies we put forward (1. do not revise the offer; 2. 
revise the offer by reducing the VC ownership share; 3. revise the offer by increasing the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary) on a two-dimensional space divided by three threshold lines to 
unearth the importance of not only the magnitude of a VC‘s ownership share, but also the 
magnitude of the change in that VC‘s service level as his or her belief improves regarding the 
entrepreneur‘s behavior.  
In §2.2 we describe two important bodies of literature that relate to our research 
questions (how should the investment deal unfold and when should the VC choose to revise 
an offer when rejected). §2.3 offers a description of the deal process, which leads to a formal 
principal-agent model and an illustrative example of that process. §2.4 presents necessary 
and sufficient conditions under which a rejected investment offer should be revised, whereas 
§2.5 discusses the impacts of paying a base salary to the entrepreneur as part of the offer. 
§2.6 concludes by articulating practical insights, and identifying limitations as extensions of 
this work.  
2.2 FIRM VALUATION AND MODELING MORAL HAZARD 
Although the commercial potential of a venture (e.g., based on technology and/or 
marketability of the new offering) is important, VCs consider an entrepreneur‘s 
characteristics, which can be represented by economic (e.g., human capital related 
competence) or behavioral dimensions (e.g., preference for work), to be the most important 
factors that affect firm valuation (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Pintado, de Lema and Van Auken, 
2007). Consequently, background checks on the entrepreneur are crucial because top 
management capabilities may become primary indicators of the venture‘s potential (Zutshi, 
Tan, Allampalli and Gibbons, 1999). Gorman and Sahlman (1989) claim that wrong doing of 
senior managers can drive venture failures. Failure rates are high for newly funded ventures 
(e.g., Dimov and De Clercq, 2006), which forces VCs to carefully scrutinize entrepreneurial 
characteristics. Other key factors affecting firm valuation include the service to be rendered 
by the VC (i.e., the level of effort invested in the newly funded venture; Amit et al., 1998; 
Hsu, 2004) and the bargaining power of the VC (Inderst and Mueller, 2004). Although many 
other factors may be considered when a firm is valued, we focus in this article on analyzing 
the most important one, entrepreneurial characteristics, everything else being equal, and thus 
pay special attention to the level of effort allocated by the two parties involved in the 
investment deal.  
The most popular valuation method among VCs is the so-called ―VC method.‖ As per 
Metrick (2007), a firm‘s total valuation is the exit valuation multiplied by the expected 
retention percentage and divided by the value multiple. Exit valuation is the valuation of the 
firm at the end of the investment contract, the expected retention percentage is the proportion 




of current number of shares to number of shares at the time of exit, and the value multiple is 
the reciprocal of the product of discount factor and probability of successful exit. If the 
present worth of returns to the VC or, in other words, the partial valuation, which is equal to 
the VC‘s ownership share times the total valuation, is at least equal to the investment, then 
the VC invests. The relationships among the VC method‘s components are formally 
presented in Appendix A.  
This formal representation has enabled us to demonstrate (in Appendix A) that the 
crucial component for our focus is the probability of successful exit because that probability 
is directly proportional to the new venture‘s expected revenue (used to compute expected 
returns to both parties). That probability is an assessment made by the VC following due 
diligence and it depends on ―gut feeling‖ (Messica, 2008; Levie and Gimmon, 2008) that 
accounts for the level of effort to be allocated in the venture by the fund-seeking 
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial effort affects the probability of successful exit, especially for 
first-time entrepreneurs lacking a track-record and possessing private information on their 
disutility of effort (likely unidentifiable through due diligence). The VC must thus use his/her 
―gut feeling‖ to form a belief on the entrepreneur‘s effort level, with a lower bound that can 
either be an underestimate or be an overestimate of the true effort level.
4
 Information 
asymmetry thus emerges and moral hazard arises. 
Moral hazard in the VC-entrepreneur relationship can be double-sided (e.g., Amit et 
al., 1998; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007). On the one hand, moral hazard from the 
entrepreneur arises because, as articulated above, the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort may 
render his/her actual level of effort allocated to the venture less than the level hoped for by 
the VC. On the other hand, moral hazard from the VC arises too because the VC possesses a 
portfolio of investments and hence offers a level of service that maximizes expected return 
from that portfolio rather than from any single venture (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006; 
Shepherd et al., 2005; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003; Jääskeläinen, Maula and Seppa, 
2006). Therefore, the literature suggests that, under time constraints, the level of service 
rendered by the VC may end up below the level that maximizes the VC‘s return from the 
focal venture. This implies that the VC‘s level of service in the venture is a second important 
construct that affects (albeit more indirectly) the probability of successful exit. In fact, the 
VC‘s service level is itself influenced by the entrepreneur‘s effort level, thereby suggesting a 
primary effect on the probability of successful exit from entrepreneurial effort and a 
secondary effect from the VC‘s service. With that probability and the new venture‘s expected 
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 Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) found that 96% of the VCs they surveyed were inaccurate in their investment 
decisions (VCs either overestimated or underestimated entrepreneurs) but those VCs were, nevertheless, 
overconfident about those decisions. The VC‘s belief on the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level may 
significantly misrepresent the entrepreneur‘s true effort, providing additional support for the need to also 
consider revising this belief. 




revenue being proportional (Appendix A), this discussion allows us to model the expected 
revenue as a function of both parties‘ effort (i.e., the entrepreneur‘s effort level and the VC‘s 
service level). 
We propose a principal-agent model of the investment deal process that has been 
inspired by the work of Amit et al. (1998), who has demonstrated the economic necessity of 
VCs as an intermediary in a market for private equity, and by Metrick (2007), who has 
illuminated the VC method. Our model incorporates double-sided moral hazard with private 
information on entrepreneurial characteristics (i.e., disutility of effort). A growing body of 
literature has considered double-sided moral hazard in the VC-entrepreneur relationship, 
focusing on choice of security type (Repullo and Suarez, 2004), cash-flow rights (Schmidt, 
2003), or contracts when a business angel investor is involved in addition to the VC (Elitzur 
and Gavious, 2003). Fairchild (2004) considers the bid of two VCs, focusing on the 
combined effects on bargaining agreements of value-added services, reputation-seeking, and 
bargaining power. Fairchild (in press) analyzes the entrepreneur‘s decision for selecting a VC 
versus an angel. In Hellmann (1998) the VC chooses the optimal rate at which to replace the 
entrepreneur, while Hellmann (2002) studies corporations that invest in ventures to acquire 
them for economies of scale or to eliminate their competition. Inderst and Mueller (2004) 
look at capital market characteristics to develop a model of contracting, bargaining, and 
search. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) focus on the optimal portfolio size.  
Nevertheless, these studies do not consider the private information of the entrepreneur 
on his/her disutility of effort. Studies that add the consideration of private information to the 
double-sided moral hazard in the VC-entrepreneur relationship are, to the best of our 
knowledge, only a few. Houben (2002) models private information for both entrepreneur and 
VC, focusing on the endogenous determination of security type, to explain why redeemable 
and convertible preferred stocks are often used in VC finance. We also note that, in Amit et 
al. (1998), the entrepreneur‘s private information is on the venture‘s quality (and information 
asymmetry is resolved before an offer is made). In other words, the focus of these important 
works differs substantially from ours.  
Further, the literature on factors that affect firm valuation identifies entrepreneurial 
characteristics as the primary determinant, but our principal-agent formulation allows us to 
identify tradeoffs in the deal process that are generated by those characteristics. Also, while 
the valuation method literature uses the VC‘s ―gut feeling‖ to estimate the probability of 
successful exit, we instead formally represent the ―gut feeling‖ with a VC‘s belief on the 
minimum level of effort to be allocated by the entrepreneur in the new venture. Doing so 
enables us to capture the entrepreneur‘s private information and go one step further from 
Amit et al. (1998) (and others) to uncover how the deal process might unfold when the 
entrepreneur possesses private information. 




Moreover, in our proposed model the bargaining power lies with the VC. This setting, 
while fundamentally different from the optimal contract literature where entrepreneurs 
typically hold the bargaining power under complete information (e.g. Casamatta, 2003; Biais 
and Casamatta, 1999), better captures early-stage venturing. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) 
argue that, in early-stage ventures, information asymmetry is present, especially when the 
entrepreneur is inexperienced. Also, many scholars (Metrick, 2007; Koskinen, Rebello and 
Wang, 2009; Parker and van Praag, 2006; Desai, Gompers and Lerner, 2003) support that the 
VC determines the offer in early-stage ventures, not the entrepreneur. Even models of 
technology transfer (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Jensen, 
Thursby and Thursby, 2003), where an inventor-entrepreneur sells an invention and his/her 
efforts are still needed after the sale to commercialize it, do not have predictions transferable 
to our setting because the bargaining power lies with the inventor-entrepreneur, which also 
eliminates the need to consider private information on the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort.  
Our modeling approach further enables us to investigate the deal iteratively by letting 
the VC revise the investment offer rather than characterizing contract terms that are 
acceptable to all parties at once, a feature more representative of the optimal contract 
literature. Milestone-based cash-flow and control rights are integral parts of VC contracts and 
have been studied by a vast body of literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994), because these rights are necessary to mitigate agency costs and increase 
the chance that expected results would be achieved. Yet in the real world, the first step in VC 
contracting is valuing the venture in terms of simple equity (Metrick, 2007), which is the 
core of the so-called ―VC method.‖ VCs then determine the security type and these rights 
exogenously of valuation (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Metrick, 2007) depending primarily 
on the agency costs in the investment but also on tax rules, the VC‘s sophistication or 
experience, and market conditions (Cumming, 2005a, 2005b; Cumming & Johan, 2008). 
They may finally refine the valuation based on the security type and rights chosen (Metrick, 
2007). Our aim is to provide a theoretical explanation for valuation as used in the VC 
method, and as such scrutinize this first step thoroughly rather than look at the complete 
contract.  
2.3 A MODEL FOR DESCRIBING THE INVESTMENT PROCESS  
Consider an entrepreneur who seeks VC investment I for a new business venture. The VC 
requires an ownership share   (0,1) of the expected revenue R and may elect to pay a base 
salary b to the entrepreneur based on exogenous considerations (e.g., to enable the 
entrepreneur to meet his/her living expenses).
5
 The VC may also elect to offer advisory 
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 Payments like base salaries are also modeled in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002), and in Repullo and Suarez 
(2004), where surplus is transferred to the entrepreneur if VCs compete to obtain the deal. On the other hand, an 




service s post investment, noting that this variable cannot be explicitly included in the 
contract since it cannot easily be observed by the entrepreneur (thus making the contract 




The entrepreneur expects to allocate effort e to the funded venture (a variable that 
also cannot be explicitly included in the contract since it cannot easily be observed by the 
VC) and encounters a privately known disutility—and hence per unit cost  —from 
allocating effort. This cost, termed unit cost of effort, depends on multiple factors. Zider 
(1998) describes the profile of an ideal entrepreneur from a VC‘s perspective, much of which 
pertains to entrepreneurial effort that depends on factors like commitment and competence. 
Hence,   depends on the entrepreneur‘s commitment, competence and, accordingly, 
preference for work. Lack of commitment arises when the entrepreneur benefits from private 
actions not aligned with the VC‘s interest (Hart and Moore, 1999), or when the entrepreneur 
has not yet completely given up prior wage work and is thus involved in ―hybrid 
entrepreneurship‖ (Folta, Delmar and Wennberg, 2010). Lack of competence arises when the 
entrepreneur does not know where to direct his/her effort without the VC‘s guidance. The 
more the entrepreneur lacks commitment and competence, and the less he/she likes to work, 
the higher is  .  
Expected revenues are positively associated with the entrepreneur‘s effort level and 
the VC‘s service level (both with diminishing returns; Amit et al., 1998); that is, R = R(e,s). 
Denoting partial first-order derivatives with a single suffix and partial second-order 
derivatives with a double suffix, the marginal productivities of the entrepreneur (  ) and the 
VC (  ) are thus positive, whereas the effect of effort level on    (i.e.,    ) and that of 
service level on    (i.e.,    ) are negative. Valliere and Peterson (2007) also observed that, as 
an entrepreneur gains experience, he/she increasingly values teamwork (i.e., compatibility) 
with the VC. The two parties are unlikely to enter into a contract if they do not expect to 
work well together.
7
 Therefore, the expected interactions between entrepreneurial effort and 
VC service (    and    ) are positive, and since entrepreneurial effort is essential to an early-
stage venture (e.g., Hellmann, 2007), no revenue is expected in its absence. Formally,  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
entrepreneur‘s decision to accept a base salary could consider the tradeoffs between personal-income and 
capital-gains taxes, and the realization of current income versus greater equity (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2002).  
6
 The VC can also outsource service to a paid ―entrepreneur-in-residence or EIR‖ (Schwarzkopf, Lévesque and 
Maxwell, 2010, offer an exploratory study on the roles of EIRs) or a business service provider. The level of 
service meant here is the VC‘s time spent for each of the portfolio ventures by way of direct involvement or 
supervision of the provider. Through outsourcing, the VC can boost time effectiveness, thus increasing  , but 
total service cost    might decrease.  
7
 We note that the findings of Hart and Moore (2008), where parties enter into a contract not anticipating ex post 
incompatibility, are not transferable to our study, because uncertainty is resolved at the time of signing the final 
contract (in our study the uncertainty is never fully resolved).     




     ,       ,        ,        ,         ,        ,   and    R(0,s) = 0. (1)  
The revenue function R is known to both parties since the VC has conducted due diligence 
over the proposed venture and the entrepreneur, and since the entrepreneur has proposed the 
venture and presumably acquired background information on the VC (Zider, 1998). Thus, 
both parties know the information in Eq. (1) prior to the first offer.  
 
 
2.3.1 The VC’s Problem 
The VC‘s problem is to determine the ownership share    to claim and the service level    to 
expect to allocate. This is resolved in three steps: Step 1, the VC derives an equation in  ,  , 
and   from his/her objective function in which the VC maximizes total return PV from 
his/her portfolio of ventures; Step 2, the VC derives another equation in  ,  , and   from 
his/her participation constraint in which the VC requires an adequate return from the 
proposed (focal) venture; Step 3, the VC takes on a belief about   and solves the above two 
equations for the remaining two unknowns,   and  . We next expand on how these three 
steps formally proceed. 
In Step 1, consider PV = V + v, where V is the VC‘s expected return from the focal 
venture and v is that from the remainder of the portfolio. Since the VC can only alter service 
levels across ventures in order to maximize PV, and denoting the total amount of service at 
the VC‘s disposal as S, we obtain PV(s) = V(s) + v(S-s). The first-order condition for 
optimality is PVs = Vs – vS-s = 0, which leads to the solution Vs = vS-s = c, where marginal 
return to service c (≥ 0) is equal across all ventures in the portfolio. Since V (if the deal 
closes) is the excess of the VC‘s share of revenues over the base salary paid to the 
entrepreneur, investment amount, and cost of service, it can be expressed as 
                    . (2) 
It follows from Eq. (2) and the above solution that  
                    or, equivalently,             
   
 
, (3) 
and from Eq. (1) and Eq. (3) that             . That is, expected return is concave in 
service for the focal venture (and also for the non-focal ventures since the return function of 
any venture is analogous to Eq. 2). Hence, PVss = Vss + vS-sS-s < 0 and the second-order 
condition for optimality is satisfied. Step 1 therefore yields Eq. (3) in  ,   and   (given   and 
 ), where s is unique because R is concave in s per Eq. (1) and the feasible set of solutions 
(     ) is compact. Petty and Gruber (in press) also argue that VCs are time-constrained 




(i.e., c > 0) and that the composition of a VC portfolio and the time allocated by the VC to 
manage the portfolio are key decision-making criteria. 
In Step 2, let r be the VC‘s cost of capital over the contract‘s life. The VC‘s 
participation constraint, which holds if the VC receives an adequate return on investment 
(considering the base salary paid to the entrepreneur as well as the cost of service), is 
expressed as 
                       . (4) 
The excess of the left-hand side of Eq. (4) over the right-hand side represents the excess 
profit P from investing in the venture. That is,  
                            . (5) 
The VC obtains a second equation in  ,   and   using Eq. (5) with P = 0 (given  ,  ,  , 
and ). The constraint in Eq. (5) is binding, for if the entrepreneur believes that P > 0, then 
there is still room for the entrepreneur to reject the offer claiming that it is unattractive. The 
VC cannot know for sure whether or not the offer is unattractive to the entrepreneur because 
the latter possesses private information about his/her disutility of effort. Yet, all else equal, 
the VC knows that an increase in P will lead to an increase in his/her ownership share α in 
Eq. (5) and a decrease in the entrepreneur‘s return (in Eq. 6 introduced below). 
Consequently, the constraint in Eq. (5) is binding with P = 0. 
In Step 3, the VC forms a belief that the entrepreneur will at least allocate a certain 
minimum level of effort       to the new venture (a level that is not necessarily ―low‖), 
which enables the VC to consider the entrepreneur‘s private information regarding the 
disutility of entrepreneurial effort. The VC‘s belief refers to the effective effort level where 
results are achieved, not nominal effort that only accounts for the number of hours spent on 
the job. An entrepreneur may not achieve adequate results despite working long hours due to, 
for instance, a lack of business competence required to transform a technical idea into a 
commercial product. Since the VC is only likely to invest if he/she can compute an adequate 
expected return, a first consequence of this assumption of a minimum effort level       is 
that the VC may demand an ownership share above what the entrepreneur may like to 
concede (this may happen when the VC underestimates that level). Another is that some 
worthy entrepreneurs will not be funded (negotiations can fail under information asymmetry; 
Muthoo, 1999) or will be offered deals found inefficient ex-post (i.e., the terms of agreements 
fail to realize the potential gains, making the negotiation costly). Nevertheless, letting the VC 
form such a belief can ex-ante be an efficient approach to establishing a common 
informational basis for an agreement (Kennen and Wilson, 1993). With        , the VC 
solves Eq. (3) and Eq. (5) for the remaining two unknowns and obtains  * and α* (given r, I, 
w, c and b). The VC then makes the offer        to the entrepreneur, expecting to allocate 




service  * for     , as will be numerically illustrated below after describing the 
entrepreneur‘s problem. 
2.3.2 The Entrepreneur’s Problem 
The entrepreneur must decide whether to accept the offer or not, which he/she also does in 
three steps: Step 1, the entrepreneur forms rational expectations about    and       using the 
offer terms and background information on the VC; Step 2, the entrepreneur computes the 
effort level    to be allocated (given   ) from his/her objective function in which the 
entrepreneur maximizes his/her return E from the focal venture; Step 3, the entrepreneur 
decides to accept the offer or not from his/her two participation constraints in which    
      and    . We now expand on how these three steps formally proceed.  
In Step 1, because the service level selected by the VC and his/her belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s effort are not explicitly included in the contract, the entrepreneur must form 
rational expectations about    and       based on solving Eq. (5) (with P = 0) and Eq. (3), 
given   , b, r, I, w and c. We note that sharing information with the entrepreneur on the VC‘s 
cost of capital r, cost of time w, and marginal return to service c is in the interest of the VC 
because an uninformed entrepreneur might reject an offer that is attractive to both parties, or 
accept an unattractive offer that might lead to friction post-deal. 
In Step 2, the entrepreneur expects a return E from the venture, which is the sum of 
the base salary and the excess of his/her share of revenues over the cost of effort, that is 
                   . (6) 
The first-order condition for optimality of Eq. (6) yields the entrepreneur‘s incentive 
compatibility constraint: 
        
           or, equivalently,       
      
 
    
 . (7) 
From Eq. (1) and Eq. (6),         
        and the second-order condition for 
optimality is satisfied. Eq. (7) yields an optimal effort level    (given   ,  , and   ), which is 
unique because E is concave in e (i.e.,      ) and the feasible set of solutions is compact 
(i.e.,        , where     is the entrepreneur‘s best effort). 
 In Step 3, the entrepreneur decides on whether or not to accept the investment offer. 
The entrepreneur must decline that offer if         (though E may be positive) because the 
VC‘s excess profit P would be negative in Eq. (5), again potentially leading to friction post-
deal; we note that clauses to be enforced in the contract to protect the interests of the VC 
should also encourage the entrepreneur to reject the offer. If        , the entrepreneur 
must compute E in Eq. (6) (given b,   , e*, s*, and  ) and accept the offer whenever E ≥ 0. 




 When the entrepreneur rejects the offer, the VC may alter the terms with a revised 
ownership share by updating his/her belief on     . But since this belief is uncertain, it 
belongs to a particular interval. The VC can thus make the initial offer with a belief that 
corresponds to the lower bound of the interval, and iteratively revise that offer until the upper 
bound of the interval has been reached. An update of this belief can even be justified since a 
rejection signals that the VC might have been too conservative. We note, however, that the 
VC‘s belief is an assessment that is crucial to protect an investment with uncertain return. 
There might not be much room for a revision (i.e., a small interval), but if rejected again, this 
iterative process could repeat itself until a mutually agreeable deal is reached. Also, when the 
entrepreneur accepts the offer and his/her optimal effort level e
*
 exceeds the VC‘s belief on 
emin, the venture‘s revenue will exceed what had been anticipated by the VC.  
2.3.3 An Illustrative Example 
We illustrate how the investment deal unfolds by first setting the VC‘s belief on       at 
1,000 hours/year and study the deal outcomes for a range of the entrepreneur‘s privately 
known unit cost of effort, ω. Then, we fix ω at $3,000/hour and study the deal outcomes for a 
range of values for     .  
We use            
      
    , where      for i  {1,2},         for 
       ,        and       , which satisfies the assumptions of our model. This 
functional form is adapted from Fairchild (in press) to permit revenue generation even in the 
absence of VC service. More specifically,   = 10,000,    = 10,000,   = 0.85,   = 0.80,   = 
0.15, r =15%, I = $2 million, b = $50,000, w = $1,500 per hour of service, c = $500 per hour 
of service, and eUB = 4,000 hours/year (around 80 hours/week) for the entrepreneur‘s best 
effort.
8
 An investment of $2 million and a contract life of 1 year are considered, although 
these figures can be altered without affecting our results qualitatively. The other values for 
the VC-related parameters r, I, w and c are determined from relevant literature. Indeed, 
Metrick (2007) estimates the cost of venture capital as 15%
.
 The selected cost for the VC‘s 
time w corresponds to an annual income of $3 million (at 2000 hours/year) to be brought 
back by the VC to his/her VC firm, again in line with Metrick (2007). The positive marginal 
return to service c accounts for the possibility of a time-constrained VC. The investment-
related parameters b, k1, k2, ε1, ε2 and σ are assigned values consistent with a $2 million 
investment.  
                                                          
8
 We use number of hours (a nominal effort level) as the unit of measure for both the entrepreneur‘s (effective) 
effort level and the VC‘s service level for ease of exposition. 




For a range of the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω, Table 2.1 illustrates the deal 
initiation process with      set at 1,000 hours/year.
9
 The VC‘s offer is the same irrespective 
of the entrepreneur‘s private information because it only depends on the VC‘s belief on emin. 
The VC asks for an ownership share of 30% and expects to offer 112 hours/year of service 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989, found that VCs typically spend about 110 hours per portfolio 
firm per year). In scenarios 1 to 4, ω is low and the deal should close for two reasons: the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level e
*
 is more than emin; and the entrepreneur is expected to 
experience a large return. In fact, the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort is so low that e
*
 far 
exceeds the best effort (i.e., 4,000 hours/year). In scenarios 7 to 9, on the other hand, the unit 
cost of effort is high and the deal should not close because e
*
 is exceeded by emin. Further, the 
VC would experience a loss if the offer had been accepted.   
 
TABLE 2.1 




unit cost of 
effort in $/hr, 
ω 
Entrepreneur‘s optimal effort 
level for the given offer in hr 
(which cannot exceed 4,000), 
e* 
Entrepreneur‘s 












































8,000 75 182 Reject -2,223 
 
† The VC‘s offer remains constant (30% in ownership share and 112 hours/year of service) because it only depends on his/her belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin. 
 
 
For a range of the VC‘s belief on emin, Table 2.2 illustrates the deal initiation process 
with the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω set at $3,000/hour. As emin varies, the VC‘s offer 
                                                          
9
 Numerical values in Tables 1 and 2 for the endogenous parameters are those anticipated respectively by the 
VC and the entrepreneur at the time of signing the deal, not necessarily actual figures observed in the funded 
venture. 




varies. When the VC is not confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance (that is, emin is 
extremely low), the VC should not make an offer.
10
 In this example, as the VC‘s belief 
improves, he/she should be willing to demand a lower ownership share and allocate a lower 
service level. As a result, the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level and expected return should 
increase, with the former being subject to the 4,000 hours/year upper bound. But the 
entrepreneur should reject the offer, unless the optimal effort level exceeds emin and his/her 
expected return is positive. 
                                                          
10
 The deal might still go though even when the entrepreneur only puts in roughly 4 hours for every hour of the 
VC effort due to positive returns to both parties (e.g., the venture is highly profitable). 





Illustrative Example of the Investment Deal Process: ω is set at $3,000/hour 
 
VC‘s belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum 
effort level in hr, 
emin 
VC‘s service 






effort level in hr (which 
cannot exceed 4,000) 
e* 
Entrepreneur‘s 












1 129.073 > 1 (infeasible) NA
†
 NA No offer made NA NA 
200 115.831 > 1 (infeasible) NA NA No offer made NA NA 
250 115.253 0.9099 0 50 Reject -2,523 -2,473 
300 114.780 0.7837 24 66 Reject -2,206 -2,140 
350 114.379 0.6907 177 167 Reject -1,086 -919 
400 114.032 0.6191 562 420 Accept 815 1,235 
450 113.725 0.5621 1,224 853 Accept 3,217 4,069 
500 113.450 0.5156 2,152 1,458 Accept 5,845 7,303 
550 113.201 0.4769 3,311 2,213 Accept 8,501 10,714 
575 113.085 0.4598 3,964 2,637 Accept 9,798 12,435 
576 113.080 0.4592 3,991 2,654 Accept 9,849 12,504 
577 113.076 0.4585 4,000 2,672 Accept 9,855 12,527 
580 113.062 0.4566 4,000 2,724 Accept 9,802 12,526 
585 113.040 0.4534 4,000 2,810 Accept 9,715 12,526 
600 112.973 0.4441 4,000 3,061 Accept 9,464 12,525 
650 112.764 0.4159 4,000 3,820 Accept 8,701 12,521 
700 112.570 0.3914 4,000 4,479 Accept 8,038 12,517 
1000 111.634 0.2921 4,000 7,144 Accept 5,355 12,499 
2000 109.808 0.1654 4,000 10,529 Accept 1,934 12,464 
 
† Not applicable 




The richness of such a table is to look for patterns as we illustrate the investment deal 
process. The upper bound on the entrepreneur‘s effort level yields interesting observations. If 
the VC‘s belief on emin keeps improving beyond a certain point, the entrepreneur reaches the 
upper bound (i.e., best effort level). At that upper bound, although the VC may be ready to 
concede a larger ownership share to the entrepreneur, such a generous offer cannot increase 
the entrepreneur‘s level of effort further. Consequently, the VC‘s expected return starts to 
decrease, although the entrepreneur‘s expected return keeps increasing due to an increase in 
his/her ownership share. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 2.2, where the VC‘s excess 
profit peaks for a ―critical‖ emin.
11
 This phenomenon is also captured in that table for the sum 
of VC‘s excess profit P and entrepreneur‘s expected return E, namely the investment-deal 
welfare W.  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 further show that the entrepreneur may accept the first offer 
without renegotiation. The VC may therefore fall prey to overpayment by taking a lower 
ownership share than necessary to get the offer accepted, because deals that are inefficient 
ex-post can take place under information asymmetry (Kennen and Wilson, 1993; Muthoo, 
1999). The VC may reduce the probability of such overpayment by setting emin low and then 
revising it as necessary. However, overpayments are not necessarily undesirable for the VC. 
For instance, referring to Table 2.2, the VC‘s excess profit   increases up to a critical point 
where emin equals 577 as the VC increasingly overpays and the entrepreneur increasingly 
gains. This counterintuitive situation arises because the entrepreneur‘s effort level increases 
when he/she is given a higher ownership share leading to an increase in the revenue and, as a 
result, the VC‘s gain is higher from the enlarged pie, in spite of a diminished share of the pie. 
Thus, any VC wishing to enhance post-deal excess profit should be willing to overpay.  
However, the entrepreneur‘s private information prevents the VC from knowing a 
priori the critical emin (where his/her post-deal excess profit is maximized). Consequently, 
systematically overpaying in the hope that he/she can gain more effort from the entrepreneur 
and increase the size of the pie is not viable. A good strategy for the VC might thus be to 
demand a moderate ownership share to enhance the chance that he/she overpays (i.e., the 
offer is accepted) and stays close to the peak excess profit.  
In the next section we go a step further by investigating the conditions under which a 
rejected offer should be revised. We put forward three revision strategies (1. do not revise the 
offer; 2. revise the offer by reducing the VC ownership share α; 3. revise the offer by 
increasing the entrepreneur‘s base salary b) and illustrate on a two-dimensional space when 
each strategy is optimal to use. This additional analysis allows us to unearth the importance 
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 The excess profit is set to zero while determining the offer, but actual (i.e., post-deal) excess profit will 
typically be positive (because e
* 
> emin).  




of not only the magnitude of a VC‘s ownership share on investment offers, which has been 
well recognized in the extant literature in entrepreneurial finance (e.g., Metrick, 2007; 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Amit et al., 1998; Bernile et al., 2007; Casamatta, 2003), but 
also the importance of the magnitude of the change in the VC‘s service level as his/her 
beliefs improve regarding the entrepreneur‘s effort level. 
2.4 REVISING THE INVESTMENT DEAL 
When the entrepreneur rejects the VC‘s investment offer and there is an opportunity for 
revising the deal, the VC can decrease his or her ownership share α, and keep the same base 
salary b, or increase b and keep α unchanged.
12
 However, since these decisions depend on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin, that level becomes the main determinant of the 
offer terms. The VC can revise the offer as long as there is room for upwardly adjusting the 
minimum effort level. In other words, α can go down, or b can go up, but emin needs to 
increase because it balances back the loss to the VC. We first look at necessary and sufficient 
conditions for revising the offer when b is kept fixed. In this case, a change in emin alters both 
the VC‘s service level s and ownership share α, and we must thus consider this dual impact 
to obtain Proposition 1.
13
  
Proposition 1:  
Case (i). The marginal change ds/demin in the VC’s service level, as the VC upwardly 
revises his/her belief on emin, is negative. Then a rejected offer should be revised 
if and only if this change exceeds a lower bound. The lower bound depends on 
the value of the ownership share claimed by the VC in the rejected offer. 
Case (ii). The marginal change ds/demin in the VC’s service level, as the VC upwardly 
revises his/her belief on emin, is positive. Then a rejected offer should be revised 
if and only if this change is below an upper bound. The upper bound does not 
depend on the value of the ownership share claimed by the VC in the rejected 
offer. 
When the change ds/demin in the VC‘s service level per additional unit of the VC‘s 
belief on emin is very negative and below a (negative) threshold, the decrease in expected 
revenue from a reduced service level (due to a higher emin) and the reduced return from a 
lower ownership share outweigh the saving in service cost. As a result, revising the offer is 
                                                          
12
 It is not clear if VCs revise offers by increasing base salary (since a higher base salary would pose a risk of a 
larger loss to the VC in the event of venture failure). In fact, one of our VC contacts informed us that they do 
not. Nevertheless, our survey of VCs (reported in Chapter 4) revealed that the size of the base salary offered can 
influence whether the deal will close. Since it is not inconceivable that offers may be revised by increasing base 
salary, we include this analysis. However, that inclusion does not imply that we recommend this kind of 
revision.  
13
 Proofs of all propositions appear in the appendix. 




unattractive to the VC. The lower threshold on the change in service level also translates into 
a lower threshold for the VC‘s ownership share, and hence revising the deal is unattractive to 
the VC unless the ownership share granted remains substantial. Similarly, when the change 
in service level (from an increase in emin) is positive and exceeds an upper threshold, the cost 
of service increases considerably. At the same time, a reduced ownership share further 
diminishes the VC‘s return, making the revision unattractive.  
The specifics of the thresholds on the change in service level ds/demin depend on the 
sign of that change (as specified in Appendix B). Worth noting are the numerous other 
factors (i.e., other than the VC‘s ownership share as per the rejected offer) that affect these 
thresholds, including: the marginal return to VC service; the marginal productivity of the 
entrepreneur (as per the VC‘s belief); the effect of entrepreneurial effort on the marginal 
productivity of the VC (as per the VC‘s belief); and the effect of service level on the 
marginal productivity of the VC. For instance, if the marginal productivity of the 
entrepreneur (as per the VC‘s belief) increases, everything else being equal, the threshold on 
the (negative) service level change is relaxed and revising the offer likely becomes more 
attractive to the VC. However, if the effect of service level on the marginal productivity of 
the VC increases (i.e., it becomes more negative), everything else being equal, the threshold 
on the (positive) service level change becomes tighter and revising the offer likely becomes 
less attractive. Overall, a larger VC‘s ownership share as per the rejected offer, a smaller 
marginal return to VC service, a larger marginal productivity of the entrepreneur (as per the 
VC‘s belief), a larger effect of entrepreneurial effort on the marginal productivity of the VC 
(as per the VC‘s belief), and/or a smaller (negative) effect of service level on the marginal 
productivity of the VC should encourage the VC to revise the offer by reducing his or her 
ownership share. 
We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the change in service 
level ds/demin is positive. Specifically, that change is positive when the VC‘s productivity per 
additional unit of emin is above a critical threshold (formally, 
  
     
    if and only if 
       
       
 
 , as shown in Appendix B). The rationale is that, when the VC‘s 
productivity is large enough, the increase in revenue due to increased service offsets the 
increase in the cost of service, encouraging a positive change in service level. 
Proposition 2, instead, highlights a necessary and sufficient condition under which 
revising a rejected offer should take place when the VC‘s ownership share  is kept fixed but 
the base salary b is increased. Contrary to Proposition 1, we note in this case that, although 
the VC‘s belief on emin is still a key determinant of the offer terms, whether or not the offer 
should be revised is unaffected by the adjustment made on that minimum effort level. We do 




verify, nevertheless, that the VC‘s service level should increase with an upward adjustment 
in emin (i.e., 
  
     
  is always positive).  
Proposition 2: Revising the deal by increasing the entrepreneur‘s base salary should take 
place if and only if the VC‘s ownership share exceeds a critical threshold.  
Since the initial investment offer was made based on no excess profit, an increase in 
the base salary is desirable only if the VC‘s share of revenues increases over and above the 
additional cost of service arising from an upward adjustment in the VC‘s belief on emin. As a 
result, the VC‘s ownership share must exceed a certain threshold. That threshold depends on 
the following: the unit cost of service, the VC‘s marginal productivity and the effect of 
service level on that productivity, the entrepreneur‘s marginal productivity (as per the VC‘s 
belief), and the effect of the entrepreneur‘s effort on the marginal productivity of the VC (as 
per the VC‘s belief). Specifically, a lower cost for the VC‘s time, a higher productivity for 
the VC, a smaller (negative) effect of service level on that productivity, a larger effect of the 
entrepreneur‘s effort on the marginal productivity of the VC (as per the VC‘s belief), and/or a 
higher entrepreneurial productivity should encourage a revision by increasing the base salary.  
Figure 2.1 summarizes when and how the decision to revise the offer should take 
place based on Propositions 1 and 2, while Table 2.3 summarizes our sensitivity analysis on 
whether or not the decision to revise is more likely to happen based on how a change in a key 
model parameter affects the various critical thresholds. Figure 2.1 also shows the directions 
in which those thresholds should move to increase the likelihood of revising. These revision 
strategies complement existing literature (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Pintado et al., 2007; 
Zutshi, 1999) by emphasizing the role played by not only the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur but also those of the VC (service level) in firm valuation and expected returns. 
Also, we note that Propositions 1 and 2 result from the moral hazard arising from the VC, 
because the conditions for whether or not to revise an offer are born from the constraints he 
or she faces. But the need to revise arises from the constraints of the entrepreneur as he or 




































  Ownership share claimed by the VC in the rejected offer 
ds/demin   Marginal change in the VC‘s service level as the VC upwardly revises his/ her belief on emin 
  Threshold on the change in the VC‘s service level when that change is positive 
()  Threshold on the change in the VC‘s service level when that change is negative 
  Threshold on the VC‘s ownership share when that share is fixed 
b  The entrepreneur‘s base salary 
a.1 & a.2  Regions where the strategy ―Do not revise the offer‖ applies 
b.1 & b.2  Regions where the strategy ―Revise the offer by reducing ‖ applies 
b.3 & b.4  Regions where the strategy ―Revise the offer by reducing  or increasing b‖ applies 
c.1 & c.2  Regions where the strategy ―Revise the offer by increasing b‖ applies 
Mathematical expressions for the thresholds are detailed in Appendix B. The block arrows show the direction in which those thresholds 
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Sensitivity of the Decision to Revise the Investment Offer 
 
Increase in the parameter 
The probability of selecting 
Revision Strategy 1: 
Do not revise the offer 
(a.1 + a.2) 
Revision Strategy 2: 
Revise the offer by reducing the 
VC‘s ownership share  
(b.1 + b.2 + b.3 + b.4) 
Revision Strategy 3: 
Revise the offer by increasing the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary b 
(c.1 + c.2 + b.3 + b.4) 
      :  effect of the entrepreneur‘s effort on the 
marginal productivity of the VC (as per the 
VC‘s belief) 
 
a measure of teamwork 
Decreases Increases Increases 
     :     effect of service level on the marginal 
productivity of the VC 
Increases Decreases Decreases 
     :   marginal productivity of the entrepreneur (as 
per the VC‘s belief) 
Decreases Increases Increases 
  :         marginal productivity of the VC Decreases No change Increases 
:          VC‘s ownership share in the rejected offer Decreases Increases No change 
c:           marginal return to service  
 
a measure of the VC‘s time constraint 
Increases Decreases No change 
w:          unit cost of service  Increases No change Decreases 
 




2.5 IMPACTS OF THE BASE SALARY  
We bring our analysis of the VC investment deal process to an end by fixing the VC‘s belief 
on the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level     . We do this to study the influence of the 
base salary b (paid to the entrepreneur) on the VC‘s ownership share  and on the VC‘s 
service level s, as well as the influence of b on the entrepreneur‘s effort level e and return E, 
the VC‘s excess profit P, and on the investment-deal welfare W (= P + E). In the absence of a 
steady income, a base salary may be necessary for the entrepreneur. But whether an increase 
in its magnitude causes both parties‘ returns to be better or worse is unclear. Proposition 3 
articulates our findings.  
Proposition 3: Everything else being equal, if the VC increases the entrepreneur‘s base 
salary, then that VC‘s ownership share and service level should increase. The resulting 
increase in the VC‘s ownership share does not necessarily decrease the entrepreneur‘s 
optimal effort level, nor does the increase in the base salary necessarily increase the 
entrepreneur‘s return, decrease the VC‘s excess profit, or decrease the investment-deal 
welfare.  
When the VC increases the entrepreneur‘s base salary (yet keeping      fixed), the 
VC must increase his or her ownership share to keep the excess profit non-negative. Since 
the VC must also satisfy the portfolio value-maximizing constraint (incentive compatibility 
constraint) in Eq. (3), the VC‘s marginal productivity decreases due to the increase in 
ownership share. The service level s must then increase due to the decreasing nature of the 
VC‘s productivity as s increases.  
Although the literature supports that an increase in the VC‘s ownership share should 
decrease the entrepreneur‘s incentive to allocate more effort (e.g., Amit et al., 1998), prior 
work has ignored the positive impact of the VC‘s service level on the entrepreneur‘s 
productivity, which can encourage the entrepreneur to allocate more effort. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneur‘s return may decrease in spite of an increase in the base salary because the 
entrepreneur‘s ownership share decreases. We also note that, even though the entrepreneur‘s 
base salary is a direct loss to the VC and paying a base salary above the ongoing market 
wage may attract the wrong kind of entrepreneurs, the VC can still benefit from increasing it 
because the VC‘s increase in ownership share may result in a larger excess profit.  
These observations add to the entrepreneurial finance literature, which has been 
limited regarding the importance of entrepreneurial salaries. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001, 
2002) and Repullo and Suarez (2003) have modeled upfront payments, although they 
rationalize them based on the surplus transferred to the entrepreneur when VCs compete to 
obtain an investment deal. This surplus is, however, only available if a VC has made an offer 
while facing a positive excess profit. Then, for a given ownership share, the VC can offer a 




base salary as high as that excess profit. But, as per our findings, such excess can instead be 
transferred by increasing the entrepreneur‘s ownership share. We already noted that the VC‘s 
ownership share increases when a base salary is paid at zero excess profit. Thus, a base salary 
costs the entrepreneur some of his or her ownership share whether the offer is made at a 
surplus or at no excess profit.  
2.6 CONCLUSION  
Entrepreneurship scholars (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Messica, 2008; Levie and Gimmon, 
2008) suggest that entrepreneurial characteristics (the outcome of which is the level of effort 
allocated by the investment-seeking entrepreneur) are crucial to firm valuation and, in turn, 
the VC‘s expected return and desire to invest. We therefore studied the VC investment deal 
process based on those characteristics, the conditions that encourage a rejected offer to be 
revised, and when and whether the entrepreneur and/or the VC can benefit from including a 
base salary for the entrepreneur as part of the deal. We now address strategy implications 
based on our findings, and conclude with a discussion of some limitations of our study and 
opportunities for future work. 
Making entrepreneurial characteristics more transparent can benefit 
entrepreneurs. Our illustrative example (Table 2.2) suggested the existence of a critical value 
for the VC‘s belief on the entrepreneur‘s level of effort emin, where the VC‘s excess profit 
and the investment-deal welfare (total of net returns to both parties) reach an optimal value. 
The VC would not want to be in the region above this critical value since in that region the 
entrepreneur would—to the detriment of the VC—take an increasingly larger share of the 
value created by the venture. Nevertheless, since Table 2.2 suggests that the entrepreneur‘s 
ownership share and return might increase with an increase in emin, the entrepreneur may find 
that informing the VC about his or her entrepreneurial characteristics (thereby diminishing 
the amount of private information and increasing the VC‘s confidence) is in that 
entrepreneur‘s best interest. 
Service rendered and teamwork may be crucial to VC investment. Our propositions1 
and 2 also propose that the VC be encouraged to revise the offer when he/she can maintain a 
high level of productivity even at high levels of service (sensitivity in Table 2.3 on Rss). This 
implication from our model is consistent with Hsu‘s (2004) work, where entrepreneurs are 
found to accept lower valuation for a highly reputed VC, suggesting that the ‗quality‘ of the 
VC is important. VCs of higher ‗quality‘ possess greater expertise that enables them to 
maintain higher levels of productivity, even at high levels of service. Further, if service 
allocated by the VC enhances the entrepreneur‘s marginal productivity (and vice versa)—i.e., 
they work well together (sensitivity in Table 2.3 on       )—then the VC would be 
encouraged to revise the offer. These observations complement the findings of Valliere and 




Peterson (2007), where teamwork between the VC and the entrepreneur has also been found 
crucial in VC financing. Our analysis therefore further complements this literature by 
characterizing conditions that should encourage an investment offer to be revised, if rejected, 
based on both the importance of service level exercised by the VC and the teamwork of the 
parties involved.  
VCs’ time constraints may discourage them from revising their offers. Proposition 1 
further shows that the threshold on the ownership share is expected to augment with an 
increase in the marginal return to service (sensitivity in Table 2.3 on c), making a revision 
less likely. Existing literature has not yet uncovered this insight on the impact of the marginal 
return to service on deal closing. Although the need for VCs to claim an ownership share is 
well-documented (Amit et al., 1998), what characterizes the actual level (and the threshold to 
exceed) is still under scrutiny.  
Industry specialization may encourage VCs to close more deals. The preference of 
the entrepreneur for high productivity on the part of the VC at high levels of service 
necessitates a high ‗quality‘ VC, as noted in the previous implication. The VC can alleviate 
this pressure on himself/herself by specializing in a few industries and, as a result, be more 
productive to the invested ventures, even at high levels of service. Specialization would then 
encourage VCs to revise their offers more often and potentially invest in more ventures. This 
implication is consistent with existing literature, including Norton and Tenenbaum (1993), 
where VCs have been observed to specialize rather than diversify.  
Entrepreneurs may lose, yet VCs gain from the payment of a base salary. Proposition 
3 proposes that the entrepreneur may be worse off (in terms of expected return), yet the VC 
better off (in terms of excess profit), when the entrepreneur receives a base salary. Scholars, 
including Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001, 2002) and Repullo and Suarez (2003) have claimed 
that, when VCs compete for a deal, a base salary should be offered to transfer surplus to the 
entrepreneur to the detriment of the VC. However, our analysis suggests that, independently 
of whether or not competition is present, the payment of a base salary can favor the VC due 
to its influence on the VC‘s ownership share and on both VC‘s service level and 
entrepreneur‘s effort level.   
But if you pay them well, be ready to put more effort. Proposition 3 also suggests that, 
everything else being equal, if the VC pays a base salary to the entrepreneur, then the VC‘s 
service level should increase; in other words, they are not substitutes. Although this appears 
counter-intuitive, we first note that the VC claims a higher ownership share when paying a 
base salary. Consequently, the VC has to supply more service to maximize his or her 
portfolio value. For the entrepreneur, his or her ownership share decreases with the 
acceptance of a base salary, yet the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level may not decrease 




because the VC supplies more service, which in turn tends to increase the entrepreneur‘s 
effort level (due to teamwork between both parties). The literature has dealt with base salary 
payment (e.g., Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001), but the impacts of such payments on the 
effort levels of the VC and of the entrepreneur have not been as deeply scrutinized. 
While our analysis is theoretical and based on mathematical reasoning, the underlying 
tradeoffs we have used and those we have uncovered are familiar in the entrepreneurship 
literature. Nevertheless, our principal-agent model has allowed us to effectively capture the 
double-sided moral hazard present in the investment deal, and consider the private 
information held by the entrepreneur, while investigating the sensitivity of the investment 
offer as the VC alters his/her belief on the entrepreneur‘s effort level. More specifically, we 
have unearthed the importance of not only the magnitude of a VC‘s ownership share, but also 
of the marginal change in that VC‘s service level as he/she alters that belief (Figure 2.1 and 
Table 2.3). We have also added some rigor by offering a formalized iterative process of the 
deal, which is in sync with the so-called VC method and has predictions consistent with 
empirical outcomes. Particularly, we show that a VC uncertain about the entrepreneur‘s 
effort does not need to offer a share just above zero, because his/her excess profit (post-deal) 
does not need to monotonically increase as the entrepreneur‘s share decreases. For instance, 
Metrick (2007) argues that VCs may estimate a probability of successful exit well above 
zero, while Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) suggest that VCs typically only require a moderate 
ownership share.   
Our arguments, however, have limitations because they are based on some modeling 
assumptions. For instance, a lack of teamwork (i.e.,         and/or        ) may arise. 
Relaxing the teamwork assumption would add flexibility to our insights, even though the vast 
majority of deals involve fairly thorough assessments to ensure teamwork. Also, inspired by 
our framework and simulation that reveal the presence of a deal-welfare-maximizing 
ownership share, future research could focus on how to design contracts (maybe with 
milestone payments) that can maximize investment-deal welfare in the presence of private 
information on the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort. As our simulation demonstrated, while 
determining the investment offer the use of ―gut feeling‖ instead of milestone payments can 
result in a suboptimal ownership share (from the view point of maximizing either the VC‘s 
excess profit or the investment-deal welfare). Further research on the investment-deal 
phenomenon would certainly uncover more insights on the VC-entrepreneur relationship and 









Properties of the Venture Capital Deal Space 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we report the simulation study based on our theoretical model of Chapter 2.
14
 
We used wide domains for the model parameters so that the simulation study covers all 
practically relevant regions of the VC investment deal space. Using quasi-randomly 
generated parameters, we computed deal outcomes. We used the resulting synthetic data to 
verify our suggestion in Chapter 2 that there may exist a ―critical‖ point in the VC‘s belief 
about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit as 
well as the investment deal welfare; we also used the data for regression analyses to uncover 
insights that the theoretical model does not readily reveal (sensitivity analysis through 
algebraic derivations is not possible for some deal outcomes). Finally, we synthesized the 
findings to answer some practically relevant questions.    
 In §3.2, we describe the Monte-Carlo method that we used for the simulations. While 
in §3.3 we provide a description of our simulation study, we report our regression analyses in 
§3.4. We answer some practically interesting questions and identify implications for practice 
in §3.5 and conclude in §3.6. The pseudo-code and the computer codes used for the 
simulations are furnished in Appendices C and D.     
3.2 MONTE CARLO METHODS 
Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is a class of computational algorithms that rely on repeated 
random sampling to compute results. Metropolis and Ulam (1949), among the earliest 
pioneers of the method, described the method as summarized here:  (a) Define a domain of 
possible inputs; (b) Generate inputs randomly from the domain using a specific probability 
distribution; (c) Perform a deterministic computation using the inputs; and (d) Aggregate the 
results of the individual computations into the final result. Two key properties of MC 
simulation are: the computation's reliance on good random numbers, and its slow 
convergence to a better approximation as more data points are sampled.  
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Quasi-Monte Carlo Simulation 
Quasi-Monte Carlo (QMC) simulation, which performs better than MC simulation with 
respect to convergence (e.g., Morokoff and Caflisch, 1995; Sloan and Wozniakowski, 1998; 
Niederreiter, 1978), varies from MC simulation in two key respects: one, inputs are generated 
quasi-randomly in a space-filling manner, within the domains specified, using low-
discrepancy sequences such as Sobol or Korobov; second, results pertaining to different 
points in the multi-dimensional hypercube (problem space) can be studied, but may not be 
aggregated to arrive at an overall result since inputs are not chosen using probability 
distributions of those inputs.  
Applications of Monte Carlo Methods 
Monte Carlo methods have been used in a wide range of applications in natural sciences 
(Caflisch, 1998), even extremely critical applications such as nuclear weapon projects. 
Physicists at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory were investigating radiation shielding and the 
distance that neutrons would likely travel through various materials. Despite having most of 
the necessary data, the problem could not be solved with theoretical calculations. John von 
Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam suggested that the problem be solved by modeling the 
experiment on a computer using chance. Being a secret, their work required a code name. 
Von Neumann chose the name "Monte Carlo" (Metropolis, 1987; Lemieux, 2009).  
 Simulation has been widely used in social sciences—for example, to test models with 
synthetic data (e.g. Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000). In finance—of greater relevance to us—
Monte Carlo methods are often used because most finance models do not have analytical 
solutions (Joy, Boyle, and Tan, 1996), an issue that we share because decision rules and 
restricted domains for some parameters make algebraic derivations of closed-form solutions 
considerably difficult for us.  Some of those finance applications include calculating the 
value of companies, evaluating investments in projects at the business unit or corporate level, 




 In fact, simulation is such a powerful tool of analysis that a variety of applications can 
make use of this. For example, governments may use it to predict how tax revenues will 
change and different sections of population be affected if a complicated piece of tax 
legislation is implemented. Central banks may use it to predict the risks of catastrophic 
events in the economy as contributing parameters in the economy change. Though the 
mathematics of simulation is well-advanced, challenges in modeling the phenomenon being 
                                                          
15
 Phelim Boyle pioneered, in 1977, the use of simulation in derivative valuation (Lemieux and L‘Ecuyer, 2001; 
Boyle, 1977).      




studied limit the use of simulation. The problem is more acute in social sciences than in 
natural sciences. 
3.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION STUDY 
3. 3.1Rationale for the simulation study 
Monte Carlo methods are appropriate for our purpose because these methods are helpful 
when it is infeasible or impossible to compute an exact result with a deterministic algorithm 
(Hubbard, 2007). In our case, a deterministic model using empirical data is infeasible 
because it is impractical to find a large number of empirical observations that cover the entire 
deal space - for example the cost of venture capital r (which is empirically around 15% as per 
Metrick, 2006) and base salary b (a wide domain of which we would like to study but may be 
difficult to empirically observe). In other words, though empirical, available data points may 
not be large enough rendering this kind of deterministic modeling to be of limited use for our 
purpose.  
 Secondly, some parameters of our model are difficult to extract from real data. For 
example, entrepreneurs will probably under-state their disutility of effort (captured by unit 
cost of effort  ). Even if they do not, it would be difficult for them to quantify it. Similarly, 
while VCs can be expected to truthfully reveal their beliefs about entrepreneur‘s minimum 
effort level emin, it would still be difficult for them to quantify it. Another parameter that may 
be difficult to quantify is VCs‘ marginal return to service c across their portfolio ventures 
that is a measure of their time constraints. On the other hand, if we use MC simulation, we 
can randomly generate values for such parameters of our model provided we are able to 
make reasonable distributional assumptions for those parameters. If we use the quasi-Monte 
Carlo (QMC) simulation and quasi-randomly generate values in a space-filling manner, we 
will not even need to make those distributional assumptions.  
 Thirdly, entrepreneurs and VCs may resort to intuition to quantify such parameters in 
view of the above difficulty. It has been found that the Monte Carlo methods are useful for 
modeling phenomena with significant uncertainty in inputs and that actual observation is 
routinely better predicted by simulations than by human intuition (Hubbard, 2009).  
Fourthly, a simulation study based on Monte Carlo methods can generate large 
amounts of synthetic data, on which regression analyses can be carried out to uncover new 
insights about the sensitivity of deal outcomes with respect to various model parameters. An 
alternate approach for sensitivity analysis is to find the simple derivative of deal outcome Y 
with respect to a model parameter Xi (i.e.,       ), but that approach is not always feasible. 
For example, we would be interested in studying the sensitivity of the deal outcome 
―Probability of VC Making an Offer‖; but it is difficult to derive an expression for that deal 
outcome from our mathematical model of the investment process in §2.3. On the other hand, 




we can study the sensitivity of that deal outcome by employing Probit model on synthetic 
data generated using our mathematical model. Such a procedure is known as ―sampling-
based sensitivity analysis‖ where—once the sample is generated—several strategies 
(including simple input-output scatter plots) can be used to derive sensitivity measures (e.g., 
Helton, Johnson, Salaberry, & Storlie, 2006; Pannell, 1997). Applications in Finance are 
abundant since analytical solutions are often absent (e.g., Joy, Boyle, & Tan, 1996; Lemieux 
& L‘Ecuyer, 2001; Boyle, 1977).        
Lastly but more importantly a simulation study per se may reveal some unforeseen 
phenomena of the deal process. In Chapter 2, the illustrative example had revealed the 
possible existence of a ―critical‖ point in the VC‘s belief (and, correspondingly, in his or her 
ownership share) that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit as well as the investment deal 
welfare. In fact, because of great practical significance of such a finding, one of the 
necessities of a simulation study was to reconfirm whether such a critical point indeed exists 
everywhere in the hypercube (that is, under a variety of scenarios).  
Still another—albeit minor—use of the simulation study is that we can verify our 
propositions. Though we have proofs for those propositions, verification through simulation 
will help us make sure that no inadvertent errors have taken place in the proofs and the 
resulting conclusions.  
3.3.2 Rationale for choosing QMC simulation   
We chose Quasi-Monte Carlo simulation since the use of MC simulation is not always 
appropriate. Since MC simulation uses inputs drawn using probability distributions, the 
results provide probabilities of different outcomes occurring (as in reality). On the other 
hand, QMC simulation is essentially deterministic modeling (L‘Ecuyer and Lemieux, 2002). 
The problem with this method is that inputs assigned to a parameter to represent different 
scenarios are all accorded the same weight, which may not be realistic (because some 
scenarios may be more likely in reality than other scenarios). It has been noted that 
(probabilistic) MC simulation has a narrower range—that is, more accurate results—than 
(deterministic) QMC simulation because the latter assigns equal weight to all scenarios
 
(Vose, 2000).  
However, QMC simulation is better suited when probability distributions of 
parameters are not known with reasonable confidence and hence aggregate results cannot be 
determined anyways (PucRio, 2009). Recall that our theoretical model, in conjunction with 
our choice of the Cobb-Douglas production function (used by Fairchild, in press) for the 
revenue function in our illustrative example, has allowed us to characterize the VC 
investment deal process as a 12-dimensional hypercube where the twelve dimensions or 




exogenously determined parameters are r, I, w, c, b, k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, ω, and emin.
16
 Information 
on the probability distributions of these parameters is scant in the literature. While we may be 
able to make reasonable distributional assumption for some parameters (such as log-normal 
for investment I), it is clear that aggregated results will be debatable. For this reason, QMC is 
better suited for our purpose. It may be noted that MC simulation using uniform probability 
distributions may serve this purpose, but generating inputs using quasi-random sequences (as 
QMC does) is more efficient (PucRio, 2009).  
Secondly, MC simulation is time-consuming in terms of computation. So in general, 
it is to be preferred to deterministic algorithms only when there are several sources of 
uncertainty, in which case the latter method would be even more time-consuming (PucRio, 
2009). If there are d sources of uncertainty (dimensions) and we wish to consider n sample 
points in each of those dimensions, the deterministic algorithms will perform n
d
 
computations (that is, they have exponential time-increase), whereas MC simulation will 
only randomly pick N sample points in the d-dimensional hypercube (where N is a 
polynomial function of d) and perform N computations (that is, they have polynomial time-
increase and, typically,       ).  In our case, the number of exogenously-determined 
parameters is twelve, which is not small (Bratley, Fox, and Niederreiter, 1992) especially 
considering that we would like to have a large sample size.  
However, QMC simulation makes use of low-discrepancy sequences (also known as 
quasi-random sequences) to generate inputs, which permits it to achieve a given accuracy 
with a number of computations that is much less than n
d
 thereby decreasing the run-time 
considerably. In fact, QMC‘s performance can even be better than MC‘s (Wang and Fang, 
2003). It has been found that QMC performs much better than MC for high dimensions in the 
best case though it performs much worse in the worst case. However, it has also been found 
that the worst-case bound is not very reliable for practical purposes. Moreover, N would be 
much larger (for MC) than the number of points necessary for QMC, for a given level of 
accuracy. Hence QMC is to be preferred to MC in cases similar to ours (PucRio, 2009). This 
is a secondary reason why we employ QMC simulation.  
3.3.3 Developing Parameters      
We chose samples for the twelve model parameters quasi-randomly from wide domains, 
which are necessary to capture most of the conceivable venture capital deal space. However, 
too large a hypercube will be practically irrelevant (for example, specifying a maximum limit 
of $100 million for investment amount I for a start-up is unwarranted), in fact undesirable 
because it will dramatically increase the total number of sample points in order to have 
adequate number of points in the practically relevant regions of the hypercube. A very large 
                                                          
16
 The revenue function used is           
      
    . 




simulation run will take a very large run time thereby discouraging us from freely 
experimenting different runs. Table 3.1 below summarizes the domains specified in the 
simulation study vis-à-vis the specific values used in the illustrative example in Chapter 2. 
Recall that, in our illustrative example in the previous chapter, we chose specific 
values for the various parameters supported by the literature, and then varied ω and emin to 
study deal outcomes. Table 3.1 shows that the domains used in simulations for the various 
parameters are wide enough in comparison to the values used in the illustrative example. We 
have very likely captured in our hypercube the empirically relevant regions of the VC deal 
space.  
  
TABLE 3.1  







 Description Minimum Maximum Specific 





r Cost of venture capital 0% 100% 15%  
I Investment amount $500,000 $10,000,000 $2,000,000  
w Unit cost of service $500 / h $10,000 / h $1,500 / h  
c Marginal return to service (a 
measure of the VC‘s time-
constraints) 
0 $10,000 / h, but c 
≤ w  




first, we set c ≤ 
w   
b Base salary 0 $500,000 $50,000   
k1 Relative importance of the 
entrepreneur‘s solo-work 
1 100,000 10,000  
k2 Relative importance of team 
work  
1 100,000 10,000  
ε1 Entrepreneur‘s effectiveness 
in solo-work 
0 0.99 0.85 This upper limit 
ensures concavity 
ε2 Entrepreneur‘s effectiveness 
in teamwork 
0 0.99 0.8  
σ VC‘s effectiveness (in 
teamwork)  
0 0.99, but ε2 + σ ≤ 
0.99  
0.15 We set ε2 + σ ≤ 
0.99 to ensure 
concavity of 
teamwork 
ω Unit cost of effort  $1 / h $80,000 / h ($1 / h, 
$8,000 / h) 
 
emin VC‘s belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum 
effort level  








We used Sobol sequence (a well known low-discrepancy sequence) to quasi-
randomly choose sample for the above parameters. This is a space-filling sequence that 
covers the space efficiently—that is, a low number of Sobol points are sufficient to cover the 
space for a given accuracy of results (e.g. Lemieux, 2009; PucRio, 2009). Table 3.2 gives a 
summary of the samples generated for the twelve parameters in a run that involved 10,400 
12-dimensional quasi-random points.  An inspection of the means, standard deviations, 
minimum, and the maximum assures that Sobol sequence has indeed returned a space-filling 
sample of points.   
 
TABLE 3.2 
Summary of Quasi-Random Samples 
 
Parameter Number of 
quasi-random 
samples 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max 
r 10,400 0.4998996 0.2886794 0.0001221 0.999878 
I 10,400 5,248,470 2,742,521 500,580 10,000,000 
w 10,400 5,249.499 2,742.482 501.16 9,999.42 
c 10,400 3,495.556 2,306.63 0.610352 9,943.85 
b 10,400 249,987.9 144,327.3 61.0352 499,939 
k1 10,400 49,496.88 28,576.25 7.04248 98,988.9 
k2 10,400 49,497.5 28,576.08 13.085 98,988.9 
ε1 10,400 0.4950638 0.2857662 0.0001209 0.98994 
ε2 10,400 0.4950202 0.2857885 0.0001209 0.98994 
σ 10,400 0.3305472 0.2337187 0.0000604 0.976042 
ω 10,400 40,005.38 23,091.55 10.7655 79,995.1 
emin 10,400 2,000.525 1,154.364 1.24408 3,999.51 
 
3.3.4 Additional assumptions for simulation 
We used in the simulation study the same specific functional form for revenue that we used 
in the illustrative example in Chapter 2. Moreover, we employed several assumptions in the 
simulation study in order to abstract the reality as richly as possible and harness the power of 
simulation to uncover as many new insights as possible about the venture capital deal 
process. Those assumptions are: (a) the entrepreneur can create value in solo-work (that is, 
even if the VC only invests and does not provide service; k1 > 0) whereas the VC cannot do 
so in the startup without the entrepreneur,
17
 (b) Teamwork is more important to the venture 
than the entrepreneur‘s solo-work (k2 > k1) or vice-versa (k1 > k2), (c) the VC may be more 
effective than the entrepreneur in their teamwork (σ > ε2) or vice-versa (ε2 > σ) , (d) there is a 
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1989). 




maximum limit to the VC‘s service level to any firm in his/her portfolio (we set s ≤ 1000 
hours / year),
18
 and (e) there is a maximum limit to entrepreneur‘s performance – that is, 
there is a best effort (we set e
*
 ≤  4,000 hours/year and emin ≤  4,000 hours/year).
19
 
3.3.5 Simulation runs, Pseudo-code, and Implementation  
We carried out two simulations. First, we quasi-randomly chose all the parameters except 
emin and then computed the deal outcomes for the entire range of emin for each of the resulting 
11-dimensional points that constitute a deal scenario; we then investigated if there exists a 
―critical‖ value of emin that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit as well as the investment deal 
welfare. Second, we quasi-randomly chose all the twelve model parameters and used the 
resulting synthetic data to carry out regressions to generate predictions on deals; we also 
extended this simulation to cover offer revisions and investigated if all the propositions hold 
always.  
It is useful to elaborate on the important difference between the two simulations. To 
understand the difference, we need to recall that a combination of eleven parameters of the 
model (excluding emin) characterize a deal scenario that the VC may face. The question of a 
deal only arises when the VC—facing a scenario—takes on a particular level of belief on emin 
to determine an offer.  That is, a combination of all twelve parameters characterizes a deal 
(which may close or not). In Simulation I, we simulate scenarios to find out if each scenario 
has a ―critical‖ value of emin. On the other hand, in Simulation II, we simulate individual 
deals to ultimately generate predictions on deals.   
Before programming in any simulation software or a general programming language, 
it is useful to write a pseudo-code from the problem since that would help to organize the 
problem before starting coding (e.g., Olsen, 2005; Linn and Clancy, 1992; Lee, Bard, Pinedo, 
and Wilhelm, 1993). Hence initially we wrote pseudo-code that is in Appendix C.
20
 Pseudo-
code is a kind of structured English for describing algorithms. It allows the designer to focus 
on the logic of the algorithm without being distracted by the details of the language syntax of 
the software program in which the simulation is implemented.  At the same time, the pseudo-
code needs to be complete.  It should describe the entire logic of the algorithm so that 
implementation becomes a rote mechanical task of translating line by line into source code.  
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their time in activities (other than service) such as screening and due diligence of potential investments (e.g. 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994), the maximum service a firm can hope to receive is 1,000 hours if that firm is the only 
firm in its VC‘s portfolio.  
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 The plausibility of a cap on the entrepreneur‘s effort level (i.e., the existence of best effort) is recognized in 
some studies such as Innes, R. D. (1990).  
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 As the simulation project progressed, we tried various simulations and did not feel the necessity to write 
pseudo-code any more. Hence the pseudo-code furnished only covers a part of our simulations.  




In general the vocabulary used in the pseudo-code should be the vocabulary of the 
problem domain, not of the implementation domain.  The pseudo-code is a narrative for 
someone who knows the requirements (problem domain) and is trying to learn how the 
solution is organized. However, the logic must be decomposed to the level of a single loop or 
decision (Pseudo-code, 2003). Depending on the writer, pseudo-code may vary widely in 
style, from a near-exact imitation of a real programming language at one extreme, to a 
description approaching formatted prose at the other (Pseudo-code, 2009). Our pseudo-code 
used the vocabulary of our problem domain, but could readily be used for coding.  
The simulations were programmed in C++ and implemented in Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2008 SP1, an integrated development environment from Microsoft. The simulation 
code is furnished in Appendix D.
21
 There are many mathematical computing programs such 
as MATLAB, Octave, Maple, and Mathematica and we had originally planned to use 
MATLAB for its versatility and popularity. However, we later chose C++ because it is fast. 
Run-time was the most important consideration for us since we planned to run large 
simulations involving a million computational cycles.  
3.3.6 Simulation I for Studying the Properties of the Deal Space 
In Simulation I, which we carried out to check if there indeed exists a critical point in the 
VC‘s belief (about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin) as suggested by our 
illustrative example of Chapter 2, we chose 5,200 scenarios (defined by eleven of the model 
parameters—namely, r, I, w, c, b, k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, and ω) quasi-randomly and then, for each of 
those scenarios, we varied the parameter emin  from 0 to 4,000 hours in steps of 20 hours. 
Thus we generated a total of 5,200*200 = 1.04 million12-dimensional points (deals) and 
computed various deal outcomes for each of those 1.04 million points (e.g., the VC‘s optimal 
ownership share and service level, whether the offer is feasible or not, the entrepreneur‘s 
optimal effort level subject to its cap and his/her return, whether the offer is accepted or not, 
the VC‘s actual excess profit, and the deal welfare). In other words, we froze all the 
parameters except emin and studied how the deal outcomes vary as we vary emin. We then 
checked if there is an emin (and a corresponding critical α) that maximizes the VC‘s excess 
profit and the investment deal welfare. Once we finished with a particular scenario, we did 
the same for another scenario. We repeated the above cycle for all the 5,200 scenarios. Since 
run time was expected to be several hours, the run was split into four separate runs (each run 
being a continuation of the previous Sobol sequence) and four spreadsheets each containing 
260,000 records were created.  
We then inspected the results to find out if there exists—for each scenario—a unique 
critical value of emin. Our illustrative example in the previous chapter had also suggested a 
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critical value for the VC‘s ownership share α as depicted in Table 2.2 (we recall that unique 
solution for α
*
 for a given emin in §2.3.1 implies a unique correspondence between emin and 
α). Consequently, we expected and looked for the existence of a critical value of α 
(corresponding to the critical value of emin) too. The findings follow.   
Simulation I confirms that, for every scenario where a deal can close (i.e. the 
maximum value of the VC‘s excess profit P was positive at least for part of the domain of 
emin, so there is a chance that the VC will put forth an offer that may be acceptable to the 
entrepreneur), there indeed exists a unique critical value of emin (which we denote eminP) and a 
corresponding unique critical value of α (denoted αP) that maximize the VC‘s excess profit P. 
The simulation results also show that there exist critical values of emin and α (denoted eminW 
and αW) that maximize the investment deal welfare W, but that those values are not 
necessarily the same as those that maximize the VC‘s excess profit P. In fact, the simulation 
results also revealed the existence of a critical value of emin denoted eminE (and a 
corresponding critical value of α denoted αE) that maximizes the entrepreneur‘s return E. All 
these critical values only exist for scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure.
22
  
Of the 5,200 scenarios of Simulation I, only 1,035 have a possibility of deal closure. 
In other words, the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level e
*
 is greater than or equal to emin (and 
the VC‘s post-deal excess profit is nonnegative) at least for part of the domain of emin. We 
found that all these 1,035 scenarios have unique values for eminE, eminP, and eminW. Moreover, 
we found that there is unique global maximum for E, P, and W for these 1,035 scenarios. 
Same results were observed for αE, αP, and αW. Another observation was that once the 
investment deal welfare is maximized it only decreases marginally with a further increase in 
emin (or a decrease in α) for a vast majority of scenarios. Only a few scenarios had steep 
declines.  
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 depict, respectively, how E, P, and W (all in the Y-axis) vary with 
the VC‘s belief on emin (in the X-axis) for the first five scenarios of the 1,035 scenarios that 
have a possibility of deal closure.
 
Figure 3.4 depicts in a single graph how E, P, and W vary 
for one of those five scenarios. In all these figures, peak values are also marked for easy 
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 These critical values also exist for scenarios where no deal can close (i.e., where the VC‘s excess profit P is 
negative for any value of emin). We however note that the question of maximizing P, W, or E is irrelevant where 
there is no chance for a deal to close.  







Sensitivity of Entrepreneur’s Return E with respect to emin 








Sensitivity of the VC’s Excess Profit P with respect to emin 
(For five sample scenarios) 
 




































Sensitivity of Deal Welfare W with respect to emin 
(For five sample scenarios) 
 
FIGURE 3.4 
Sensitivities of E, P, and W with respect to emin 
(For one sample scenario) 
 
 




































 Figure 3.1 shows that the critical value of emin that maximizes E, namely eminE, is 
4,000 hours (which represents the best effort of the entrepreneur) in all these five scenarios, 
but the simulation results show that eminE can be less. Consequently, we use Figures 3.5 and 
3.6 to show the distribution of eminE among the 1,035 scenarios that have a possibility of deal 
closure (with frequency in the Y-axis). Nevertheless, a vast majority (859 scenarios) have 
eminE  = 4,000 hours.  
       
       FIGURE 3.5         FIGURE 3.6 
     Distribution of eminE           Distribution of eminE in sub-range 
   
 
 
Figure 3.2 suggests that the critical value of emin that maximizes P, namely eminP, is 
very low (with eminP close to 0 for one, around 1,500 for one, and between these two values 
for the rest in that figure). Consequently, we use Figures 3.7 and 3.8 to show the distribution 
of eminP among the 1,035 scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure. A vast majority 
(803 scenarios) have eminP  ≤ 500 hours.  
FIGURE 3.7                                                      FIGURE 3.8 
        Distribution of eminP                                 Distribution of eminP in sub-range 
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Figure 3.3 suggests that the critical value of emin that maximizes W, namely eminW, can 
lie anywhere in the range of emin. Consequently, we use Figures 3.9 and 3.10 to show the 
distribution of eminW among the 1,035 scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure. 607 
scenarios have eminW  at 4,000 hours (the best effort of the entrepreneur) and 280 have eminW  ≤ 
500 hours, showing clustering at the two extremes but also the domination of the former. An 
important observation about eminW is that, for scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure, 
it is always bounded by eminP at its lower limit and by eminE at its upper limit (we computed 
[eminE – eminW] and [eminW – eminP] and found them always nonnegative).  
 
FIGURE 3.9     FIGURE 3.10 
Distribution of eminW               Distribution of eminW in sub-range 
 
   
 
Figures 3.11 to 3.13 depict, respectively, how E, P, and W (all in the Y-axis) vary 
with the VC‘s ownership share α (in the X-axis) for the first five scenarios of the 1,035 
scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure.
 
Figure 3.14 depicts in a single graph how E, 
P, and W vary for one of those five scenarios. In all these figures, peak values are also 
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Sensitivity of Entrepreneur’s Return E with respect to α 








Sensitivity of VC’s Excess Profit P with respect to α 



































Sensitivity of Deal Welfare W with respect to α 
(For five sample scenarios) 
 
 
                        
 
FIGURE 3.14 
Sensitivities of E, P, and W with respect to α 
(For one sample scenario) 
 
Figure 12 shows that the critical value of α that maximizes E, namely αE, is low and 
varies from about 0.05 to about 0.2 in all those five scenarios, whereas αP varies from about 
0.3 to about 0.75 (Figure 13) and αW from about 0.1 to about 0.75 (Figure 14).  Moreover, as 
we already noted, we found that αW (that equals 0.14 in Figure 15 for a particular sample 








































scenario) is bounded by αE (= 0.10) and αP (= 0.42) for all scenarios that have a possibility of 
deal closure. 
 Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 show the distributions of αE, αP, and αW, respectively, 
among the 1,035 scenarios that have a possibility of deal closure. It is found that αE is very 
low (< 0.1) in a vast majority of scenarios, whereas αP is distributed widely (though dominant 
in the sub-range 0.2 – 0.3) and αW is concentrated on the lower end (though a significant 
number of scenarios have moderate to high αW). An important observation is that αW  is 
bounded by αE at its lower limit and αP at its higher limit for all those 1,035 scenarios (we 
computed [αP – αW] and [αW – αE] and found them always nonnegative).   
 
FIGURE 3.15                                                       FIGURE 3.16 
Distribution of αE                                                              Distribution of αP   
  
FIGURE 3.17 
Distribution of αW 
 
   
We find from the above simulation that: (i) unique critical values of emin and α exist 
that maximize the entrepreneur‘s value E, the VC‘s excess profit P, and the investment deal 



































































































respectively, for any scenario that has a possibility of deal closure. Recall that we have 
chosen a large number of scenarios (5,200), in a space-filling manner, from a hypercube 
defined with wide domains for the parameters (hence very likely capturing the empirically 
relevant VC investment deal space within it). That simulation design allows us to conjecture 
that: 
Conjecture:  
(a) Unique eminP, eminE and eminW for the VC‘s belief regarding the entrepreneur‘s 
minimum effort level exist that respectively maximize the VC‘s excess profit P, the 
entrepreneur‘s expected return E, and the investment deal welfare W. Also, in 
scenarios where a deal can close (i.e., e
*
 ≥ emin),  
eminP  ≤  eminW  ≤  eminE. 
(b) Unique αP, αE and αW for the VC‘s ownership share exist that respectively 
maximize the VC‘s excess profit P, the entrepreneur‘s expected return E, and the 
investment deal welfare W. Also, in scenarios where a deal can close (i.e., e
*
 ≥ emin),  
αE  ≤  αW  ≤  αP. 
The reason for the existence of critical values of the VC‘s belief on emin and 
ownership share is as follows. Recall that the VC is forced to take on a belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level because of the private information possessed by the latter on his or 
her disutility of effort. If the VC is overly pessimistic (that is, emin is very low), he or she may 
demand a high ownership share α (as in Table 2.2) thereby decreasing the entrepreneur‘s 
incentive to take effort (e.g., Amit et al. 1998; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Gompers, 
1997; Hellmann, 2006; Cassamatta, 2003). Even if the VC‘s service level increases, the 
firm‘s revenue, the entrepreneur‘s return, and the VC‘s excess profit (in spite of a high α) 
may all decrease with a high α. On the other hand, as the VC‘s belief improves regarding the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level, the former may demand a lesser ownership share α, which may 
lead to an increase in the returns to the two parties. However, if the VC‘s belief improves 
beyond a point, the effect of reduced α (if any) may dominate that of an increase in the firm‘s 
revenue arising from increased entrepreneurial effort, causing the VC‘s excess profit to start 
declining. Moreover, the entrepreneur may reach his or her best effort level and cannot be 
motivated further (which causes kinks in the curves in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.12, and 3.13).  
Our approach of employing emin (namely, letting the VC take on a belief while facing 
private information), not found in the extant literature, has allowed us to uncover the above 
insight in the conjecture, which has practical significance. For example, the conjecture 
implies that VCs should claim a moderate ownership share in order to maximize their own 
return. Moreover, with the above insight novice entrepreneurs may appreciate why VCs‘ may 




not normally demand a low ownership share. Bernile et al. (2007) found in their proprietary 
international dataset that VC ownership share had a mean, min, and maximum of 29.74%, 
2.5%, and 100%; our observation that the critical ownership share that maximizes the VC‘ 
excess profit may vary widely across its range (Figure 3.16) is perfectly in line with that 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, our finding in that figure that in bulk of the cases that 
critical ownership share is between 20% to 60% is consistent with the mean ownership share 
found in that study as well as Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) who reported typical VC share of 
50% in the US. The US VCs‘ ownership share had a mean of 32.36% in the dataset of 
Bernile et al. (2007). 
If the VC‘s belief regarding emin improves (and consequently α decreases) further 
beyond another critical point, the entrepreneur‘s incentive to take more effort will saturate 
(due to cost overriding benefit) leading to no further increase in the entrepreneur‘s return. 
Thus there is a critical point in the VC‘s belief regarding emin that would maximize the 
entrepreneur‘s return. Simulations reveal that this point eminE (and corresponding αE) is the 
best effort level of the entrepreneur in a vast majority of cases though it can be less in some 
cases. That is, in a vast majority of cases, the entrepreneur gets to maximize his or her return 
if the VC is confident that the entrepreneur will put in best performance (and consequently 
demands a low ownership share).  The VC contracting literature has not uncovered this 
insight about how the entrepreneur‘s maximal return may be related to the VC‘s assessment 
of the entrepreneur since that literature has not considered private information about the 
entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort (e.g., de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Amit et al. 1998; 
Fairchild, 2007; Bernile, Cumming, and Lyandres, 2007) though it is known that VCs assess 
novice and experienced entrepreneurs differently (Wright, 1997).    
The investment deal welfare W, which is the sum of the returns to the two parties, can 
start to decrease at eminP (and corresponding αP) if the decrease in the VC‘s excess profit P 
exceeds the increase in the entrepreneur‘s return E. If not, W will keep increasing till it starts 
to decrease at eminE (and corresponding αE) or earlier. Thus this critical point eminW (and 
corresponding αW) that maximizes welfare is bounded such that eminP  ≤  eminW  ≤  eminE and αE  
≤  αW  ≤  αP. This observation from our simulation study is consistent with but more robust 
than that of Bernile et al. (2007)—who in their study of optimal VC portfolio size that 
ignores the entrepreneur‘s private information about his or her characteristics—provide 
closed-form expressions for αW  and αP  and show that, for any number of firms in the VC 
portfolio,  αW  is less than αP. Analytical studies usually ignore bounds on parameters, and 
obtain analytical solutions using continuous and differentiable functions. However, in reality, 
the VC‘s excess profit (which is essentially an inverted-U shape) may not be a smooth 
function in many cases (as revealed in Figures 3.2 and 3.12); consequently, deal welfare may 
also not be smooth (Figures 3.3 and 3.13). We incorporated realistic bounds on parameters 








 A vast majority of scenarios had eminE at 4,000 hours (Figures 3.5 and 3.6), which 
denotes the best effort of the entrepreneur. Since the VC presumes that the entrepreneur will 
only allocate a minimum effort level in order to account for the private information of the 
latter, emin is highly unlikely to be 4,000; and correspondingly, the VC‘s ownership share is 
highly unlikely to be very low. In fact, VCs normally take up much larger ownership shares 
(Bernile et al, 2007; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; DevelopmentCorporate, 2010; A VC, 
2009; PwC, 2010), so these observations suggest that the entrepreneur does not get to 
maximize his/her value in most of the deal space consistent with the empirical observation in 
the literature (e.g., Zider, 1998) that entrepreneurs are put at a steep disadvantage.  
A vast majority of scenarios (803 out of 1,035) have eminP  ≤ 500 hours (Figures  3.7 
and 3.8). This suggests that, under information asymmetry about the entrepreneur‘s 
characteristics, it is a rewarding strategy for the VC to believe that the entrepreneur will only 
allocate a moderate level of effort. Correspondingly, Figure 3.16 offers a possible 
explanation for why the VC is unlikely to demand a low ownership share, by showing that 
the VC‘s excess profit is usually maximized at moderate to high VC ownership shares. 
Literature—as noted above—records empirical prevalence of moderate VC ownership 
shares, but explanation for why it might be so is lacking. Some authors analytically 
characterize optimal ownership share (e.g., de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Bernile et al, 
2007), but all with the assumption of complete knowledge of entrepreneurial characteristics 
and none appears to explain the above empirical prevalence.  
Recall that the investment deal welfare-maximizing minimum effort level of the 
entrepreneur as believed by the VC, namely eminW, is polarized in the two extremes—the best 
effort level of the entrepreneur at 4,000 and the one close to zero (Figure 3.9)—with the 
former being the dominant  (Figure 3.10). Under our key assumption that the VC takes on a 
belief about the entrepreneur‘s effort level, the above observation implies that, in most of the 
deal space, accepted offers will not be welfare-maximizing. In fact, correspondingly, roughly 
a half of the scenarios have welfare-maximizing VC ownership share αW less than 0.1 (Figure 
3.17), a share that is unlikely to happen for two reasons: (1) the VC‘s excess profit-
maximizing ownership share αP is moderate to high, not low (Figure 3.16); and (2) the VC is 
likely to be on the upside of the power equation between the two parties since entrepreneurs 
are usually credit-constrained (e.g., Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee, 2001; Åstbro and 
Bernhardt, 2003; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; Murray, 1999), so the agreed 
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 The conjectured relationships on emin and α do not always hold true for scenarios where no deal can close. 
Again we note that the question of maximizing P, W, or E is anyways irrelevant for such scenarios.   




upon VC ownership share is likely to be closer to αP rather than αW. We however note that—
as Figures 3.3 and 3.13 show—the investment deal welfare is close to its peak for a wide 
range of emin and α, so not maximizing welfare may not be a serious issue.  The literature is 
inadequate (except for some studies such as Bernile et al, 2007) with respect to its scrutiny of 
the VC‘s ownership share that is desirable from the view point of welfare. Since 
entrepreneurship—especially, innovative startup activity—is an important driver of growth 
(Acs and Szerb, 2006; Pamela Mueller, 2007; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991), our 
findings on VC ownership share vis-à-vis welfare is of interest.   
3.3.7 Simulation II for Generating Synthetic Data 
We primarily carried out Simulation II to generate synthetic data for regression analyses that 
can generate predictions on the parameter sensitivities of various deal outcomes. We also 
used that simulation to verify if all our propositions hold true in all deals (to assure there are 
no inadvertent errors in the proofs). We generated10,400 12-dimensional quasi-random 
sample points consisting of all the model parameters—namely, r, I, w, c, b, k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, ω, 
and emin (each such point representing a deal) and computed the deal outcomes for each deal 
(the same deal outcomes as in Simulation I). Then, if an offer was rejected, we revised that 
offer by increasing emin of the previous offer by 100 (letting the VC‘s ownership share α to 
vary while keeping the entrepreneur‘s base salary b fixed) and determined the revised deal 
outcomes. While doing so, we verified whether (i) the condition for ds/demin (the marginal 
change in VC service with respect to emin) to be positive holds true and (ii) Proposition 1 
holds true. If the revised offer was also rejected, we revised the offer again by increasing emin 
by a further 100 and repeated the above cycles till we had revised the original offer thrice or 
till the offer was accepted - whichever happened earlier. Then, we revised all the rejected 
original offers by increasing emin by 100 (letting the entrepreneur‘s base salary b vary while 
keeping the VC‘s ownership share α fixed) and determined the revised deal outcomes. While 
doing so we verified if Proposition 2 holds true. We repeated this cycle till we had revised 
the original offer thrice or till the offer was accepted - whichever occurred earlier. Finally, 
for each of the 10,400 scenarios, we increased the base salary b by $25,000 while keeping 
emin the same at the original quasi-randomly chosen value and recomputed the deal outcomes. 
While doing so, we verified if Proposition 3 holds true. We repeated this cycle till we had 
increased the base salary thrice. We found that all the three propositions held true for all the 
deals. We now report out regression study in the next section. 
3.4 REGRESSION ANALYSES ON SYNTHETIC DATA  
We used the synthetic data generated in Simulation II for regression analyses to uncover 
what factors influence the following deal aspects of interest and how: (i) probability of VC 
making an offer; (ii) the VC‘s ownership share and service level; (iii) the entrepreneur‘s 




effort level; (iv) probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort; (v) probability of 
entrepreneur accepting an offer; and (vi) the entrepreneur‘s return, the VC‘s excess profit, 
and the investment deal welfare. We present the estimation results of the above regression 
analyses in Tables 3.4-3.10. Discussions on the findings immediately follow the respective 
tables.   
3.4.1 Issues with the Regression Analyses 
A potential issue with the regression analyses is that we do not use any kind of sampling 
weights on the synthetic data generated from space-filling sample points of the hypercube. 
The effect of the space-filling sample points would be akin to sample points drawn from 
uniform distribution. Recall that information about the distribution (plausible or empirically 
observed) is scant in the literature wherever parameter values have been noted. Recall also 
that we have used a large hypercube to characterize the VC deal space and that the boundary 
of the region within that hypercube that applies in practice is not clearly known. Moreover, 
the whole manifold (space) is not smooth due to kinks noted in, for example, Figure 3.2. 
Consequently, lack of weighting may bias the estimates since sample points may vary in 
practical importance or influence.  To deal with this problem, we generated 100,000 space-
filling sample points from a small hypercube that is (roughly) centered on the specific values 
of the model parameters that we used in our illustrative example with justification; we then 
repeated the regressions with the synthetic data from the small hypercube. If the estimates of 
the two hypercubes are sufficiently close, the estimates may not be biased. While Table 3.3 
presents the parameter domains for the small hypercube, the regression results of that 
hypercube are presented in Tables 3.4 to 3.10 alongside those of the large hypercube.  
 We note that pair-wise correlation was nearly zero for all the pairs of parameters 
except (w, c) and (ε2, σ). For the former, it was +0.5647 and +0.4105, respectively for the 
large and the small hypercubes. For the latter, it was respectively -0.6122 and -0.6125. As 
Tables 3.1 and 3.3 show, the above two pairs are inter-dependent. The marginal return to 
service c—which denotes the value the VC could have created if he or she had had one extra 
hour—and the unit cost of service w are (positively) correlated because that lost value could 
be large for a VC with a large unit cost. We recall that we set c ≤ w because more profitable 
opportunities would be exhausted first (a standard assumption in economic theory). The 
exponents ε2 and σ are (negatively) correlated because we set ε2 + σ ≤ 0.99 to ensure 
concavity of teamwork. In spite of high correlation, we retain these parameters in the 
regressions since they are conceptually different. We also note that we have let revenue-
related parameters k1 and k2 to be drawn independent of investment I since it is well-known 
that revenues in early-stage entrepreneurial ventures are inherently uncertain (e.g., Mason 
and Harrison, 2002, who report that, in their sample of angel investments, 34% exited at a 




total loss but 23% showed a return of 50% or more; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Brouwer 
and Hendrix; 1998).  
 
TABLE 3.3 
 Parameter Domain Specifications – Small Hypercube 
 
Parameter Minimum Maximum Specific value used in 
the illustrative example 
r 10% 20% 15% 
I $500,000 $3,500,000 $2,000,000 
w $500 / h $2,500 / h $1,500 / h 
c 0 $2,500 / h, but c ≤ w 
always 
$500 / h 
b 0 $200,000 $50,000 
k1 1 40,000 10,000 
k2 1 40,000 10,000 
ε1 0 0.99 0.85 
ε2 0 0.99 0.8 
σ 0 0.99, but ε2 + σ ≤ 0.99 
always 
0.15 
ω $1 / h $30,000 / h ($1 / h, $8,000 / h) 
emin 1 h 4,000 h (1, 2000) 
  
3.4. 2 Further Properties of the Deal Space and Discussion 
Probability of VC Making an Offer 
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the probability that an offer will be made by 
the VC, by employing a Probit model on the 10,400 observations of the large as well as the 




 The probability of VC making an offer is positively affected by the parameters w, c, k1, 
k2, ε1, ε2, σ, and emin; and negatively by r, I, and b; but is not affected by ω. Recall that the 
VC‘s ownership share α encourages the VC to make an offer (as per the VC‘s participation 
constraint in Equation 4 in Chapter 2), but also that α will be high when, everything equal, 
the VC time is worth high and/or he or she is busy (high w and/or c) so that the VC‘s 
incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 3 is satisfied. An increase in any of the 
parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ increases revenue R (     
      
    ), encouraging the VC to 
make an offer. Moreover, if the VC is more confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance 
(that is, emin is high), he or she is encouraged to make an offer. The cost of VC capital r (a 
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hurdle rate), and the investment amount I and the base salary b paid to the entrepreneur (both 
potential losses) all discourage the VC from making an offer. The entrepreneur‘s unit cost of 
effort ω does not affect the probability of VC making an offer because ω is the 
entrepreneur‘s private information that cannot be part of the VC‘s consideration.  
 
TABLE 3.4 
Probit Model of Probability of VC Making an Offer 
 
 Dependent Variable (DV): Probability of VC Making an Offer 
Coefficients Elasticity at means
25
 
Large Hypercube Small Hypercube Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r -.722
***      
(.057) -1.093
***
   (.187) -.184
***
      (.015) -.063
***
      (.011) 
I -2.29e-07
***








      (.019) -.474
***
      (.005) 
w 6.53e-05
***








       (.019) .101
***
      (.006) 
c 8.57e-05
***








      (.016) .151
***
      (.004) 
b -2.32e-07
**








      (.014) -.028
***
       (.004) 
k1 8.81e-06
***








      (.015) .158
***
      (.004) 
k2 1.27e-05
***








      (.015) .237
***
      (.004) 
ε1 2.341
***
   (.065) 2.476
***
   (.022) .591
***
      (.017) .472
***
      (.004) 
ε2 3.979
***
   (.086) 4.175
***
   (.029) 1.004
***
      (.025) .796
***
      (.006) 
σ 1.249
***
   (.087) 1.165
***
   (.027) .211
***
      (.015) .148
***
      (.004) 
ω -3.29e-07    
(7.17e-07) 
-5.01e-07    
(6.27e-07) 
-.007      (.015) -.003      (.004) 
emin 3.40e-04
***








      (.015) .276
***
      (.004) 
Constant -3.794
***
   (.118) -3.843
***
   (.048)   




  .691 .776 
     
N 10,400 100,000   
LR Chi
2
 6,287 58,151   
Prob > Chi
2
 0.000 0.000   
Pseudo R
2 
0.452 0.454   
Significance level: p < 0.01 is denoted by 
***
, p < 0.05 by 
**
, and p < 0.10 by 
*
. Standard errors are noted in 
parentheses.  
 
 Table 3.4 reveals some interesting observations and implications. First, the results are 
qualitatively the same for both the large and the small hypercubes. Second, the probability of 
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, thus it is a measure of sensitivity. Specifically, it measures estimated 
percentage change in the dependent variable for a one percent increase in the concerned explanatory variable.  




VC making an offer is highly sensitive to the parameters ε1, ε2, and I (most sensitive to ε2 at 
1; that is, the probability of VC making an offer increases by 1% when ε2 increases by 1%). 
The entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work ε1 and in teamwork ε2 are major factors 
motivating the VC to make an offer, ε2 being the most important. The investment amount is a 
major factor discouraging the VC.  Consequently, the entrepreneur should strive to convince 
the VC of his or her effectiveness in teamwork (consistent with Valliere and Peterson, 2007, 
that compatibility is important; and with Bruno, Mcquarrie, and Torgrimson, 1992, that 
problems with VC relationships is a factor of failure) and to lower the investment amount 
(consistent with PwC, 2010, that VCs try to invest less) in order to enhance the prospects of 
obtaining an offer. While the literature recognizes the importance of compatibility and low 
investment to secure a deal, our insights about the sensitivities are deeper (we uncover the 
importance of other parameters too).  
VC’s Ownership Share and Service Level  
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the log values of the VC‘s ownership share 
α and service level s, by employing an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on the 
whole samples of the large as well as the small hypercubes.
26 Table 3.5 presents the elasticity 
estimates of α and s. 
 The VC‘s ownership share α is positively affected by the parameters r, I, w, c, and b; 
and negatively by k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, and emin; but is not affected by ω. Recall that because r, I, 
and b are barriers to the VC, his or her ownership share α has to be high enough to induce the 
VC to invest. Recall also that, as per Equation 3 (in Chapter 2), α has to be high when w and 
c are high. Revenue R is high when k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, and emin are high and a high R can enable 
the VC to demand a low ownership share α. Finally, the entrepreneur‘s effective wage rate ω 
(which is that party‘s private information) does not affect the ownership share α demanded 
by the VC. 
Table 3.5 reveals some interesting observations and implications for practitioners. 
First, the results are again qualitatively the same for both the large and the small hypercubes. 
Second, the VC‘s ownership share is highly (negatively) sensitive to the parameters ε2, σ, and 
k2 (most sensitive to ε2 at -2.2; that is, α decreases by 2.2% when ε2 increases by 1%). When 
these parameters are high, revenue generated from the entrepreneur-VC teamwork is high 
thereby permitting a low VC ownership share α. Though teamwork is the most important 
factor permitting a low α, the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work (ε1) and the VC‘s 
confidence in the entrepreneur (high emin) are also important. The above observations are 
consistent with the literature (e.g., Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003, who find in their sample of 
VC funds that the entrepreneur‘s equity stake increases with firm performance).  Investment 
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amount I is an important factor necessitating a high α. If revenue increases in line with 
investment amount I, the VC‘s ownership share α may not have to be high. But, as we 
already noted a high investment may not result in high revenue in an uncertain investment. 
Finally, the VC‘s time-constraints c and the entrepreneur‘s base salary b only play a minor 
(though significant) role in influencing α. Findings in relation to the VC‘s unit cost of service 
or time-constraints are thin in the literature.  
 
TABLE 3.5 
OLS Model of VC’s Ownership Share and Service Level  
 
 DV: VC‘s Ownership Share α   DV: VC‘s Service Level s 
Elasticity at means
27
 Elasticity at means  
Large Hypercube Small Hypercube Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r .269
***
      (.014) .095
***
      (.013) .450
***
      (.030) .152
***
      (.027) 
I .902
***
      (.016) .816
***
      (.006) 1.428
***
       (.033) 1.302
***
      (.012) 
w .268
***
      (.019) .223
***
      (.007) -.886
***
      (.040) -.714
***
      (.015) 
c .051
***
      (.015) .051
***
      (.005) -.551
***
      (.032) -.558
***
         (.01) 
b .058
***
      (.014) .046
***
      (.004) .082
***
      (.030) .073
***
      (.009) 
k1 -.356
***
      (.014) -.356
***
      (.004) -.599
***
      (.030) -.596
***
      (.009) 
k2 -1.001
***
      (.014) -1.004
***
      (.005) .872
***
      (.030) .847
***
       (.009) 
ε1 -.941
***
      (.014) -.942
***
      (.004) -1.600
***
       (.030) -1.573
***
      (.009) 
ε2 -2.205
***
      (.019) -2.204
***
      (.006) 1.806
***
      (.039) 1.786
***
      (.012) 
σ -1.220
***
      (.015) -1.214
***
      (.005) 2.273
***
       (.032) 2.312
***
      (.010) 
ω -.002         (.014) 1.592e-04      
(.004) 
.005         (.030) -.001      (.009) 
emin -.873
***
      (.014) -.873
***
      (.004) -.282
***
       (.030) -.273
***
      (.009) 




-.915 -1.112 4.603 4.632 
     
N 10,309
28
 99,403 10,309 99,403 
F 2,578 25,066 1,080 10,319 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R
2 
0.750 0.752 0.557 0.555 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. 
 
The VC steps up his/her involvement in the venture (high s) in order to influence its 
success when investment amount I and base salary b are high or when there is need to obtain 
high revenue because the VC‘s alternate investment fetches a high rate of return r.  On the 
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 The elasticity for this table is estimated as dy/d(lnx) since the dependent variables have already been log-
transformed.  
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 91 of the 10,400 sample points (about 1%) could not be computed for α and s (they did not converge) since 
the algorithm had been optimized for run-time. Computing such records would have increased the run-time for 
every sample in the population, significantly increasing the overall run-time. Manual computations confirmed, 
as suspected, that these had values for α and s at both extremes. The same was the case with 597 of the 100,000 
sample points (about 0.6%) of the small hypercube.  




other hand, a VC with a high unit cost of service w or someone who is busy (high c) cannot 
offer a high level of service to the venture. Similarly, the VC would extend a high level of 
service when he or she can meaningfully contribute to the success of the venture (high σ) or 
when the teamwork is highly rewarding (high k2 and ε2). The VC would reduce the level of 
service when the entrepreneur is able to create value on his or her own (high k1 and ε1) or 
when he or she is confident of the entrepreneur‘s performance (high emin) since in those cases 
there is reduced need for advising and monitoring. The estimates are in line with the above 
reasoning and also with observations in the literature. For example, Lerner (1995) reported 
that the VC‘s involvement increases when the need to monitor increases and that distance to 
the firm is a determinant of board membership—presumably because a VC with a high unit 
cost of service cannot offer a high level of service. Sapienza (1992) found that the more 
frequent the contact between the lead investor and the CEO, the more open the 
communication, and the less severe the conflict of perspective in the VC-CEO pair, the 
greater was the value of the involvement.  
To sum up, the VC‘s service level is highly sensitive to his or her effectiveness in the 
venture σ (most sensitive at 2.3), the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork ε2, and 
investment amount I (all positively); and the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work ε1 
(negatively). While the entrepreneur‘s effective wage rate ω does not influence s, the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary b only plays a minor (though significant) role. Though literature 
discussing VC service is numerous, factors affecting service have not been comprehensively 
identified or their sensitivities adequately studied as in this research.
29
 This knowledge would 
help entrepreneurs appreciate when they can expect a high level of VC service.   
Entrepreneur’s Effort Level  
We estimated—first from the twelve model parameters and then from the VC‘s ownership 
share α and service level s—the entrepreneur‘s effort level and the probability that the 
entrepreneur will put in his or her best effort. The regressions employed a censored model 
and a Probit model on the observations of the large as well as small hypercubes, where an 
offer had been made. Effort level can only be positive, so we choose to model it as log-
normal. Moreover, there is a limit to the effort level (the ―best effort‖ of the entrepreneur, 
which we set at 4,000 hours). So effort level, denoted by effortlimited lies in (0, 4000), with 
values equal to and above 4,000 capped and clustered at 4,000. A categorical variable 
besteffort was assigned 0 if effort level was below 4,000 and assigned 1 otherwise. 
                                                          
29 Prior research has discussed VC service in various contexts such as financial contracting (e.g., Bergemann 
and Hege, 1998);  the rationale for VC (e.g., Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998); what VCs do (e.g., Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989); how entrepreneurs value service (e.g., Hsu, 2004); impact of service (e.g., Jääskeläinen, Maula 
and Seppa, 2006; H. J. Sapienza, 1992); attention in the context of portfolio of investment (e.g., Dimov and De 
Clercq, 2006; Jääskeläinen, et al. 2006; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003; Shepherd, Armstrong, and 
Levesque, 2005; Gifford, 1997); and VCs‘ time-constraint (e.g., Petty and Gruber, in press).  




Consequently, we employ a censored regression on ln(effortlimited), censored by besteffort. 
For the Probit model, we used besteffort as the dependent variable. Table 3.6 presents the 
elasticity estimates of effort level and probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort. 
 
TABLE 3.6 
Censored Regression Model of Entrepreneur’s Effort Level and Probit Model of Probability of 
Entrepreneur Exerting Best Effort 
 
 Censored Regression Model 
DV: Effort Level 
Probit Model 




 Elasticity at means  
Large Hypercube Small Hypercube Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r -.083       (.063) -.013      (.061) -.046      (.091) -.002      (.079) 
I -.159
**
      (.067) -.040      (.026) .053      (.095) .191
***
      (.033) 
w -.468
***
      (.095) -.444
***
       (.035) -.182      (.135) -.327
***
      (.045) 
c -.255
***
      (.073) -.250
***
      (.024) -.342
***
      (.106) -.196
***
      (.031) 
b .104      (.066) .022      (.020) .056      (.095) .041      (.026) 
k1 1.552
***
      (.071) 1.511
***
      (.022) 1.243
***
      (.114) 1.136
***
      (.031) 
k2 4.575
***
      (.076) 4.293
***
       (.023) 2.304
***
      (.140) 2.147
***
      (.038) 
ε1 2.349
***
      (.080) 2.183
***
       (.024) 2.815
***
      (.167) 2.540
***
      (.043) 
ε2 6.047
***
      (.133) 6.309
***
      (.040) 4.091
***
      (.260) 4.013
***
       (.070) 
σ 2.616
***
      (.079) 2.799
***
      (.024) .197       (.128) .270
***
       (.034) 
ω -4.873
***
      (.069) -4.632
***
      (.021) -5.410
***
      (.248) -4.762
***
     (.061) 
emin .946
***
      (.075) .812
***
      (.023) .580
***
      (.111) .396
***
      (.030) 





4.027 4.359 .040 .059 
     
N 6,328 66,156 6,330 66,182 
Uncensored 
Obs. 




1,392 15,249   
LR Chi
2 
6,630 66,695 3,556 37,331 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2 
0.202 0.197 0.533 0.523 
   
α -3.045
***
      (.058) -12.044
***
   (.066) -1.069
***
      (.056) -1.189
***
     (.019) 
s .841
***
      (.045) .003
***
    (6.1e-05) -.112
***
       (.026) -.222
***
      (.009) 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
The estimates of α and s are from separate models, for which we only report the estimates. 
   
 The entrepreneur‘s effort level is affected positively by the parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, 
and emin; and negatively by w, c, and ω; but is not affected by r and b. The influence of I is 
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 Elasticity is estimated as dy/d(lnx) in this model since the dependent variable has already been log-
transformed.   
31
 Ln(Y) is predicted for the censored regression model.  




ambiguous. The parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, and σ all affect revenue positively, so the 
entrepreneur may be motivated to put in large effort when these are high. When the VC is 
highly confident about the entrepreneur, the VC‘s ownership share α would be low, which 
would motivate the entrepreneur to put in greater effort. When the VC‘s unit cost of service 
is high (high w) and/or the VC is busy (high c), he or she may not advise/monitor the 
entrepreneur adequately, which may decrease the entrepreneur‘s effort level. Similarly, when 
the entrepreneur is not adequately committed, competent, and willing to work hard (high ω), 
he or she would put in a low level of effort. Finally, the parameters r, b, and I are either 
inconsequential or ambiguous for the following reason: as revealed in the previous Table 3.5, 
when the cost of capital r is high, the VC would claim a high ownership share α negatively 
affecting the entrepreneur‘s effort level; but the VC‘s service level s would also increase in 
turn positively affecting that effort level. The same is the case with the base salary b paid to 
the entrepreneur and investment amount I.  
 It is notable that the entrepreneur‘s effort is highly positively sensitive to his or her 
effectiveness in teamwork ε2, the relative importance of teamwork k2, and the VC‘s 
effectiveness σ (ε2 being the most sensitive, at 6); it is highly negatively sensitive to the 
entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω. Finally, though counter-intuitively, the VC cannot use 
high base salary b as a means to obtain better effort from the entrepreneur because the 
coefficient of b—though positive—is insignificant even at a 10% confidence level.  
 The influence of the various parameters on the probability of entrepreneur exerting 
best effort is the same as on effort level, except that the influences of the VC‘s unit cost of 
service w and effectiveness σ are ambiguous. Plausible explanations are that these parameters 
(that also affect the VC‘s service level) are influential only when effort level is moderate 
(and responsive to that service level) and that many sample points result in best effort 
anyway. We further note that the above probability is highly (negatively) sensitive to the 
entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω and (positively) to his or her effectiveness in teamwork ε2 
(the former being the most sensitive, at -4.76). Again, it is noteworthy that base salary 
payment is not a means to make the entrepreneur put in best effort. Finally, in terms of deal 
outcomes, the entrepreneur‘s effort level is highly sensitive to the VC‘s ownership share α (-
3 for the large hypercube and -12 for the small hypercube that may be empirically more 
relevant). The probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort is also considerably negatively 
affected by α. Though significant, the VC‘s service level s only plays a minor role.    
 The above results are interesting because the entrepreneur‘s performance is the 
primary factor affecting the success of the venture (e.g., Fried and Hisrich, 1994). 
Consequently, understanding its determinants would help VCs and entrepreneurs in 
enhancing the chance that their venture will succeed. While the literature has emphatically 
documented the impact of ownership share (a deal outcome) on entrepreneurial motivation 




(e.g., Amit, et al. 1998; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Fee, 2002; and Nisar, 2005), prior 
research is scant on determinants of entrepreneurial effort in terms of fundamental 
parameters of the VC investment process.  
Probability of Entrepreneur Accepting an Offer 
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the probability that the entrepreneur will 
accept the offer, by employing a Probit model on the observations of the large as well as the 
small hypercubes where the VC had made an offer.   The elasticity estimates are presented in 
Table 3.7.  
 
TABLE 3.7 
Probit Model of Probability of Entrepreneur Accepting an Offer 
 
 DV: Probability of Entrepreneur Accepting an Offer 
Elasticity at means  
Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r -.055      (.080) -.010      (.069) 
I .1274      (.083) .152
***
      (.029) 
w -.280
**
      (.118) -.341
***
      (.040) 
c -.316
***
      (.092) -.211
***
       (.027) 
b .103      (.083) .043
*
      (.023) 
k1 1.064
***
      (.098) .990
***
      (.027) 
k2 2.238
***
      (.123) 2.216
***
      (.034) 
ε1 2.526
***
      (.141) 2.237
***
      (.036) 
ε2 3.951
***
      (.227) 3.953
***
      (.063) 
σ .550
***
      (.111) .657
***
      (.031) 
ω -4.699
***
      (.199) -4.258
***
      (.051) 
emin -.215
**
      (.095) -.387
***
      (.026) 
   
Y predicted at means .069 .092 
   










   
α -.891
***
      (.045) -.911
***
      (.014) 
s -.036
*
      (.022) -.106
***
       (.007) 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
The estimates of α and s are from separate models, for which we only report the estimates. 
   
 The probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer is positively influenced by the 
revenue-related parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, and σ; possibly positively by I and b; negatively by 
w, c, ω, and emin; and not influenced by r. High expected revenue facilitates deal closure. 
High investment amount I by the VC and base salary b to the entrepreneur possibly 
encourage the latter to accept the offer because the entrepreneur needs them and they can 




ultimately increase the entrepreneur‘s return. However, their influence is not certain since the 
revenue (and the entrepreneur‘s return) need not be high when the investment amount is high 
and base salary is only a small portion of the entrepreneur‘s overall (long-term) return (but a 
deal may not materialize if the entrepreneur is not paid a base salary that is essential to 
him/her in the short-term). If the VC is time-constrained (high c) or his or her unit cost of 
service w is high, he or she would demand a large ownership share α possibly making the 
offer unattractive to the entrepreneur.  If the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω is high, the 
total cost of effort may be high which also may make the offer less attractive to the 
entrepreneur. Finally, if the VC is overly optimistic about the entrepreneur‘s performance 
(high emin), he or she may claim a low ownership share α that may lead to high return to the 
entrepreneur but loss to the VC (i.e., the entrepreneur may find e
*
 < emin). Though seemingly 
counter-intuitive, a high emin decreases the chance that the entrepreneur will accept the offer 
because the protective clauses in the offer will discourage him or her from accepting a deal 
where the VC would incur a loss.   
 It is noteworthy that the probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer (and deal being 
closed) is most sensitive to the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω (at -4.7) followed by the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork (at 3.95). It is logical that deals are unlikely to 
close for entrepreneurs who are less committed, competent, and willing to work hard. 
Moreover, deals may not close if the entrepreneur is not expected to work well with the VC. 
On the other hand, an excessive base salary does not appear to be an effective means to get 
the entrepreneur to accept the offer because the entrepreneur‘s ownership share and 
consequently his or her overall return will both decrease. In any case, base salary is among 
the factors least affecting the probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer. In terms of deal 
outcomes, a large VC ownership share decreases the chance that a deal will close, but the 
VC‘s service level appears to only play a minor (though significant) role. 
 The probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer (i.e., deal being closed) is 
important for obvious reasons. Specifically, these findings suggest that entrepreneurs should 
lower their unit cost of effort and be determined to work well with the VC in order to secure 
VC financing. They also suggest that deal closures may not be influenced by base salary 
payment (except when the entrepreneur is not offered a base salary that is essential to him or 
her), so VCs should strive to offer as high an ownership share as possible to the entrepreneur 
instead. The literature has scantily considered base salary payment so it does not have much 
to say about its impact on deal closures as we do.    
Entrepreneur’s Return 
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the log of expected return to the 
entrepreneur E, by employing an OLS model on the observations of the large as well as the 




small hypercubes where the entrepreneur accepted the offer. The elasticity estimates are 
presented in Table 3.8.  
 
TABLE 3.8 
OLS Model of Entrepreneur’s Return 
 




Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r .040      (.035) .016      (.032) 
I .018      (.038) .088
***
      (.014) 
w -.065      (.048) -.098
***
      (.017) 
c -.098
***
      (.038) -.076
***
      (.012) 
b -.022      (.036) .018
*
      (.011) 
k1 .461
***
      (.043) .418
***
      (.012) 
k2 1.009
***
      (.059) 1.070
***
      (.016) 
ε1 .657
***
      (.055) .723
***
      (.015) 
ε2 1.367
***
      (.103) 1.228
***
      (.031) 
σ .147
***
      (.040) .112
***
      (.012) 
ω -.412
***
      (.030) -.454
***
       (.008) 
emin .472
***
       (.039) .439
***
     (.011) 
   
Ln(Y) predicted at 
means 
17.853 16.911 
   








   
α -.543
***
      (.021) -.574
***
      (.006) 
s .053
***
      (.017) .043
***
      (.005) 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
The estimates of α and s are from separate models, for which we only report the estimates. 
 
The expected return to the entrepreneur is affected positively by the parameters k1, k2, 
ε1, ε2, σ, and emin; negatively by c and ω; possibly positively by I and b; and possibly 
negatively by w; but is not affected by r. The parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, and σ are positively 
related to revenue, so they affect the expected return to the entrepreneur. As per Table 2.2, 
when the VC is more confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance (i.e., emin is high), the 
latter may be allotted a large ownership share that may increase his or her return. A busy VC 
(with a high c) would seek a large ownership share α (as per Table 3.5) even while offering 
inadequate service to the venture (leading to lower revenue), both of which would decrease 
the entrepreneur‘s return. An entrepreneur who has a large unit cost of effort ω would have a 
low return. When the investment amount I is high, the revenue (and the entrepreneur‘s 
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return) may be high (though not necessarily). A high unit cost of service w that would 
necessitate the VC to seek a large ownership share α (Table 3.5) may consequently reduce 
the entrepreneur‘s return—but not necessarily, because decreased VC service resulting from 
a high w (Table 3.5) would also reduce the entrepreneur‘s effort level and total cost of effort 
(Table 3.6). The cost of capital r does not affect the entrepreneur‘s return since there is no 
direct relationship between the two as seen from the model equations in Chapter 2.  
It is noteworthy that the entrepreneur‘s return is most sensitive to his or her 
effectiveness in teamwork ε2 (at 1.3), followed by the relative importance of teamwork k2 (at 
1), implying that getting financed (and advised) by VCs is good for entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, entrepreneurs in ventures where teamwork (i.e., VC service) is not crucial would 
have lower returns. Moreover, for reasons cited earlier, higher investment amount I may not 
always mean higher return to the entrepreneur. Furthermore, a high base salary may not mean 
high return; even if it does, its impact is minor. Finally, the VC‘s time-constraint (c) only 
appears to be a minor factor decreasing the entrepreneur‘s return. In terms of α and s, the 
entrepreneur‘s expected return decreases about 0.54% for a 1% increase in the VC‘s 
ownership share, while the VC‘s service s plays a minor role in directly increasing that 
return. These findings imply that entrepreneurs should focus on teamwork and consequently 
on the VC they select (because the VC‘s service has a multiplier effect on the entrepreneur‘s 
effort in generating revenue) and only seek a necessary base salary in order to increase their 
return. Evidence from the VC industry supports the above findings (e.g., Gerschick, 2006).  
VC’s Excess Profit 
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the log of the VC‘s excess profit P, by 
employing an OLS model (Model 1) on the observations of the large as well as the small 
hypercubes where the entrepreneur accepted the offer.   In order to shed more light on the 
influence of the VC‘s belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin, we also 
estimated log of VC‘s excess profit on all the parameters excluding emin (Model 2) and then 
only on emin (Model 3). The elasticity estimates are presented in Table 3.9. 
 The VC‘s excess profit is positively affected by the parameters r, I, and b, and the 
revenue-related parameters k1, k2, ε1, and ε2; and negatively by c, σ, ω, and emin; but is not 
affected by w. When the parameters r, I, and b are large, the VC‘s return from his or her 
alternate investment would be large too, as per Equation 4 (all else equal). If the venture is 
profitable enough to assure the VC such a large return, the VC‘s excess profit is also likely to 
be large. In general, the VC‘s excess profit would be large when the revenue is large as 
evident from the positive sensitivities to revenue-related parameters. All else equal, when the 
VC is time-constrained (high c), he or she would serve the venture inadequately, so revenue 
and the VC‘s excess profit would reduce. Again, everything equal, when the VC‘s 




effectiveness σ is high in the venture, his or her service level would increase (as seen from 
Table 3.5), which may cause a larger increase in the cost of service than in the VC‘s share of 
revenue, resulting in decreased excess profit. When the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω is 
high, his or her effort and revenue would be low leading to low excess profit for the VC. 
Finally, when the VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur‘s performance (i.e., emin is 
high), the former may claim a low ownership share leading to low excess profit.  
 
TABLE 3.9 
OLS Model of VC’s Excess Profit 
 




Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
r .360
***
   (.033) .317
***  (.065)  .122
***
  (.033) .141
**




***  (.070)  1.096
*** (.014) .890
***
  (.026)  
w .061      (.046) .052      (.089)  .012      (.018) .013      (.033)  
c -.085
**







   (.034) -.002    (.066)  .062
***
  (.011) .060
***
  (.020)  
k1 .061      (.041) .127     (.079)  .105
***
  (.013) .094
***
  (.024)  
k2 .007      (.056) .232
**




    (.017) .175
***
  (.031)  
ε1 .246
***
   (.053) .191
*
    (.103)  .324
***
  (.015) .245
***
  (.028)  
ε2 .129      (.098) .406
**




  (.032) .276
***
  (.059)  
σ -.220
***













*** (.037)  -2.349
*** (.048) -2.339*** (.011)  -2.219***(.014) 




15.115 15.115 15.115 14.041 14.041 14.041 
       
N 1,606 1,606 1,606 17,658 17,658 17,658 
F
 
444 20 2,364 4,004 134 26,575 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.768 0.115 0.596 0.731 0.077 0.601 
       
α .818
***
      (.036) .698
***
      (.011) 
s -.083
***
      (.028) -.114
***
      (.009) 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
The estimates of α and s are from separate models, for which we only report the estimates. 
    
The most striking observation from Table 3.9 is that the VC‘s excess profit P is almost 
exclusively influenced by emin. The explanatory power of the model that only includes emin is 
about 60%, whereas that of the model that includes all of the rest of the parameters is merely 
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12%. Because elasticities reported are estimated at means and because the VC‘s excess profit 
is non-linear and non-monotonic in emin and α (as revealed in Table 2.2 and Figures 3.2 and 
3.12), we do not discuss the estimates for emin and α except to reiterate that the VC‘s belief on 
emin (and consequently the ownership share he or she claims) is the most important 
determinant of the VC‘s excess profit.    When the entrepreneur has private information about 
his or her characteristics, it is thus reasonable to expect the VC to underrate the entrepreneur 
with a low emin. With that reasoning, the regression finding is consistent with our earlier 
finding from the simulation study that the value of emin that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit 
P, namely eminP, is often very low (see Figures 3.7 and 3.8).  
Investment Deal Welfare 
We estimated from the twelve model parameters the log of expected investment deal welfare 
(the sum of the expected return to the entrepreneur and the expected excess profit of the VC) 
by employing an OLS model on the observations of the large as well as the small hypercubes 
where the entrepreneur accepted the offer.   The elasticity estimates are presented in Table 
3.10. 
 The parameters that affect the entrepreneur‘s return E as well as the VC‘s excess 
profit P positively (I, b, k1, k2, ε1, and ε2) influence the investment deal welfare W positively 
(since W is merely the sum of E and P). Those affecting E and P negatively (c and ω) affect 
W negatively. Parameters that positively affect one but do not affect the other (r) would 
affect W positively. Similarly, parameters that negatively affect one but do not affect the 
other (w) would affect W negatively. The parameters affecting one positively but affecting 
the other negatively (σ and emin) can affect W either way.  
 There are two noteworthy observations about Table 3.10. One, investment deal 
welfare is most sensitive to the teamwork related parameters k2 (the relative importance of 
teamwork) and ε2 (the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork). Particularly, a 1% increase 
in ε2 would increase W by 1.1%, at means. This implies the desirability (from the welfare 
point of view) of VC financing where the VC and the entrepreneur work together. Two, it is 
the entrepreneur who plays the primary role in influencing welfare because the other 
entrepreneur-related parameters (namely, k1, ε1, and ω) also have high sensitivities while the 
rest of the parameters only have minor sensitivities. Together those two observations imply 












OLS Model of Investment Deal Welfare 
 




Large Hypercube Small Hypercube 
r .061
**
      (.031) .034
***
       (.029) 
I .157
***
      (.034) .198
***
      (.012) 
w -.054       (.043) -.088
***
      (.016) 
c -.093
***
      (.034) -.075
***
      (.011) 
b .005      (.032) .017
*
     (.010) 
k1 .428
***
      (.038) .386
***
      (.011) 
k2 .885
***
      (.052) .947
***
      (.015) 
ε1 .622
***
      (.049) .686
***
      (.013) 
ε2 1.218
***
      (.091) 1.086
***
      (.028) 
σ .076
**
      (.036) .044
***
      (.011) 
ω -.399
***
      (.026) -.430
***
      (.007) 
emin .091
***
      (.035) .135
***
      (.010) 
   
Ln(Y) predicted at 
means 
18.048 17.079 
   








   
α -.261
***
      (.021) -.340
***
      (.006) 
s .010      (.017) -.001      (.005) 
Significance level: 
*** 
 p < 0.01; 
**  
p < 0.05; and 
*  
p < 0.10. Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
The estimates of α and s are from separate models, for which we only report the estimates. 
 
 Table 3.11 summarizes our regression findings. We note that these findings are 
essentially our predictions (not empirical observations) about various parameter sensitivities 
of deal outcomes because these resulted from synthetic data (not empirical data). So these are 
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r - + + N.A. N.A N.A. N.A. + + 
I - + + -? +? +? +? + + 
w + + - - -? - -? N.A. -? 
c + + - - - - - - - 
b - + + N.A. N.A. +? +? + +? 
k1 + - - + + + + +? + 
k2 + - + + + + + +? + 
ε1 + - - + + + + + + 
ε2 + - + + + + + +? + 
σ + - + + +? + + - + 
ω N.A. N.A N.A. - - - - - - 
emin + - - + + - + - + 
α N.A. N.A N.A. - - - - + - 
s N.A. N.A N.A. + - - + - N.A. 
Legend: ―+‖ indicates positive influence; ―-‖ negative; ―?‖ possibly; and ―N. A.‖ Not affected. 
 
3.5 SOME QUESTIONS OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE 
Next we synthesize the results of the regression analyses to answer some questions of 
practical importance.  
How do deal outcomes change when the VC is time-constrained? 
A busy VC (with a high c) needs to claim a large ownership share α and allocate less service 
s in order to fulfill his or her incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 3. A large α and a 
low s together, probably make the investment more attractive to the VC, so the VC would be 
more likely to put forth an offer. However, the deal would be less attractive from the 
entrepreneur‘s view point, so his or her effort level and consequently the probability of 
accepting the offer both decrease. Even if accepted, the returns to the two parties and the deal 
welfare would all be less than what they would be when the VC is not time-constrained. The 
literature has scarcely dealt with the impact of VCs‘ time constraints on deal outcomes, so 
prior findings similar to ours are difficult to find.  
How do deal outcomes change when the VC offers a high base salary to the entrepreneur? 
Can base salary play an important role in VC deals? 
A base salary is basically a hurdle to the VC in investing in the venture (because that money 
would be lost if the venture fails), so a high base salary decreases the chance that the VC will 




put forth an offer; but it would increase the chance that the offer—if made—would be 
accepted by the entrepreneur. Though the VC would claim a larger ownership share, he or 
she would also allocate more service which in turn would increase revenue and possibly the 
entrepreneur‘s return as well. The entrepreneur‘s effort is however not affected by the size of 
his or her base salary. The increased ownership share and revenue (the latter resulting from 
the increased service level of the VC) exceed the increase cost of service resulting in 
increased excess profit for the VC. Thus it appears that high base salaries to entrepreneurs are 
desirable. However, as well observed by prior research, base salary payment is not incentive 
compatible so VCs would resist paying high base salaries to entrepreneurs (this might be a 
reason why fixed payments like base salary have not received much scrutiny in the 
literature). 
As per our predictions, base salary is unlikely to play a major role in VC deals (after 
it is agreed upon by the two parties exogenously to our model). We recall our Proposition 3 
(in Chapter 2) that suggests ambiguous effects of base salary on the returns to the two parties 
and deal welfare. In fact, the coefficient magnitudes and statistical significance of base salary 
are weak in our regressions for various deal outcomes presumably because the size and 
changes in base salary are small relative to the investment amount or the expected revenue of 
the venture. However, the VC may lose an otherwise profitable investment opportunity if the 
VC refuses to pay the base salary that is absolutely essential to the entrepreneur (while 
determining the base salary exogenously). So, base salary may play a role in deals.  
What is the influence of teamwork vis-à-vis the entrepreneur’s solo-work in VC investments? 
The most noteworthy finding from regressions is that teamwork is the most influential factor 
in VC investment deals (i.e., for most of the deal outcomes studied). Recall that the 
probabilities of offer made, best effort, and offer accepted; and investment deal welfare are 
all most sensitive to the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork (ε2) and highly sensitive to 
the relative importance of teamwork (k2). Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital must 
appreciate the importance of teamwork and convince the VC of their competence and 
willingness to cooperate with the latter. Ventures where VC advisory support is not crucial 
for success are less likely to be VC financed.  
How do deal outcomes change with the entrepreneur’s disutility of effort and the VC’s belief 
about the entrepreneur’s performance? 
The entrepreneur‘s privately known unit cost of effort (ω) does not directly affect either 
whether the VC will put forth an offer or the offer terms (though the information asymmetry 
forces the VC to take on a belief about the entrepreneur‘s performance—i.e., effort level 
emin). But a high ω decreases the chance of a deal closure as well as the returns to the two 
parties (ω is one of the factors to which deal outcomes are highly sensitive).  




 The VC‘s belief about the entrepreneur‘s performance (emin) enables the VC to put 
forth an offer, but decreases the chance that the entrepreneur will accept the offer (because 
the entrepreneur may find that he or she cannot meet the expectations of the VC). The VC‘s 
excess profitable peaks for a particular value of his or her belief about the entrepreneur‘s 
minimum effort level emin (performance) and that value is most often low, though being too 
pessimistic would preclude the VC from investing in the first place. Consequently, making 
entrepreneurial characteristics more transparent can benefit the entrepreneur.  
When would the VC demand a high ownership share? When would he/ she allocate more 
service to the venture? 
As noted from Table 3.5, the VC would demand a high ownership share α when the 
investment amount I is high (to protect that large investment), expected revenue generation is 
low (i.e., especially, teamwork is expected to be weak), and when the information asymmetry 
is large.  
 Again as noted from the above table, the VC‘s service level s would be high when the 
investment amount I is high, the teamwork is expected to be strong, and when the VC is able 
to meaningfully contribute to the venture‘s success. These observations are well-known in 
the prior research. 
How does a limit on the entrepreneur’s effort level affect deal outcomes? 
As noted in Simulation I, a limit on the entrepreneur‘s effort level is what gives rise to the 
existence of ―critical‖ points in the VC‘s belief about the entrepreneur‘s performance (emin) 
that maximize the VC‘s excess profit, the return to the entrepreneur, and the deal welfare, 
thereby forcing the VC to be careful with his or her belief (and consequently the ownership 
share he or she should demand). Analytical approach in the literature often ignores bounds on 
parameters, so our findings with respect to the above-mentioned critical points are an 
addition to the literature.  
What is the effect on deal outcomes (all other things equal) of increasing the entrepreneur’s 
base salary when correspondingly decreasing his/her ownership share? 
As seen from Table 3.11, the VC‘s excess profit is positively sensitive to base salary as well 
as the VC‘s ownership share. So the VC stands to gain from the base salary payment (since 
his or her ownership share would increase). This is not to recommend that the VC should pay 
an exorbitant base salary since a high VC ownership share is not a guarantee for the VC to 
eventually break-even from the investment (fixed payments like base salary are not incentive 
compatible). But when not willing to pay the base salary that is essential to the entrepreneur 
(if that salary is not unreasonably high), the VC may lose an otherwise profitable deal.  




 Our predictions based on the regressions suggest that base salary would not influence 
the entrepreneur‘s motivation (as reflected in his or her effort level) but may increase his or 
her overall return (when controlled for ownership share). However, if his or her ownership 
share is correspondingly decreased, the entrepreneur‘s motivation and return will both 
decrease. So the overall influence of base salary on these deal outcomes is ambiguous, 
consistent with our Proposition 3.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Our illustrative example in Chapter 2 had suggested the existence of a ―critical‖ point in the 
VC‘s belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin (and a corresponding point in 
the VC‘s ownership share) that maximizes the VC‘s excess profit as well as the investment 
deal welfare. Because of the difficulty in obtaining analytical solutions (due to bounds on 
parameters and categorical decision rules in the sequential deal process), we carried out a 
simulation study to investigate if indeed such a critical point exists. Moreover, we used 
synthetic data from simulation on regressions to uncover insights not readily revealed by the 
mathematical model.   
 We carried out two simulations, one with 1.04 million sample points (arising from 
5,200 11-dimensional quasi-random samples each checked against 200 values of emin in its 
full range) and the other with 10,400 12-dimensional quasi-random sample points. The 
second simulation generated synthetic data which we used on regressions to estimate 
different deal outcomes such as VC ownership share, the probability of entrepreneur 
accepting an offer, and deal welfare. Since we did not use sample weights, we carried out a 
separate simulation using 100,000 sample points from a small hypercube that is roughly 
centered on the parameter values of our illustrative example that we had used with 
justification from the literature.  
The simulation study revealed several insights. First, Simulation I confirmed our 
expectation of the above-mentioned critical point. In fact, simulation revealed different 
critical points in emin that separately maximize the VC‘s excess profit, the entrepreneur‘s 
return, and the deal welfare. Based on these and further findings, we conjectured that critical 
emin that maximizes the deal welfare is bounded (at the lower limit) by the point that 
maximizes the VC‘s excess profit and (at the upper limit) by the point that maximizes the 
entrepreneur‘s return. We conjectured similar bounds for critical VC ownership share. 
Second, the regression estimates using the synthetic data from the small hypercube (which 
may be empirically more relevant) are comparable to those from the large hypercube 
suggesting that properties are homogenous across the deal space. Major regression findings 
are that: (i) Teamwork (so VC advisory support) is crucial to VC financing (specifically, the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork is the most important factor affecting deal 




outcomes, followed by the relative importance of teamwork to the venture); (ii) The 
entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort is the most important factor that would negatively affect 
deal outcomes, once an offer has been made; (iii) The VC‘s high expectation about the 
entrepreneur‘s performance would lead to high share of the value created in the venture taken 
by the latter; and (iv) base salary payment normally would only play a minor role in deal 
outcomes.  
Our simulation study has two notable limitations. First, we had to use a specific 
functional form for the revenue function unlike in our theoretical model that used generic 
function. However, though empirically different functional forms may be noticed, a Cobb-
Douglas function meets all our model assumptions and is widely employed in economic 
theory. Second, our Simulation I only conjectures that there exist critical values of ownership 
share that maximize the returns to the two parties and the deal welfare. We do not have 
formal proof for the above conjecture, but our conjecture is of high practical significance.  
Opportunities for further work may arise from the large amount of synthetic data that 
we already possess. We may, for example, carry out more regressions to check the robustness 
of the findings or to uncover new insights by segregating data with respect to, for example, 
whether solo-work is crucial (k1 > k2) or teamwork is crucial. Another opportunity is to try 
alternate functional forms for the revenue function. Moreover, we can identify the part of the 
large hypercube that is practically most relevant if we can collect empirical data on model 
















Survey of Venture Capitalists 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
If we were to use empirical data to test our predictions using, say, regression analysis, we 
would need data on the various deal parameters of our model pertaining to proposals that 
received active consideration by VC firms for investment.
35
 That data would typically come 
from due diligence and a subsequent deal process while some would pertain to the VC and 
the entrepreneur. However, another (more practical) approach for empirical validation might 
be to seek the opinions of practicing VCs—who have negotiated a large number of 
investment deals especially with first-time entrepreneurs—in the form of their level of 
agreement/disagreement with our model assumptions and predictions. A substantial degree of 
support might then suggest that our model is empirically valid.  
 We take the second approach and report on a survey of eight seasoned VCs located in 
Toronto, Waterloo, and Montreal and affiliated with seven firms operating in three 
countries—Canada, USA, and UK. Specifically, we administered an online questionnaire 
using the survey portal SurveyMonkey which asked questions related to our assumptions, 
and predictions from our propositions, conjecture, and regressions (that used synthetic data 
from simulation). We found support for the vast majority of our important predictions. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: While we describe our survey planning, design, 
and administration in §4.2, we present the credentials of the eight VCs in §4.3. §4.4 
compares the survey findings with our predictions, followed by §4.5 that concludes.                  
4.2 SURVEY PLANNING, DESIGN, AND ADMINISTRATION 
Our first task in the survey project was to find how many VCs we could enlist to respond to 
our survey. One VC whom we knew (our VC contact) agreed to help us with enlisting VCs, 
so we met him for a face to face preliminary discussion. We briefed him of our theoretical 
research and the objective of the proposed survey. He advised us to contact him when were 
ready with our survey instrument. The original survey instrument had 94 items of different 
kinds—many asked the respondent to choose from multiple choice (e.g., specifying level of 
agreement in a five-point scale and answering yes or no) while the rest required the 
respondent to provide quantitative data or a qualitative response. Those items covered our 
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assumptions, and predictions from our propositions, conjecture, and regressions (the last one 
relates to parameter sensitivities of deal outcomes).         
  Our VC contact advised us that the questionnaire needed be shortened drastically (so 
VCs do not give up before completing the survey). Specifically, he made it clear that the 
respondents should not have to spend more than fifteen minutes to complete the survey and 
advised us that there should only be fifteen to twenty items in the survey instrument.
36
 He 
further advised us to administer the survey online (perhaps that mode is more convenient 
than mail mode to VCs, in the opinion of our VC contact).
37
 He informed us that he could 
connect us with seven VCs. He also asked us to contact him again when the finalized survey 
instrument was ready so that he could send his emails to the VCs requesting them to 
complete our survey. We could then email the survey to those VCs. Furthermore, he advised 
us that we could contact over the phone any VC who had not completed the survey within 
three days after the first contact. 
 The need to limit the number of items in the survey instrument to a maximum of 
twenty posed severe restrictions in redesigning the survey. Since we had more than 90 items 
in the original survey instrument, limiting the number of items to twenty would be 
impractical if we were to seek VCs‘ responses to as many of our predictions as possible. So 
we decided to only include items for the most important assumptions and predictions.  
Consequently, we first removed the items that sought quantitative data and qualitative 
responses from VCs (those responses were only designed to give us some parameter values 
that apply in practice, which are not as important to us as VCs‘ responses to our assumptions 
and predictions).
 
We then removed items related to proposition P2 since revising offers by 
increasing base salary does not seem to be an important problem in practice. As for the items 
pertaining to the predictions from our regressions, we prioritized them and removed the 
following items: (a) those relating to parameters that were predicted to not significantly 
affect many of the deal outcomes (e.g., the cost of venture capital r); (b) most of the items 
pertaining to ambiguous predictions (e.g., some predictions about investment amount I and 
unit cost of service w; and some predictions concerning the probability of entrepreneur 
exerting best effort and the VC‘s excess profit); (c) items pertaining to predictions that are 
very likely to hold in practice anyway (e.g., those concerning the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of 
effort ω); and (d) the items  pertaining to deal welfare (which is merely the sum of the 
entrepreneur‘s return and the VC‘s excess profit). 
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 Since we were still left with about fifty items, we decided to remove ten more items, 
split the seven VCs (other than our VC contact) to form two groups of five and four 
respondents each (with each group also including our VC contact), and administer separate 
surveys to the two groups with twenty items each. That would allow us to seek five responses 
for twenty items and four responses for the remaining twenty items, instead of eight 
responses each for only twenty items that was possible if we were to administer a single 
survey to all the respondents. Consequently we removed some more items pertaining to the 
predictions of our regressions and finally retained thirty-nine items for two surveys with one 
item included in both surveys. Since the assumption that rejected offers can be revised was 
the basis for a considerable part of our theoretical model, we decided to include an item 
pertaining to that assumption in both surveys in order to increase the likelihood that we know 
unambiguously whether rejected offers are indeed revised or not. All the retained items 
involved statements where the respondent was asked to choose his/her level of agreement 
with that statement in a seven-point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree). Five-point or 
seven-point scales are normally used for level-of-agreement type items (e.g., Trochim, 2006) 
and these permit a neutral response.   
 Once the thirty-nine items to be included in two survey instruments were finalized, 
we divided them into two sets of twenty items each for the two instruments (repeating one 
item in both sets). While doing so, we tried to distribute the items relating to the predictions 
of our regressions into the two sets on the basis of deal outcomes and model parameters (i.e., 
if there were two items involving same parameter or same deal outcome, we included one in 
one instrument and the other in the other instrument). As for the items relating to 
assumptions, and predictions from the propositions and the conjecture, we evenly distributed 
the items into the two sets as far as possible.  
When the two instruments were ready, we rephrased the items (statements) as 
necessary for easy reading and clarity (e.g., we replaced compound sentences with simple 
ones) since questions should be simple and unambiguous (Arsham, 2011). We also rephrased 
the items as necessary to ensure that positively-keyed items and negatively-keyed items were 
about equal in number in each set to avoid acquiescence bias—namely, the tendency of 
respondents to uniformly agree or disagree to the items in a survey (Frary, 1996).
38
 For 
example, we rephrased an item from positively-keyed to negatively-keyed if necessary. The 
rephrasing exercise took place in several rounds of review and editing between the researcher 
and the members in the advisory committee until the two survey instruments (named Surveys 
                                                          
38
 A positively-keyed item is one for which a response of agreement is supportive of the model prediction 
associated with that item; a negatively-keyed items is one for which a response of disagreement is supportive.    




A and B) were finalized.
 39
 The thirty nine unique items (statements) in those two surveys 
together are presented in Appendix F where each item is also assigned a questionnaire item 
number for reference purposes.
40
  
We created the online versions of surveys A and B in SurveyMonkey, a popular 
online survey portal. The surveys displayed the University of Waterloo logo.
41
 We allowed 
only one response per computer. Though the respondents could edit their responses before 
exiting or completing the survey, we did not allow them to do so afterwards. Neither did we 
display survey results to the respondents once they completed the survey. For anonymity, we 
set the surveys not to collect identifying information about the respondents (e.g., Internet 
Protocol (IP) address). When we were ready with our two online surveys, we informed our 
VC contact who in turn sent out his recruitment emails to the other seven VCs requesting 
them to participate in our survey.
 
We then sent out our introduction email that also contained 
the online survey link to those VCs as well as our VC contact in two groups. We present the 
survey instrument A in its SurveyMonkey print version in Appendix E as a sample. Survey B 
contained items 2 and 21 to 39, but was otherwise identical with survey A.  
Survey A had hundred percent response rate, while one VC did not participate in 
survey B.
42, 43
 When we analyzed the survey responses, we found that responses to seven 
items appeared to be inconsistent with our predictions (out of the total thirty nine). Hence we 
decided to administer one more round of the survey with those seven items rephrased for 
greater clarity, for a reconfirmation of those apparently inconsistent responses. We prepared 
new survey instruments (named surveys A2 and B2) each of them containing eight rephrased 
items (one of those seven items had two rephrased versions).
44
 Since we could include a 
maximum of twenty items in each instrument, we also included twenty four of the remaining 
thirty two items (twelve each in surveys A2 and B2) in order to maximize the overall number 
of responses from the survey project. To avoid administering the same item to a respondent 
                                                          
39
 At this stage, we obtained ethics clearance for the survey project from the Office of Research Ethics (ORE) of 
the University of Waterloo (ORE reference # 16864, Project Title: ―Venture Capital Investment: Initiating and 
Revising the Deal‖).    
40
 The reference number of some of the items in that table have suffix where ―a‖ indicates the original 
statement, and ―b‖ and ―c‖ indicate the rephrased versions of the corresponding original statement, discussion 
on which follows in this section. That table also shows the total number of responses received, the distribution 
of responses across different response choices, and the weighted average score for each item, discussion on 
which follows in §4.4.      
41
 Fox, Crask, and Kim (1988) found that university sponsorship improves response rate.  
42
 We decided not to follow up telephonically (from ethics point of view) because it was respondents‘ decision 
to participate or not and also because only one did not participate.  
43
 Non-response bias is not a problem here since all survey items apply uniformly to our respondents (Cui, 
2003) who are all of similar professional stature.    
44
 Though we could limit the item length to twenty five words or less recommended by the literature (e.g., 
Garson, 2009) for most of the original thirty nine items, the rephrased items often had to be longer; however, we 
split those items into two or three simple sentences where possible.     




in the two rounds, items that appeared in survey A in the first round were now included in 
survey B2 and vice versa. The eight items (out of thirty two) that were excluded were those 
that had clear responses in the first round (i.e., they each had either a very high or a very low 
average score and usually had responses that were not widely dispersed).
45
 The second-round 
of survey was then administered, but only one VC (out of four) responded to survey A2 and 
none responded to survey B2. We then compiled and analyzed the responses of both rounds, 
which we report in §4.4 after discussing the respondents in §4.3.                
4.3 SURVEY RESPONDENTS  
The online survey was administered to eight VCs of seven venture capital firms (with two of 
those VCs affiliated with one firm). In this section, we present anonymous details of the VCs 
and their firms. Since we knew from our VC contact the identity of those VCs and their 
firms, we could collect information about those VCs and their firms by accessing those 
firms‘ websites. All firms invest in high-growth technology companies at various growth 
stages including seed and early stages. Their investments typically range in size from C$ 
500,000 to C$ 10 million. Some of these firms specifically state that they do not seek control 
in invested ventures, but all the firms actively commit their time and resources to ensure the 
success of ventures where their partners often take a seat in the board and use their expertise 
to play a key role for the success of the venture.        
The VC from firm F1 has more than five years of investing experience and even 
longer operational leadership including board experience. This VC‘s investment experience 
includes that as the lead investor in at least five ventures some of which have also exited 
successfully, while the VC‘s operational experience includes CEO/COO positions in 
entrepreneurial ventures. Firm F1 has operations in the US and Canada and invests in 
information and communication technologies (ICT), has five partners (VCs), and has more 
than a hundred investments in its past and current portfolios.  
The VC from firm F2 has more than ten years of investing and intellectual property 
legal experience focused on technology companies including board experience. The VC has 
negotiated and closed more than a hundred deals and was associated with more than ten 
successful exits. Firm F2 is a Canadian company that also has operations in Europe and 
invests in ICT. It has five partners, more than C$ 300 million under management, and more 
than fifteen ventures in its current portfolio, and has successfully exited from more than 
twenty ventures.       
The VC from firm F3 co-founded that firm and holds board positions in various 
firms. In more than ten years of venture capital experience, the VC mobilized about C$ 200 
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million in venture capital and invested in twenty ventures many of which exited through 
acquisitions or Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).  Firm F3 is based in Canada and is focused on 
life sciences ventures. It has five partners and there are five healthcare/biotechnology 
ventures in its current portfolio. The firm has also successfully exited from more than five 
ventures. 
The VC from firm F4 has more than five years of experience as a VC, also as a board 
member, and several years of experience as a high ranking private equity investment banker 
and as a consultant for large companies in the ICT sector. Firm F4 is a Canadian company 
operating in multiple locations with diverse interests in ICT, green technologies, and life 
sciences among others but with partners usually focused on specific sectors. About fifteen 
partners take care of more than C$ 500 million under management in numerous portfolio 
companies.   
The VC from firm F5 has ten years of experience as a VC. He/She is a member in 
boards, has extensive experience in all facets of venture capital deals—valuation, structuring, 
and closing, and also has several years of industry experience. Firm F5 is Toronto based and 
invests in growth ventures in the ICT sector. It has five partners currently overseeing more 
than fifteen portfolio companies. It has already exited successfully from more than twenty 
ventures. 
The VC from firm F6 combines more than fifteen years of experience as a 
technologist, an entrepreneur, a VC, and a board member, and that experience also includes 
corporate venture capital investing. Having been a start-up CEO, this VC focuses on 
evaluating the entrepreneurial team. Firm F6 is part of a large US based venture capital group 
and operates from Quebec with a focus on the ICT sector. It has three partners, 
complemented by more than ten partners in the parent company, overseeing about C$ 100 
million under management in more than ten current portfolio companies.  
We administered the survey to two VCs from firm F7. One of them cofounded that 
firm and has been a VC for about ten years, prior to which that VC held CEO/CFO or board 
positions in several technology start-ups and negotiated the sale of one of those ventures for 
about half a billion dollars. The other has also been a VC for about ten years and also has 
senior management experience including as a board member in technology start-up 
environment. Firm F7 is Ontario based and focused on the ICT sector, has three partners 
overseeing about C$ 100 million under management. It has more than ten ventures in its 
current portfolio and has had successful exits through acquisitions and IPOs.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the VCs who responded to our survey are 
highly accomplished venture capital investors who are experts in transforming technology 
start-ups into successful companies through all growth stages. Most often they also bring 




entrepreneurial or operational experience from technology start-ups. Most importantly, they 
are seasoned in negotiating and closing deals. It is apparent that these respondents are highly 
qualified to comment on the venture capital deal process.   
4.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
In this section, we discuss how our predictions compare with our survey findings. Appendix 
F presents the distribution of responses for each of the thirty nine survey items and also the 
rephrased items. By assigning values ranging from 7 to 1 (in steps of one) to the response 
choices ranging from ―Strongly Agree‖ to ―Strongly Disagree,‖ we computed an average 
score for each of the items.
 46
 We use those scores in the following discussion of findings, 
where an average score greater than 4 indicates agreement with the item and less than 4 
indicates disagreement while an average score of 4 indicates a neutral position.         
Model Assumptions 
We now report how two central assumptions of our model compare with the survey findings. 
The first such assumption is that the VC takes on a belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum 
effort level emin in order to determine the offer—the modeling feature that enabled us to deal 
with private information on entrepreneurial characteristics. In fact, the respondents agreed to 
the item (statement) ―The VC‘s judgment, at the time of making the offer, about the 
entrepreneur‘s future performance is ultimately the most important factor affecting his/her 
return from the investment‖ (Q29 in Appendix F) with an average score of 5.2, which 
supports that VCs use judgment in their decision-making (Messica, 2008; Levie and 
Gimmon, 2008; Metrick, 2007) and specifically that the VC‘s judgment about emin is central 
to his/her decision-making, a major departure from the optimal contract literature but one that 
is consistent with the ―VC method.‖ Our second central assumption is that the VC‘s belief on 
emin is likely hazy and belongs to an interval so there may be room for the VC to improve that 
belief in the course of the deal negotiations which in turn would enable the VC to revise a 
rejected offer. The respondents disagreed with the item ―VCs do not revise offers rejected by 
first-time entrepreneurs‖ (Q2) with an average score of 2.375, which supports that 
assumption because a revision must necessarily be preceded by an improvement in the VC‘s 
belief on emin. We recall that the VC‘s offer (i.e., the VC‘s ownership share α) is a unique 
solution dependent on emin for given values of the rest of the parameters per §2.3.1 and 
further that the VC can revise a rejected offer if α decreases when emin increases per 
propositions P1 and P2 in §2.4. In other words, this small set of VCs support our central 
modeling approach. Table 4.1 summarizes the above findings.  
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Summary of Survey Findings for Assumptions 
 
Assumption Questionnaire Item to Test Assumption
† 
Result 
1. VC takes on a belief 
on emin to determine the 
offer. 
Q29: The VC‘s judgment, at the time of 
making the offer, about the 
entrepreneur‘s future performance is 
ultimately the most important factor 
affecting his/her return from the 
investment. (Agree) 
Q29: Support (we know from an 
agreement to this statement that 
VCs take on a belief on 
entrepreneurial effort)  
2. VC‘s belief on emin 
likely belongs to an 
interval so the VC may 
revise a rejected offer. 
Q2: VCs do not revise offers rejected by 
first-time entrepreneurs. (Disagree) 
Q2: Support (we know from a 
disagreement that VCs may revise 
rejected offers, which is only 
possible with an update of the VC‘s 
belief on emin)  
†
The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
Propositions 
Proposition 1 (P1) proposed that, when the marginal change ds/demin in the VC‘s service 
level is negative (as his/her belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level improves), 
the VC should revise a rejected offer if and only if ds/demin >  
       
 
   . As noted in 
Table 2.3, lower time constraints and higher ownership share (in the rejected offer) for the 
VC and higher entrepreneurial productivity anticipated by the VC all relax  and facilitate 
revision and deal closure. However, on the contrary, the statement ―VCs under greater time 
constraints are less likely to revise rejected offers‖ (Q20) was disagreed with an average 
score of 2.5. The rephrased statement in the second round survey ―VCs under greater time 
constraints may be less likely to find it feasible to revise rejected offers though they can find 
the time required to revise such offers‖ was also disagreed with a score of 2 (for a combined 
average of 2.4). The statement ―The VC would be more inclined to revise a rejected offer if 
the VC‘s ownership share in the rejected offer is high‖ (Q39) received a neutral response 
with an average score of 4. One plausible explanation for the above apparent inconsistency is 
that VCs minimize the negative impact of time constraints on their deal-making ability—that 
is, they keep the marginal return to service c as low as possible (c can approach 0) so that  
relaxes considerably and there is effectively no lower bound for ds/demin.
47
 In that case the 
revision decision would become insensitive to the parameters  ,      , and c. Recall from 
Table 3.11 that a high c is undesirable for the VC because that tends to reduce the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level and the VC‘s actual excess profit. In fact, VCs employ analysts 
and investment managers to help them (e.g., Metrick, 2007) and may also outsource service 
to paid ―entrepreneurs-in-residence‖ (Schwarzkopf et al., 2010)—practices that should help 
them deal with time-constraints.  
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 Since    ,    , and, per Eq. (1),            , the lower bound on ds/demin will approach -∞ as c 
approaches 0.  




 P1 also proposed that, when the marginal change ds/demin in the VC‘s service level is 
positive (as his/her belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level improves), the VC 
should revise a rejected offer if and only if ds/demin  
      
     
  . As noted in Table 2.3, a 
larger effect of the entrepreneur‘s effort on the marginal productivity of the VC (i.e., more 
effective teamwork) and a smaller effect of service level on the marginal productivity of the 
VC (i.e., less severe concavity of revenue with respect to the VC‘s service) both relax  and 
facilitate revision and deal closure. While the statement ―VCs who specialize in the venture‘s 
industry are more likely to invest than those who do not‖ (Q19) was agreed with an average 
score of 6.25, the one VC who responded to the statement ―The entrepreneur‘s ability to 
work well with the VC is one of the most important factors influencing whether the VC will 
make an offer‖ (Q11c) agreed with that statement with a score of 6, both broadly consistent 
with P1. We recall that when VCs specialize in industries they can maintain high 
productivities even at high levels of service (i.e.,       would be low) since their advisory 
capacity will increase. In fact, the respondents also agreed that ―VCs who specialize in 
industries are likely to provide high quality advising/monitoring‖ (Q38) with an average 
score of 6.     
Proposition 3 (P3) proposed that ―Everything else being equal, if the VC increases the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary, then that VC‘s ownership share and service level should increase. 
The resulting increase in the VC‘s ownership share does not necessarily decrease the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level, nor does the increase in the base salary necessarily 
increase the entrepreneur‘s return, decrease the VC‘s excess profit, or decrease the 
investment-deal welfare.‖ Indeed, the respondents disagreed with the statement ―The 
entrepreneur‘s performance is usually sensitive to the size of the base salary he/she receives‖ 
(Q28) with an average score of 2.8, which supports P3 that the entrepreneur‘s effort level 
may not (indirectly) decrease as a result of an increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary. The 
respondents also disagreed with the statement ―An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 
would necessarily increase the entrepreneur‘s overall return‖ (Q13) with an average score of 
3, which supports P3 that an increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary need not increase 
his/her return. The respondents further disagreed with the statement ―An increase in the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary would necessarily decrease the VC‘s return‖ (Q 17) with an 
average score of 2.5, which also supports P3 that an increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 
need not decrease the VC‘s excess profit. Despite the above supports to P3, the respondents 
were neutral with the statement ―If the entrepreneur requires a higher base salary, the VC 
would demand a larger ownership share‖ (Q31) with an average score of 4, which does not 
firmly support P3 that an increase in the entrepreneur‘s salary will lead to an increase in the 
VC‘s ownership share. A plausible explanation for this ambiguity is that the entrepreneur is 
likely paid a modest base salary that is primarily meant to cover his/her living expenses, so 




any increase on that salary would be even more modest. Such a modest increase is unlikely to 
lead to a considerable (perceptible) increase in the ownership share that the VC should 
demand. In fact, our regression in Table 3.5 predicts that a 1% increase in base salary would 
only lead to an about 0.05% increase in the VC‘s ownership share.
48
 Table 4.2 summarizes 
the above findings.  
 
TABLE 4.2 
Summary of Survey Findings for Propositions 
 










     
  
      
     
   
Lower Bound 
Q20a: VCs under greater time constraints are less 
likely to revise rejected offers. (Disagree) 
Q20b: VCs under greater time constraints may be 
less likely to find it feasible to revise rejected offers 
though they can find the time required to revise such 
offers. (Disagree) 
Q39: The VC would be more inclined to revise a 
rejected offer if the VC‘s ownership share in the 
rejected offer is high (Neutral) 
 
Upper Bound 
Q19: VCs who specialize in the venture‘s industry 
are more likely to invest than those who do not. 
(Agree)  
Q11c: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with 
the VC is one of the most important factors 
influencing whether the VC will make an offer. 
(Agree) 
Q38: VCs who specialize in industries are likely to 









P3: Everything else being equal, 
if the VC increases the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary, then 
that VC‘s ownership share and 
service level should increase. 
The resulting increase in the 
VC‘s ownership share does not 
necessarily decrease the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort 
level, nor does the increase in 
the base salary necessarily 
increase the entrepreneur‘s 
return, decrease the VC‘s excess 
profit, or decrease the 
investment-deal welfare. 
Q28: The entrepreneur‘s performance is usually 
sensitive to the size of the base salary he/she 
receives. (Disagree) 
Q13: An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 
would necessarily increase the entrepreneur‘s overall 
return. (Disagree) 
Q17: An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 
would necessarily decrease the VC‘s return. 
(Disagree) 
Q31: If the entrepreneur requires a higher base 







The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 
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 The elasticities noted in this chapter are from our regressions in Chapter 3 and pertain to the large hypercube.   





Based on our simulation, we conjectured that eminP  ≤  eminW  ≤  eminE (where eminP, eminW, and 
eminE are the VC‘s beliefs on the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level that respectively 
maximize the VC‘s actual excess profit P, the deal welfare W, and the entrepreneur‘s return 
E) and that αE  ≤  αW  ≤  αP (where αE, αW, and αP are the VC‘s ownership shares that 
respectively maximize E, W, and P) in VC investment scenarios where a deal closure is 
possible. In fact, the respondents agreed with the statement ―If the VC is highly confident 
about a first-time entrepreneur‘s performance, it would normally work to the advantage of 
that entrepreneur‖ (Q30) with an average score of 5.4, which supports the conjecture by 
implying that a high emin (resulting from the VC‘s high confidence) is more likely to 
maximize E than P to the advantage of the entrepreneur. The respondents further agreed that 
―Making entrepreneurial characteristics (e.g., commitment and competence) more transparent 
to VCs can benefit entrepreneurs‖ (Q37) with an average score of 5, which also supports the 
conjecture because a well-informed VC need not underestimate  emin in order to safeguard 
his/her investment. Moreover, the respondents agreed that ―It is desirable for VCs to hold a 
moderate ownership share (say, 20% to 60%) in early-stage ventures of first-time 
entrepreneurs‖ (Q18) and that ―The entrepreneur would normally like to own a larger share 
of the venture than what is offered by the VC‖ (Q1) with average scores of 5.25 and 5.5 
respectively, consistent with the conjecture that there exists unique αP and that αE  < αP. We 
note that Q18 implies that P is an inverted-U shape with respect to α where it is maximized 
for some value of α. Table 4.3 summarizes the above findings.  
 
TABLE 4.3 
Summary of Survey Findings for Conjecture 
 




There exist unique 
―critical‖ values of 
emin and α  such that, 
where a deal can 
close, 
eminP  ≤  eminW  ≤  eminE 
and 
αE  ≤  αW  ≤  αP. 
Q30: If the VC is highly confident about a first-time 
entrepreneur‘s performance, it would normally work to the 
advantage of that entrepreneur. (Agree) 
Q37: Making entrepreneurial characteristics (e.g., commitment 
and competence) more transparent to VCs can benefit 
entrepreneurs. (Agree) 
Q18: It is desirable for VCs to hold a moderate ownership share 
(say, 20% to 60%) in early-stage ventures of first-time 
entrepreneurs. (Agree) 
Q1: The entrepreneur would normally like to own a larger share 














Probabilities of VC Making an Offer and Entrepreneur Accepting an Offer 
For a deal to close, the VC should make an offer and the entrepreneur should ultimately 
accept an offer. Our regression results in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 predict, respectively, how the 
model parameters would influence the probability of VC making an offer and the probability 
of entrepreneur accepting an offer. A 1% increase in the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork ε2 (effectiveness in solo-work ε1) would increase the probability of VC making an 
offer by 1% (0.59%) and the probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer by 3.95% 
(2.52%). In fact, the respondents agreed with the statement ―For VC financing to materialize, 
the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is more important than the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well independently of the VC‖ (Q14) with an average score of 4.5 and 
disagreed that ―For encouraging the VC to make an offer, the entrepreneur‘s ability to work 
well independently of the VC is more important than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
with the VC‖ (Q3) with an average score of 2.5. They also agreed that ―The entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well independently of the VC encourages the VC to make an offer‖ (Q33) 
with an average score of 4.6. All those responses support the above predictions. The 
respondents further agreed that ―The VC is more likely to invest if the entrepreneur‘s effort is 
expected to be highly productive‖ (Q21) with an average score of 6.25 consistent with the 
predictions that these two probabilities are highly sensitive to the two parameters ε2 and ε1.  
However, though as per regression coefficients ―the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork (ε2) is the most important factor influencing whether the VC will make an offer,‖ 
the respondents disagreed with the statement ―the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the 
VC is the most important factor influencing whether the VC will make an offer‖ (Q11a) with 
an average score of 2.75, but were neutral with the statement ―Apart from the commercial 
potential of the venture, the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is the most 
important factor influencing whether the VC will make an offer‖ (Q11b). A plausible reason 
for the inconsistency is that the phrase ―the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC‖ 
may not unambiguously convey ―the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork (ε2)‖; rather, 
the respondents might have sometimes interpreted that phrase to mean how cooperative the 
entrepreneur is with the VC, which is indeed unlikely to be more important than the 
entrepreneur‘s competence itself (the other factor contributing to ε2 and the only factor 
contributing to the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work ε1). That explanation is 
consistent with the respondents‘ agreement with the statement ―The entrepreneur‘s ability to 
work well with the VC is one of the most important factors influencing whether the VC will 
make an offer‖ (Q11c).      
The respondents also agreed that ―VCs who specialize in the venture‘s industry are 
more likely to invest than those who do not‖ (Q19) with an average score of 6.25and 
disagreed that ―A VC expecting to be influential in advising/monitoring would be less likely 




to finance the venture‖ (Q36) with an average score of 2.4 both supporting the regression 
predictions that the probabilities of VC making an offer and entrepreneur accepting an offer 
would increase, respectively, by 0.21% and 0.55% when the VC‘s effectiveness σ increases 
by 1%. We recall that VCs become more effective in their service when they specialize in 
industries. The respondents further agreed that ―The size of the base salary offered affects 
whether the deal will close‖ (Q22) with an average score of 5.25. Though the sensitivity of 
the probability of VC making an offer with respect to base salary is low (a 1% increase in the 
base salary only reduces that probability by about 0.03%) and the sensitivity of the 
probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer is ambiguous, the former sensitivity is 
statistically significant at a 5% confidence level.  
Regressions also predict that a 1% increase in the investment amount would decrease 
the probability of VC making an offer by about 0.6% though the effect on the probability of 
entrepreneur accepting an offer is ambiguous. Though the respondents, on the contrary, 
disagreed that ―The VC would be reluctant to make an offer when the investment amount is 
large‖ (Q8a) with an average score of 1.5, the lone VC responding in the second round 
agreed, consistent with that prediction, that ―VCs would like entrepreneurs to ask for an 
investment amount that is only absolutely essential, not any more‖ (Q8b). We note that the 
sensitivity of offer made with respect to investment amount is after controlling for the 
parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ that represent the revenue (i.e., commercial) potential of the 
venture, so we may infer that VCs are ready to invest large sums but those sums should be 
commensurate with the commercial potential of the venture. Table 4.4 summarizes the above 
findings.  
VC’s Ownership share 
Our regression results in Table 3.5 predict that a 1% increase in the VC‘s belief on emin would 
decrease the VC‘s ownership share α by 0.87%. When there is large uncertainty about the 
venture‘s success, the VC would estimate a low probability of successful exit in the ―VC 
method‖ (equivalently, a low emin in our model) and consequently a high α. In fact, 
respondents agreed that ―The VC would demand a large ownership share to invest in 
ventures with large uncertainty‖ (Q4) with an average score of 5.25. Respondents also agreed 
that ―The VC would demand a larger ownership share when the investment amount is larger‖ 
(Q23) and disagreed that ―A VC under greater time constraints would demand a smaller 
ownership share‖ (Q26) with average scores of 1.6, both consistent with our predictions that 
a 1% increase in the investment amount I and marginal return to service c would respectively 
increase α by 0.9% and 0.05%.  
 
 





Summary of Survey Findings for the Probabilities of VC Making an Offer and 
Entrepreneur Accepting an Offer 
 









work ε1) would increase 
the probability of VC 
making an offer by 1% 
(0.59%) and the 
probability of 
entrepreneur accepting 
an offer by 3.95% 
(2.52%). 
Q14: For VC financing to materialize, the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well with the VC is more important than the 
entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently of the VC. 
(Agree)   
Q3: For encouraging the VC to make an offer, the 
entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently of the VC 
is more important than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work 
well with the VC. (Disagree) 
Q33: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently 
of the VC encourages the VC to make an offer. (Agree) 
Q21: The VC is more likely to invest if the entrepreneur‘s 
effort is expected to be highly productive. (Agree) 
Q14: Support 
Q3: Support  
Q33: Support 
Q21: Support  
2. The entrepreneur‘s 
effectiveness in 
teamwork (ε2) is the 
most important factor 
influencing whether the 
VC will make an offer. 
Q11a: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is 
the most important factor influencing whether the VC will 
make an offer. (Disagree) 
Q11b: Apart from the commercial potential of the venture, 
the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is the 
most important factor influencing whether the VC will make 
an offer. (Neutral) 
Q11c: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is 
one of the most important factors influencing whether the 




3. The probabilities of 
VC making an offer and 
entrepreneur accepting 
an offer would increase, 
respectively, by 0.21% 
and 0.55% when the 
VC‘s effectiveness σ 
increases by 1%.  
Q19: VCs who specialize in the venture‘s industry are more 
likely to invest than those who do not. (Agree) 
Q36: A VC expecting to be influential in 




4. A 1% increase in the 
base salary reduces the 
probability of VC 
making an offer by about 
0.03%. 
Q22: The size of the base salary offered affects whether the 
deal will close. (Agree) 
Q22: Support 
5. A 1% increase in the 
investment amount 
would decrease the 
probability of VC 
making an offer by about 
0.6%. 
Q8a: The VC would be reluctant to make an offer when the 
investment amount is large. (Disagree) 
Q8b: VCs would like entrepreneurs to ask for an investment 





The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 
    
 
 




The importance of teamwork for VC financing was reiterated by the respondents‘ 
disagreement with the statements ―If the VC is confident that the entrepreneur will work well 
with him/her, the VC would demand a larger ownership share‖ (Q9) and ―If the VC-
entrepreneur teamwork is critical to the venture‘s success, the VC would demand a larger 
ownership share‖ (Q15) with average scores of 2.75 and 3.5 respectively, both consistent 
with our regression predictions that a 1% increase each in the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork ε2 and the relative importance of teamwork k2 would respectively decrease α by 
2.2% and 1%.  
However, the respondents agreed with the statement ―The VC would demand a large 
ownership share if the VC‘s advising/monitoring is of high quality‖ (Q32a) with an average 
score of 5 and the lone VC who responded in the second round strongly disagreed with the 
statement ―Consider a situation where a VC may invest but demand a large ownership share 
in a first-time entrepreneur‘s venture with a large uncertainty. Now assume that the VC‘s 
advising/monitoring is of high quality and larger revenue would be generated because of that 
high quality advising/monitoring. Then, that high quality would enable that VC to reduce to 
some extent the ownership share demanded‖ (Q32b). ―High quality‖ of advising/monitoring 
(arising from the VC‘s competence) and how cooperative the VC is with the entrepreneur 
both contribute to the VC‘s effectiveness σ, a 1% increase in which our regression predicts 
would lead to a 1.22% reduction in α. Given that teamwork in general helps to reduce α (as 
suggested by the discussion on ε2 in the previous paragraph), probably there are two effects 
on the sensitivity of α with respect to σ—a negative effect from the VC‘s teamwork 
(cooperation) with the entrepreneur and a positive effect from the VC‘s quality of 
advising/monitoring. If that is the case, a dominant negative effect would reconcile the 
survey finding with the regression predictions; it would also reiterate the importance of 
teamwork in VC financing by suggesting that not only the entrepreneur‘s teamwork with the 
VC but also the VC‘s teamwork with the entrepreneur is important (i.e., both parties should 
cooperate).    
Finally, the respondents disagreed that ―The VC would demand a large ownership 
share if his/her time is highly valuable‖ (Q12a) with an average score of 3 and the lone 
respondent in the second round also somewhat disagreed with the statement ―Consider a 
situation where a VC has determined the ownership share he/she should demand if he/she 
were to invest in a venture. Then, if the VC‘s time were more valuable than what it actually 
is, the VC would increase to some extent the ownership share demanded‖ (Q12b), both 
inconsistent with the regression prediction that a 1% increase in the unit cost of service (i.e., 
the unit cost for the VC‘s time) w would increase the VC‘s ownership share α by 0.27%. A 
plausible reason for the discrepancy is that, though significant, w is one of the least important 
factors predicted to influence α, so VCs are unlikely to be categorical about the influence of 




w on α. In fact, the responses to the two statements were widely dispersed from ―somewhat 
agree‖ to ―strongly disagree‖ (with no two VCs exhibiting same level of agreement or 
disagreement). Table 4.5 summarizes the above findings. 
TABLE 4.5 
Summary of Survey Findings for the VC’s Ownership Share 
 




1. A 1% increase in emin would 
decrease the VC‘s ownership 
share α by 0.87%. 
Q4: The VC would demand a large ownership share 
to invest in ventures with large uncertainty. (Agree) 
 
Q4: Support 
2. A 1% increase in the 
investment amount I would 
increase α by 0.9%. 
Q23: The VC would demand a larger ownership 
share when the investment amount is larger. (Agree) 
 
Q23: Support 
3. A 1% increase in marginal 
return to service c would 
increase α by 0.05%. 
Q26: A VC under greater time constraints would 
demand a smaller ownership share. (Disagree) 
Q26: Support 
4. A 1% increase in the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork ε2 would decrease α 
by 2.2%. 
Q9: If the VC is confident that the entrepreneur will 
work well with him/her, the VC would demand a 
larger ownership share. (Disagree) 
Q9: Support 
5. A 1% increase in the relative 
importance of teamwork k2 
would decrease α by 1%. 
Q15: If the VC-entrepreneur teamwork is critical to 
the venture‘s success, the VC would demand a larger 
ownership share. (Disagree) 
Q15: Support 
6. A 1% increase in the VC‘s 
effectiveness σ would decrease α 
by 1.22%. 
Q32a: The VC would demand a large ownership 
share if the VC‘s advising/monitoring is of high 
quality. (Agree) 
Q32b: Consider a situation where a VC may invest 
but demand a large ownership share in a first-time 
entrepreneur‘s venture with a large uncertainty. Now 
assume that the VC‘s advising/monitoring is of high 
quality and larger revenue would be generated 
because of that high quality advising/monitoring. 
Then, that high quality would enable that VC to 




7. A 1% increase in the unit cost 
of service w would increase α by 
0.27%. 
Q12a: The VC would demand a large ownership 
share if his/her time is highly valuable. (Disagree)  
Q12b: Consider a situation where a VC has 
determined the ownership share he/she should 
demand if he/she were to invest in a venture. Then, if 
the VC‘s time were more valuable than what it 
actually is, the VC would increase to some extent the 




The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 
VC’s Service Level     
As per our regression predictions in Table 3.5, a 1% increase in the VC‘s effectiveness σ, the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in teamwork ε2, and the latter‘s base salary b each would 
respectively increase the VC‘s service level s by 2.27%, 1.81%, and 0.08%. Consistent with 
those predictions, our respondents agreed that ―If the VC‘s advising/monitoring is influential, 




the VC would increase advising/monitoring‖ (Q27) and disagreed with the statements ―If the 
entrepreneur works well with the VC, the VC would reduce advising/ monitoring‖ (Q24) and 
―The VC would reduce advising/monitoring when the entrepreneur is paid a high base 
salary‖ (Q5) with average scores respectively of 4.4, 2.6, and 1.25. 
The respondents however disagreed that ―The VC would increase 
advising/monitoring when the investment amount is large‖ (Q10a) with an average score of 
3.25 and the lone VC responding in the second round also somewhat disagreed with the 
statement ―Consider a situation where a VC may invest in a first-time entrepreneur‘s venture. 
Now assume that the venture requires an investment that is larger for its level of expected 
revenue. Then, the VC would expect to advise/monitor more if he/she were to invest‖ (Q10b) 
while the regression predicts on the contrary that a 1% increase in the investment amount I 
would increase the VC‘s service level s by 1.43% (I being one of the most important 
predictors of s). We note that, since revenue-related parameters k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ have all been 
controlled for in the regression, the above sensitivity refers to investment relative to the 
revenue potential of the venture. Now recall that the lone VC responding in the second round 
had somewhat agreed that ―VCs would like entrepreneurs to ask for an investment amount 
that is only absolutely essential, not any more‖ (Q8b). In any case, it is reasonable to expect 
that VCs would take necessary steps in due diligence to verify the investment amount asked 
for and only invest an amount that does not have a significant slack (since surplus investment 
would pose a risk of larger loss in the event of venture failure). If that is the case, service 
level may not significantly be sensitive to investment amount (whether large or small). Table 
4.6 summarizes the above findings. 
TABLE 4.6 
Summary of Survey Findings for the VC’s Service Level 
 




1. A 1% increase in the VC‘s 
effectiveness σ, the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness 
in teamwork ε2, and the 
latter‘s base salary b each 
would respectively increase 
the VC‘s service level s by 
2.27%, 1.81%, and 0.08%. 
Q27: If the VC‘s advising/monitoring is influential, the 
VC would increase advising/monitoring. (Agree) 
Q24: If the entrepreneur works well with the VC, the 
VC would reduce advising/ monitoring. (Disagree)  
Q5: The VC would reduce advising/monitoring when 




2. A 1% increase in the 
investment amount I would 
increase s by 1.43%. 
Q10a: The VC would increase advising/monitoring 
when the investment amount is large. (Disagree)  
Q10b: Consider a situation where a VC may invest in a 
first-time entrepreneur‘s venture. Now assume that the 
venture requires an investment that is larger for its level 
of expected revenue. Then, the VC would expect to 
advise/monitor more if he/she were to invest. (Disagree)  
Q10a/b: Reject? 
†
The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 




Entrepreneur’s Effort Level 
The respondents agreed that ―The entrepreneur puts in more effort if VC-entrepreneur 
teamwork is critical to the venture‘s success‖ (Q6) with an average score of 4.25 consistent 
with the prediction in Table 3.6 that a 1% increase in the parameter k2 would lead to a 4.58% 
increase in the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level and a 2.3% increase in the probability of 
entrepreneur exerting best effort. Recall that k2 is the relative importance of teamwork (i.e., 
the weight of teamwork in the revenue function) while k1 is the relative importance of the 
entrepreneur‘s solo-work. On a related note, we also recall that our various regressions 
predict that k2 is more important than k1 in determining the various deal outcomes —namely, 
the probability of VC making an offer (Table 3.4), the VC‘s ownership share and service 
level (Table 3.5), the entrepreneur‘s effort level and the probability of entrepreneur exerting 
best effort (Table 3.6), the probability of entrepreneur accepting an offer (Table 3.7), the 
entrepreneur‘s expected return (Table 3.8), and investment deal welfare (Table 3.10). This 
implies that VC financing is more likely for ventures where teamwork is important (i.e., 
where the VC can meaningfully contribute).  
Furthermore, the respondents disagreed that ―The entrepreneur puts in less effort if 
the VC‘s advising and monitoring is of high quality‖ (Q34) with an average score of 2.6 
consistent with the prediction that a 1% increase in the VC‘s effectiveness σ would lead to a 
2.62% increase in the entrepreneur‘s effort level (though its influence on the probability of 
entrepreneur exerting best effort is ambiguous). As already noted, the quality of the VC‘s 
advising and monitoring arising from his/her competence contributes to the VC‘s 
effectiveness. The respondents also disagreed that ―The entrepreneur would exert best effort 
only when allocated a large ownership share (say, above 80%)‖ (Q7) with an average score 
of 1.25, consistent with our finding from our illustrative example in Table 2.2 where the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level reaches its maximum even when the VC takes as large as 
46% of the ownership share leaving only about 54% for the entrepreneur. Finally, as we 
already noted in §4.4.2 with reference to our Proposition 3, the respondents disagreed that 
―The entrepreneur‘s performance is usually sensitive to the size of the base salary he/she 
receives‖ (Q28) with an average score of 3.25, which is also consistent with our regression 
prediction that base salary does not significantly influence either the entrepreneur‘s optimal 
effort level or the probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort. 
Table 3.6 also predicts that a 1% increases each in the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork ε2 and his/her effectiveness in solo-work ε1 would respectively increase the 
probability of entrepreneur exerting best effort by about 4.09% and 2.82%. In fact, ε2 is the 
second most important parameter (after the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of effort ω but ahead of 
the entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in solo-work ε1) predicted to influence whether the 
entrepreneur will put in his/her best effort in the invested venture. However, our respondents 




disagreed that ―For encouraging the entrepreneur to exert best effort, the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well with the VC is more important than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work 
well independently of the VC‖ (Q25a) with an average score of 3.75. The lone VC 
responding in the second round also disagreed with the statement ―The entrepreneur‘s ability 
to work well with the VC is more influential than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
independently of the VC in determining whether the entrepreneur will exert best effort‖ 
(Q25b). A plausible reason for this apparent discrepancy is that, as already noted, the 
respondents could have interpreted the phrase ―the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with 
the VC‖ to mean how cooperative the entrepreneur is with the VC rather than how effective 
he/she is in teamwork, which is also influenced by the entrepreneur‘s competence. An 
entrepreneur who is ready to cooperate with the VC but lacking in competence is less likely 
to display superior performance. Table 4.7 summarizes the above findings.  
TABLE 4.7 
Summary of Survey Findings for the Entrepreneur’s Effort Level 
 




1) A 1% increase in the relative 
importance of teamwork k2 would 
lead to a 4.58% increase in the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level 
and a 2.3% increase in the 
probability of entrepreneur 
exerting best effort. 
Q6: The entrepreneur puts in more effort if VC-
entrepreneur teamwork is critical to the venture‘s 
success. (Agree) 
Q6: Support 
2) A 1% increase in the VC‘s 
effectiveness σ would lead to a 
2.62% increase in the 
entrepreneur‘s effort level.  
Q34: The entrepreneur puts in less effort if the VC‘s 
advising and monitoring is of high quality. 
(Disagree)  
Q34: Support 
3) The entrepreneur may exert 
best effort even when not 
allocated a large ownership share 
(per Table 2.2). 
Q7: The entrepreneur would exert best effort only 
when allocated a large ownership share (say, above 
80%). (Disagree) 
Q7: Support 
4) Base salary does not 
significantly influence either the 
entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level 
or the probability of entrepreneur 
exerting best effort.  
Q28: The entrepreneur‘s performance is usually 
sensitive to the size of the base salary he/she 
receives. (Disagree) 
Q28: Support 
5) 1% increases each in the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork ε2 and his/her 
effectiveness in solo-work ε1 
would respectively increase the 
probability of entrepreneur 
exerting best effort by about 
4.09% and 2.82%. 
Q25a: For encouraging the entrepreneur to exert 
best effort, the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
with the VC is more important than the 
entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently of 
the VC. (Disagree) 
Q25b: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with 
the VC is more influential than the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well independently of the VC in 
determining whether the entrepreneur will exert 
best effort. (Disagree) 
Q25a: Reject? 
†
The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 




Entrepreneur’s Return and VC’s Excess Profit  
Our respondents agreed that ―The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently of the 
VC affects his/her return from the venture‖ (Q16) and that ―The VC-entrepreneur teamwork 
highly influences the entrepreneur‘s return‖ (Q35) with average scores respectively of 5 and 
5.4, consistent with our predictions in Table 3.8 that a 1% increase each in the entrepreneur‘s 
effectiveness in solo-work ε1 and the relative importance of teamwork k2 would respectively 
increase the entrepreneur‘s return E by about 0.66% and 1%. Moreover, as noted in §4.4.2, 
the respondents disagreed that ―An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary would 
necessarily increase the entrepreneur‘s overall return‖ (Q13) with an average score of 3, 
consistent with Proposition 3 and our regression prediction where the influence of base salary 
b on E is ambiguous. Furthermore, as noted in §4.4.2, they agreed with the statements ―If the 
VC is highly confident about a first-time entrepreneur‘s performance, it would normally 
work to the advantage of that entrepreneur‖ (Q30) and ―Making entrepreneurial 
characteristics (e.g., commitment and competence) more transparent to VCs can benefit 
entrepreneurs‖ (Q37) with average scores respectively of 5.4 and 5, supporting our 
conjecture and regression prediction that a 1% increase in the VC‘s belief about the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin would lead to a 0.47% increase in the latter‘s return. 
With better information about entrepreneurial characteristics, VCs are less likely to 
underestimate emin.  
As per our regression results for Model 1 in Table 3.9, the VC‘s belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level emin is the most important predictor of the VC‘s excess 
profit P (i.e., P is most sensitive to emin). Specifically, a 1% increase in emin is predicted to 
reduce P by 2.48%. In fact, as noted in §4.4.1, the respondents agreed to the statement ―The 
VC‘s judgment, at the time of making the offer, about the entrepreneur‘s future performance 
is ultimately the most important factor affecting his/her return from the investment‖ (Q29) 
with an average score of 5.2 consistent with the above prediction. Furthermore, as noted in 
§4.4.2, the respondents disagreed that ―An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary would 
necessarily decrease the VC‘s return‖ (Q17) with an average score of 2.5, consistent with 
Proposition 3 and our regression that predicts that a 1% increase in the entrepreneur‘s base 
salary b would in fact increase P by 0.1%. We recall that, when b increases, the ownership 
share α the VC should demand will increase (as per the proof for Proposition 3 in Appendix 
B), which in turn may cause P to either increase or decrease depending on whether α moves 











Summary of Survey Findings for the Entrepreneur’s Return and the VC’s Excess Profit 
 




1) 1% increases each in the 
entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
solo-work ε1 and the relative 
importance of teamwork k2 
would respectively increase the 
entrepreneur‘s return E by 
about 0.66% and 1%.  
Q16: The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
independently of the VC affects his/her return from 
the venture. (Agree) 
Q35: The VC-entrepreneur teamwork highly 
influences the entrepreneur‘s return. (Agree) 
Q16: Support 
Q35: Support 
2) The influence of base salary 
b on E is ambiguous 
Q13: An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 
would necessarily increase the entrepreneur‘s overall 
return. (Disagree) 
Q13: Support 
3) A 1% increase in the VC‘s 
belief about the entrepreneur‘s 
minimum effort level emin 
would lead to a 0.47% increase 
in the latter‘s return.  
Q30: If the VC is highly confident about a first-time 
entrepreneur‘s performance, it would normally work 
to the advantage of that entrepreneur. (Agree) 
Q37: Making entrepreneurial characteristics (e.g., 
commitment and competence) more transparent to 
VCs can benefit entrepreneurs. (Agree)  
 
4) The VC‘s belief on the 
entrepreneur‘s minimum effort 
level emin is the most important 
predictor of the VC‘s excess 
profit P. 
Q29: The VC‘s judgment, at the time of making the 
offer, about the entrepreneur‘s future performance is 
ultimately the most important factor affecting his/her 
return from the investment. (Agree) 
Q29: Support 
5) A 1% increase in the 
entrepreneur‘s base salary b 
would increase P by 0.1%.   
Q17: An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary 




The average response the questionnaire item received is noted in parentheses for each item.  
¥ 
Results with a question mark are explained in the discussion of findings. 
  
Overall Summary of Survey Findings vis-à-vis Predictions          
Table 4.9 summarizes how our survey findings compare with our regression predictions on 
the parameter sensitivities of various deal outcomes. This table is essentially a replication of 
Table 3.11 that summarizes those predictions, but in the new table we also show which of 
those predictions are supported by our survey findings using square brackets for support and 
parentheses for possible support. We recall that a few questionnaire items did not apparently 
support their corresponding predictions but we reasoned why that need not be the case (and 
uncovered new insights while doing so). The cells containing such predictions are enclosed 










































































































































































r - + + N.A. N.A N.A. N.A. + + 
I (-) [+] (+) -? +? +? +? + + 
w + (+) - - -? - -? N.
A. 
-? 
c + [+] - - - - - - - 
b [-] + [+] [N.A.] [N.A.] +? [+?] [+] +? 
k1 + - - + + + + +? + 
k2 + [-] + [+] [+] + [+] +? + 
ε1 [+] - - + + [+] [+] + + 
ε2 [+] [-] [+] + (+) [+] + +? + 
σ [+] (-) [+] [+] +? [+] + - + 
ω N.A. N.A N.A. - - - - - - 
emin + [-] - + + - [+] [-] + 
Legend: ―+‖ indicates positive influence; ―-‖ negative; ―?‖ possibly; and ―N. A.‖ Not affected. Predictions in square brackets are 




We conducted an online survey of VCs to see how our predictions compare with practice. 
We asked eight accomplished VCs located in Toronto, Waterloo, and Montreal to answer 
thirty-nine questionnaire items that concerned our major assumptions and predictions from 
our propositions, conjecture, and regressions (that used synthetic data from our simulation).   
Though the number of respondents was small and the individual survey items only 
had a maximum of five responses (one had eight), the survey exercise appears to have served 
an important purpose. Specifically, this (mini) survey has revealed support for our two 
central assumptions and also for a vast majority of our predictions. Particularly, our modeling 
of the VC deal process as an iterative process, a substantial departure within the VC 
contracting literature dominated by optimal contracts (where an offer made is immediately 
acceptable to the entrepreneur) and our use of belief on the part of the VC (in line with the 
―VC method‖) as the basis of that iterative process seem to have received credence from the 
survey findings. This kind of support (from a small sample of VCs) suggests that the model 
has face validity and, possibly, some preliminary empirical support.  
That small sample size is the key drawback of the survey exercise. However, a large 
sample would only be needed in situations such as when weaker relationships are to be 
detected and when the variables have large variance (Garson, 2009). Our need to limit the 




survey length forced us to exclude insignificant and ambiguous relationships, so our survey 
did not have to detect weak relationships. We further note that, since the average score would 
normally converge as the sample size increases, a small sample may not be a problem where 
the average score is not close to the neutral score of 4 and strong relationships are being 
detected. In our case, only 10 of the 47 items (including the second round items) have 
average score close to neutral (specifically, more than 3 but less than 5).  
Another issue might be selection bias arising from non-random sampling, but such a 
sample need not be unrepresentative of the population (Trochim, 2006). The reason is that 
ours is not a convenience (availability) sample of VCs. The recruited VCs represent an expert 
sample because they are experts in deal negotiation. For that reason, our sampling frame of 
VCs located in Toronto, Waterloo, and Montreal should not affect the generalizability of our 
predictions (Garson, 2009).  
Finally, the survey is readily scalable. The current survey may be considered as a 
preliminary work to support a major survey (e.g., one supported by a Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council Grant) since it would be fruitful to administer it to a large 
number of VCs in the future. Before doing so, the few items with phrases that might have 
sometimes been misunderstood may be rephrased.                  
 
      
   

















Conclusion and Future Research 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
Having presented a detailed overview in Chapter 1, we only briefly summarize the thesis 
here. We studied how the venture capital deal process may unfold when the entrepreneur has 
private information about his/her disutility of effort but the VC has the bargaining power. In 
a double-sided moral hazard framework where we also considered one-sided private 
information, we let the VC take on a belief about the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level to 
determine the offer. The entrepreneur evaluates that offer using his/her private information to 
accept/reject it. We also identified the conditions under which the VC may revise a rejected 
offer. Furthermore, we studied the impacts of a base salary on deal outcomes. A simulation 
based on our theoretical model revealed that there exist critical values of the VC‘s belief and 
ownership share that maximize the returns to the two parties and the deal welfare, and also 
that there exists an ordering relationship among those critical values. Notably, the VC‘s 
return is an inverted U-shape with respect to the VC‘s ownership share. Using synthetic data 
from another simulation for regression analyses, we generated predictions about how 
different factors would affect various deal outcomes. The entrepreneur‘s effectiveness in 
teamwork and the relative importance of teamwork to the venture are the major factors 
enabling VC financing. The size of the value created and how that value is shared between 
the two parties are highly sensitive to the VC‘s belief; but the entrepreneur‘s disutility of 
effort negatively affects that value. Finally, an online survey of eight seasoned VCs offered 
support for most of our predictions.  
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH   
Our modeling of the VC deal process in sync with the ―VC method‖ of valuation popular 
among VCs is a major departure from the optimal contracting literature and we hope that this 
thesis will encourage future research in a new direction. We now identify some such future 
research, a few of which are direct extensions of the thesis while others are new streams of 
research inspired by the thesis.  
Ex-post efficient VC Contracts under private information 
Our thesis conjectures that there exist critical values of the VC‘s ownership share that 
maximize the returns to the two parties and overall deal welfare. Hence the VC (when 




possessing the bargaining power) may wish to maximize his/her excess profit or, if altruistic, 
the deal welfare. However, the private information available with the entrepreneur precludes 
the VC from knowing those critical values. Consequently, the VC‘s use of a belief 
(judgment) to determine the offer is ex-ante efficient because that approach enables the VC 
to put forth an offer even while facing private information and to have a chance at clinching a 
potentially attractive deal. Nevertheless, as our illustrative example and Simulation I 
revealed, that approach may lead to deals that are ex-post inefficient because an incorrect 
ownership share will result in suboptimal deal welfare and suboptimal excess profit for the 
VC. For that reason, future research could explore if and how this inefficiency can be 
eliminated or minimized under private information. We propose these ideas, but it is not clear 
if they solve the problem: (1) The VC puts forth a package of offers such that the offer 
chosen by the entrepreneur reveals the latter‘s disutility of effort; (2) The VC requires the 
entrepreneur to put forth an offer; and (3) Using milestone-based payments. We note that 
financing in sequential rounds only helps to minimize or eliminate this inefficiency for 
subsequent rounds. Consequently, that research can be valuable to practitioners since the 
―VC method‖ uses judgment in decision-making. 
Factors influencing critical values of the VC’s belief and ownership share  
Though the VC does not know the critical values of his/her belief and ownership share under 
private information, we can extend this thesis research to shed light on the parameter 
sensitivities of those critical values through regression analyses using the synthetic data from 
Simulation I. Recall that in Simulation I we found the above (unique) critical values for 
5,200 scenarios. In other words, for any given venture capital deal scenario, there is unique 
critical value for the VC‘s belief (and corresponding ownership share) that maximizes his/her 
excess profit. We can estimate those critical values on the eleven model parameters that 
define a deal scenario. Such regressions will reveal the sensitivity of those critical values 
with respect to individual parameters. We note that the VC cannot estimate those critical 
values (for the scenario that he/she faces) using the coefficients obtained from the above 
regressions since one of those eleven parameters—namely, the entrepreneur‘s unit cost of 
effort—is not known to the VC. Nevertheless, the regressions can enhance our understanding 
of the critical values and help VCs improve their judgment in determining the offer terms.  
Closed form solutions for the model and proof for the conjecture 
A more tedious alternative to the regressions is algebraic derivations. Recall that, though we 
used a specific functional form for revenue in our illustrative example and simulations, 
however we used a generic function while formulating and solving our theoretical model. 
Thus we avoided the derivations of closed-form solutions for the VC‘s optimal ownership 
share and service level, the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level, and the two parties returns (as 




a function of the VC‘s belief on the entrepreneur‘s minimum effort level). If we have such 
solutions, we can then find the critical values by maximizing, for example, the VC‘s excess 
profit with respect to that belief. We note that the resulting closed-form solutions for the 
critical values would be functions of the privately known entrepreneurial unit cost of effort. 
Nevertheless, such an exercise can further enhance our understanding of those critical values. 
Furthermore, with the closed-form solutions, we can attempt to prove our conjecture by 
demonstrating that for any given value of entrepreneurial unit cost of effort the ordering 
relationships among those critical values hold as per that conjecture.  
Further inquiry on the properties of the deal space under private information 
Using the synthetic data, we can further scrutinize the properties of the deal space in several 
ways. We note that, since values for each parameter were drawn independently of those for 
the rest of the parameters, any sub-set of the data with respect to one parameter will still fill 
the entire deal space with respect to the rest of the parameters. First, we may study whether 
the properties of the deal space change if the VC systematically underestimates the 
entrepreneurial effort level. Since the VC‘s belief can significantly misrepresent the true 
effort level either positively or negatively (a point we noted in §2.2), Simulation II quasi-
randomly chose values for that belief. We can use a sub-set of our data (say, the observations 
where the VC‘s belief is below a certain value) for regressions and look for any changes in 
the deal space properties when the VC systematically underestimates the entrepreneurial 
effort. Other sub-sets can be generated—for example, where the VC‘s marginal return to 
service is below a certain value (to study how properties change if VCs minimize their time 
constraints) or where the teamwork is less important than the entrepreneur‘s solo-work.  
Private information with the VC 
 Our thesis concerns the VC deal process when the entrepreneur alone possesses private 
information. We could study the double-sided private information case where the 
entrepreneur does not have full information about the VC that is necessary for evaluating the 
VC‘s offer (e.g. the VC‘s unit cost of service and the VC‘s minimum required rate of return). 
If the entrepreneur cannot correctly evaluate the offer, he/she cannot know precisely what the 
VC‘s expectation is about his/her minimum effort level and also the service level the VC 
expects to allocate to the venture. Under these conditions, it might be appropriate for the 
entrepreneur to accept the offer if his/her optimal effort level is high enough for whatever 
level of the VC‘s service. One situation where that might happen is when the VC offers a 
fairly high ownership share to the entrepreneur. Such extensions can further enhance our 
understanding of deals under private information.  
 
 




Modeling angel investment 
With angel investment (also known as informal venture capital), relational rents from 
empathy between the angel and the entrepreneur play a key role; both parties not only care 
about their monetary return but also to some extent about the other party‘s monetary return. 
Thus, the angel investment model should have utility functions that are combinations of the 
two parties‘ returns. Since angels are known to be heterogeneous (unlike VCs), some may 
advise and monitor their entrepreneur while others may not. For that reason, we could 
consider the two cases separately and study how the deal process would evolve under private 
information about the entrepreneur‘s disutility of effort. While in the former case the angel 
would choose his/her ownership share and service level to maximize his/her utility, the 
entrepreneur would choose his/her effort level (for the offered ownership share and the 
angel‘s service level), the angel would only choose his/her ownership share in the latter case 
and the entrepreneur his/her effort level (for the offered ownership share). With these 
modifications, we might be able to model and also simulate the angel investment deal 
process under private information to uncover new insights concerning angel investment.       
 
 





Relating the Revenue Function to the Probability of Successful Exit 
 
From the VC method, let TV be the total valuation, EV the exit valuation, M the value 
multiple and ERP the expected retention percentage. Then,          
 
. Exit valuation 
EV is taken exogenously and it measures the commercial potential of the venture (e.g., the 
VC considers firms with similar products that have already gone through an initial public 
offering and takes the average of these firms‘ valuation as an estimated value for EV). ERP is 
the proportion (total for the VC and the entrepreneur) of current number of shares to the 
number of shares at the time of exit, which decreases if new shares are issued subsequent to 
the initial investment by the VC (e.g., if the current number of shares is 1M with 500,000 
each to be taken by the VC and the entrepreneur, but later another 2M shares are issued to 
other investors, then the proportion at the time of exit is 1M/3M or 33.33%). With a discount 
factor of  
       
, where r is the cost of capital and T the investment timeframe, and p being the 
probability of successful exit,       
 
 
. Substituting in TV for M, we obtain       
    
 
      
. The expected revenue from the new venture can be expressed by   
        , and substituting the latter expression for TV in the revenue function yields 
          . Since the variables we focus on only affect the probability of successful 
exit p, there exists a direct proportional relationship between R and p, allowing us to use R in 


















Proofs for the Propositions 
 
Proposition 1 (revising the offer by decreasing α, but keeping b fixed). While the VC 
revises the investment offer (α, b), his/her expected return from the venture portfolio must be 
maximized (i.e., Equation 3 must hold) and his/her participation constraint in Equation 5 
(with P = 0) must be satisfied. The VC‘s decisions—ownership share α and service level s—
depend on his/her belief on emin, which is therefore the main determinant of the offer terms. 
The VC can revise the offer if and only if there is room for upwardly adjusting that belief. 
Therefore, we must characterize the range of values for 
  
     
 (also depending on 
  
       
 for 
Proposition 1) that enables a revision to take place.  
The VC‘s service level s and ownership share α change with an additional unit of 
    . Rearranging Equation 5 (with P = 0) yields 
                                           . 
Differentiating both sides with respect to     , we obtain 
  
     
    
  
     
  
  
     
  
             
  
     
    
  
     
. Letting 
  
     
   and 
  
       
  ,  
                          . (A1) 
Similarly, the VC‘s portfolio return must be maximized and Equation 3 must hold, which 
yield                            . Differentiating both sides with respect to     , we 
obtain  
   
     
       . That is, 
                         . (A2) 
Solving Equations A1 and A2 simultaneously for   yields    
                        
          
            
. Since 
    
   
 
, after rearranging and simplifying,    
                       
   
           
. Since c, w, R, 
      ,    and          are all positive but     < 0, we note that     if and only if 
                , i.e., if and only if          
       
 
 .  




From Equation A1,   
                   
 
 . Since the VC can revise the offer only by 
decreasing α (b is kept fixed) and since      increases during a revision, we must have     
for a revision to take place and thus                    . Substituting       for      
yields                     . After rearranging and simplifying, we obtain   
 
       
 
     (< 0), which provides a negative lower bound for   (Case a). From 
Equation A2,      
                
  
. Since     and since   and    are both positive, we 
must have               , which leads to     
      
   
  . Since     < 0, this upper 
bound on   is positive (Case b). Consequently, the range of values for 
  
     
 that allows for a 
revision to take place are between   (< 0) and   (> 0).  
We also note that since   depends on , a threshold condition on , which depends 
on  , can equivalently be established for Case (a). Specifically, from     
       
 
  , we 
obtain    
   
     
. If     (Case a), then α must exceed 
     
     
  , which is positive since 
c > 0 and        .  
Proposition 2 (revising the offer by increasing b, but keeping α fixed). In this case, only 
the VC‘s service level s changes with an additional unit of     . We now begin with the 
VC‘s incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 3, which can be written as 
                     . Differentiating both sides with respect to      yields 
               
  
     
   , which after rearranging leads to 
  
     
  
      
   
  
      
   
  
  since          and      . Similarly, the VC‘s excess profit in Equation 5 equals zero 
when          
                           
   
   . Differentiating with respect to      yields 
  
     
  
            
  
     
    
  
     
 
   
 . Since the offer is revised by increasing b and since      
increases during a revision, we must have 
  
     
   for a revision to take place. Hence, 
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  , and since 
  
     
 
 
      
   
 , we must have   
  
      
   
 
         
      
   
 
    . 
Proposition 3 (increasing b for a given     ). Everything else being equal, when the VC 
increases b he or she must increase   to keep the excess profit non-negative. Hence, 
  
  
  . 
The VC‘s incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 3 can be written as 
                     . Differentiating both sides with respect to b yields 
  
  
   
   
  
  
   . Since 
  
  
  ,     ,      , and    , we must have 
  
  
  .  
The entrepreneur‘s incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 7 can be written as 
              
 
      




   
  
  
            
  
  
     . Multiplying both sides by 
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  , we obtain 
  
  
  . The sign of 
  
  
 is, however, ambiguous because      , 
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    , and           . 
The entrepreneur‘s expected return E in Equation 6 can be rewritten as        
                          . Differentiating with respect to b yields 
  
  




   
  
  
   
  
  
           
  
  
 . Since, from Equation 7,             , we obtain 
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 and   are positive. We note that the sign of 
  
  




The VC‘s excess profit in Equation 5 can be rewritten as 
                                        , noting that VC‘s ownership share 
and service level, as well as the entrepreneur‘s optimal effort level, are all affected by a 
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1. Create in a table (Table A) the following parameters: r, I, w, c, b, k1, k2, ε1, ε2, σ, , 
emin0,   ,   ,     ,    ,      ,   ,        , emin1,    ,   ,   , XPOSITIVE0,    ,       , 
       ,                 , CROSSDERIVHIGH0, XCONDITIONPOS0,   , REVISED0,  
LAMBDA0,     , XWITHINBOUNDS0, PROP1HOLDS0, PHI0, ALPHAABOVELIMIT0, 
  ,      ,   ,        ,     emin2,    ,   ,   , XPOSITIVE1,    ,       ,        , 
                , CROSSDERIVHIGH1, XCONDITIONPOS1,   , REVISED1,  
LAMBDA1,     , XWITHINBOUNDS1, PROP1HOLDS1, PHI1, ALPHAABOVELIMIT1, 
  ,      ,   ,        . 
2. Quasi-randomly draw 10,400 combinations of parameters (records or synthetic 
observations) from within the specified domains and store them.  
Parameter Minimum Maximum 
r 0 1 
I 500,000 10,000,000 
w 500 10,000 
c 0 10,000, but c ≤ w 
always 
b 0 500,000 
k1 1 100,000 
k2 1 100,000 
ε1 0 0.99 
ε2 0 0.99 
σ 0 0.99, but ε2 + σ ≤ 
0.99 always 
ω 1 80,000 
emin 1 4,000 
   
3. Label the records with number (1 to 10400).  
Part II 
4. Take record 1 of Table A.  
5. Solve the following two equations simultaneously for    and   , and store the 
solutions: 
          
          
    
                     




       
     
     




6. Evaluate             
          
    
  and store. 
7. Solve the following equation for    and store the solution: 
      
           
      
  
 
    
 
8. Evaluate           
       
    
  and store.  
9. Evaluate    as per the following equation and store: 
                     
10. Check if    ≥ emin0 and    ≥ 0. If yes, assign 1 to         and store. If no, assign 0 
and store.  
11. Take the next record and execute steps (5) to (11). When the last record is done, go to 
the next step. 
Part III 
12. Create a table (Table B) with records of Table A for which         = 0.  
13. Take the first record of Table B.  
14. Set N = 0 
15. Evaluate eminN+1 = eminN + 100 and store. 
16. Solve the following two equations simultaneously for     ,  and     , and store the 
solutions: 
              
            
      
                       
         
       
     
   
    
 
17. Evaluate                 
            
      
  and store. 
18. Evaluate    
         
               
 and store. 
19. Check if     . If yes, assign 1 to XPOSITIVEN and store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
20. Evaluate             
     
    and store.  
21. Evaluate                  
              
      
  and store.  
22. Evaluate                  
       
    and store.  
23. Evaluate                  
          
    
 and store.  




24. Check if                         . If yes, assign 1 to CROSSDERIVHIGHN 
and store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
25. Check if XPOSITIVEN = CROSSDERIVHIGHN. If yes, assign 1 to 
XCONDITIONPOSN and store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
26. Evaluate    
         
               
 and store. 
27. Check if     . If yes, assign 1 to REVISEDN and store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
28. Evaluate LAMBDAN= 
        
 
 and store.  
29. Evaluate             
          
    and store.  
30. Evaluate DELTAN= 
       
    
 and store. 
31. Check if LAMBDAN <   < DELTAN. If yes, assign 1 to XWITHINBOUNDSN and 
store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
32. Check if REVISEDN = XWITHINBOUNDSN. If yes, assign 1 to PROP1HOLDSN and 
store; if no, assign 0 and store.  
33. Check if REVISEDN =1. If yes, go to step (34); if no, take the next record and go to 
step (14). 
34. Check if XPOSITIVEN =1. If yes, go to step (37). If no, go to step (35). 
35. Evaluate PHIN = 
     
      
 and store.  
36. Check if    > PHIN. If yes, assign 1 to ALPHAABOVELIMITN and store; if no, assign 
0 and store. Go to step (38)  
37. Assign 1 to ALPHAABOVELIMITN and store.  
38. Solve the following equation for      and store the solution: 
        
             
        
  
 
      
 
39. Evaluate               
         
      
  and store.  
40. Evaluate      as per the following equation and store: 
                             
41. Check if      ≥ eminN+1 and      ≥ 0. If yes, go to step (42). If no, go to step (44).  
42. Assign 1 to           and store.  
43. Take the next record and go to step (14). 
44. Assign 0 to           and store. 
45. Check if N < 2. If yes, go to step (46); if no, go to step (47).  
46. Set N = N + 1 and go to step (15). 
47. Take the next record and go to step (14). 
48. When all records of Table B are done, stop. 






















class BadConversion : public std::runtime_error { 
 public: 
   BadConversion(const std::string& s) 
     : std::runtime_error(s) 
     { } 
 }; 
  
 inline double convertToDouble(const std::string& s, 
                               bool failIfLeftoverChars = true) 
 { 
   std::istringstream i(s); 
   double x; 
   char c; 
   if (!(i >> x) || (failIfLeftoverChars && i.get(c))) 
     throw BadConversion("convertToDouble(\"" + s + "\")"); 
   return x; 
 }  
 
#define PI 3.141592654 
 
double newtonRaphson1(double alpha0guess, double s0guess, double r, double 
I, double w,double c,double b0,double k1,double k2, 
       double e1,double e2,double sigma, double 
emin0, int i, std::vector<double>& properCheck); 
double newtonRaphson2(double x0, double k1, double k2, double e1, double 
e2,  
       double s0, double sigma, double omega, 
double alpha0); 




using namespace std; 
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
















eLimited0(260000),R_ent0(260000), R_entLimited0(260000),  




















for(int j=0; j<260000; j++) 
{ 










































for(int i=0; i<1300; i++) 
{ 
 maxELimited0[i]= -500000000.0; 
 maxPLimited0[i]= -500000000.0; 





 for(int k=i*200,count=0; count<200; k++,count++) 
 { 
 
  if(maxELimited0[i]<=ELimited0[k]) 
  { 
  if(maxELimited0[i]==ELimited0[k]) 
  {recordCountE[i]=recordCountE[i]+1; 
  }else 
  {recordCountE[i]=1; 
  } 
   
  maxELimited0[i]=ELimited0[k]; 
  } 
   
  if(maxPLimited0[i]<=PLimited0[k]) 
  { 
  if(maxPLimited0[i]==PLimited0[k]) 
  {recordCountP[i]=recordCountP[i]+1; 
  }else 
  {recordCountP[i]=1; 
  } 
 
  maxPLimited0[i]=PLimited0[k]; 
  } 
 
  if(maxWLimited0[i]<=WLimited0[k]) 
  { 
   
  if(maxWLimited0[i]==WLimited0[k]) 
  {recordCountW[i]=recordCountW[i]+1; 
  }else 
  {recordCountW[i]=1; 




  } 
 
  maxWLimited0[i]=WLimited0[k]; 






































































for(int j=0,i=0; j<1300; j++) 
{ 
 for(int k=j*200,count=0; count<200; k++,count++) 
 { 
  if(maxELimited0[j]==-500000000.0) 
  { 
  rVecE[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecE[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecE[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecE[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecE[i]=b0Vec[k]; 
  k1VecE[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecE[i]=k2Vec[k]; 
  e1VecE[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecE[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecE[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecE[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
   
  if(count==199) 
  {i++; 
  } 
 
  } 
 
  if(maxELimited0[j]==ELimited0[k]) 
  { 
  recordNumE[i]=RecordCounter[k]; 
  alpha0E[i]=alpha0[k]; 
  s0E[i]=s0[k];  
  eLimited0E[i]=eLimited0[k]; 
 
  rVecE[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecE[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecE[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecE[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecE[i]=b0Vec[k]; 
  k1VecE[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecE[i]=k2Vec[k]; 
  e1VecE[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecE[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecE[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecE[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
 
  offerInfeasibleE[i]=offerInfeasible[k]; 




  R_vc0E[i]=R_vc0[k]; 
  e0E[i]=e0[k]; 
  R_ent0E[i]=R_ent0[k];  
  R_entLimited0E[i]=R_entLimited0[k]; 
  E0E[i]=E0[k];  
  ACCEPT0E[i]=ACCEPT0[k]; 
  ELimited0E[i]=ELimited0[k]; 
  PLimited0E[i]=PLimited0[k]; 
  WLimited0E[i]=WLimited0[k]; 
  emin0E[i]=emin0Vec[k]; 
  i++; 
  } 





for(int j=0,i=0; j<1300; j++) 
{ 
 for(int k=j*200,count=0; count<200; k++,count++) 
 { 
 
  if(maxPLimited0[j]==-500000000.0) 
  { 
  rVecP[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecP[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecP[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecP[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecP[i]=b0Vec[k]; 
  k1VecP[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecP[i]=k2Vec[k]; 
  e1VecP[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecP[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecP[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecP[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
   
  if(count==199) 
  {i++; 
  } 
 
  } 
  if(maxPLimited0[j]==PLimited0[k]) 
  { 
  recordNumP[i]=RecordCounter[k]; 
  emin0P[i]=emin0Vec[k]; 
  alpha0P[i]=alpha0[k]; 
  s0P[i]=s0[k];  
  eLimited0P[i]=eLimited0[k]; 
  ELimited0P[i]=ELimited0[k]; 
  PLimited0P[i]=PLimited0[k]; 
  WLimited0P[i]=WLimited0[k]; 
 
  rVecP[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecP[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecP[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecP[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecP[i]=b0Vec[k]; 




  k1VecP[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecP[i]=k2Vec[k]; 
  e1VecP[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecP[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecP[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecP[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
  offerInfeasibleP[i]=offerInfeasible[k]; 
  R_vc0P[i]=R_vc0[k]; 
  e0P[i]=e0[k]; 
  R_ent0P[i]=R_ent0[k];  
  R_entLimited0P[i]=R_entLimited0[k]; 
  E0P[i]=E0[k];  
  ACCEPT0P[i]=ACCEPT0[k]; 
  i++; 




for(int j=0,i=0; j<1300; j++) 
{ 
 for(int k=j*200,count=0; count<200; k++,count++) 
 { 
  if(maxWLimited0[j]==-500000000.0) 
  { 
  rVecW[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecW[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecW[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecW[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecW[i]=b0Vec[k]; 
  k1VecW[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecW[i]=k2Vec[k]; 
  e1VecW[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecW[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecW[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecW[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
   
  if(count==199) 
  {i++; 
  } 
 
  } 
 
  if(maxWLimited0[j]==WLimited0[k]) 
  { 
  recordNumW[i]=RecordCounter[k]; 
  emin0W[i]=emin0Vec[k]; 
  alpha0W[i]=alpha0[k]; 
  s0W[i]=s0[k];  
  eLimited0W[i]=eLimited0[k]; 
   
  rVecW[i]=rVec[k]; 
  IVecW[i]=IVec[k]; 
  wVecW[i]=wVec[k]; 
  cVecW[i]=cVec[k]; 
  b0VecW[i]=b0Vec[k]; 
  k1VecW[i]=k1Vec[k]; 
  k2VecW[i]=k2Vec[k]; 




  e1VecW[i]=e1Vec[k]; 
  e2VecW[i]=e2Vec[k]; 
  sigmaVecW[i]=sigmaVec[k]; 
  omegaVecW[i]=omegaVec[k]; 
  ELimited0W[i]=ELimited0[k]; 
  PLimited0W[i]=PLimited0[k]; 
  WLimited0W[i]=WLimited0[k]; 
  offerInfeasibleW[i]=offerInfeasible[k]; 
  R_vc0W[i]=R_vc0[k]; 
  e0W[i]=e0[k]; 
  R_ent0W[i]=R_ent0[k];  
  R_entLimited0W[i]=R_entLimited0[k]; 
  E0W[i]=E0[k];  
  ACCEPT0W[i]=ACCEPT0[k]; 
  i++; 








fout1 << "Record Number, r, I, w, c, b0, k1, k2, e1, e2, sigma, 
omega,Records with maxELimited0, Records with maxPLimited0, Records with 
maxWLimited0" << endl; 
fout1.precision(20); 
 














fout2 << "Record Number, Parent Record Number, r, I, w, c, b0, k1, k2, e1, 
e2, sigma, omega, emin0, alpha0, s0, Offer Infeasible,R_vc0, e0, 
eLimited0,R_ent0, R_entLimited0, E0, ELimited0, ACCEPT0,PLimited0, 
WLimited0" << endl; 
fout2.precision(20); 
 



























fout3<< "Record Number, Parent Record Number, r, I, w, c, b0, k1, k2, e1, 
e2, sigma, omega, emin0, alpha0, s0, Offer Infeasible,R_vc0, e0, 
eLimited0,R_ent0, R_entLimited0, E0, ELimited0, ACCEPT0,PLimited0, 
WLimited0" << endl; 
fout3.precision(20); 
 























fout4<< "Record Number, Parent Record Number, r, I, w, c, b0, k1, k2, e1, 
e2, sigma, omega, emin0, alpha0, s0, Offer Infeasible,R_vc0, e0, 
eLimited0,R_ent0, R_entLimited0, E0, ELimited0, ACCEPT0,PLimited0, 
WLimited0" << endl; 
fout4.precision(20); 
 




























fout5<< "Record Number, r, I, w, c, b0, k1, k2, e1, e2, sigma, omega, 
emin0_E, alpha0_E, s0_E,eLimited0_E, max ELimited0,ACCEPT0 E,offer 
Infeasible E,emin0_P, alpha0_P, s0_P, eLimited0_P,max PLimited0,ACCEPT0 
P,offer Infeasible P,emin0_W, alpha0_W, s0_W, eLimited0_W, max 



























































































double newtonRaphson1(double alpha0guess,double s0guess,double r, double 
I, double w,double c,double b0,double k1,double k2, 
       double e1,double e2,double sigma,double 
emin0,int i, std::vector<double>& properCheck) 
{ 







double f = 0.1; 
double xi=alpha0guess; 
double yi=s0guess; 
x = xi; 
y = yi; 
int check = 0, counter=0 ; 
 
while ((check ==0)&&(counter<5000)) 
{ 
F1 =x*(k1*pow(emin0,e1)+k2*pow(emin0,e2)*pow(y,sigma))-(1+r)*(I+b0)-y*w; 
F2 = k2*pow(emin0,e2)*sigma*pow(y,sigma-1)-(c+w)/x; 
a = k1*pow(emin0,e1)+k2*pow(emin0,e2)*pow(y,sigma); 
b = x*k2*pow(emin0,e2)*sigma*pow(y,sigma-1)-w; 
cJ = (c+w)/pow(x,2); 
d = k2*pow(emin0,e2)*sigma*(sigma-1)*pow(y,sigma-2); 
detj = a*d - b*cJ; 
jinv11 = d/detj; 
jinv12 = -b/detj; 
jinv21 = -cJ/detj; 
jinv22 = a/detj; 
detjinv = (((a*d)/(detj*detj)) - ((b*cJ)/(detj*detj))); 
deltax = (jinv11*F1*f)+(jinv12*F2*f); 
deltay = (jinv21*F1*f)+(jinv22*F2*f); 
x = x-deltax; 
y = y-deltay; 
counter++; 
if((fabs(F1) < 0.001) && (fabs(F2) < 0.001)) 








double newtonRaphson2(double x0, double k1, double k2, double e1, double 
e2,  
















x= x - (fx/fpx); 










void fillInCell(int i,std::vector<double>& variable, std::stringstream& 
ls1) 
{ 
















Survey Instrument (Sample) 
 





























































































































































Q1 The entrepreneur would normally like to own a 
larger share of the venture than what is offered by 
the VC 
4 1  3     5.5 
Q2 VCs do not revise offers rejected by first-time 
entrepreneurs 
8   2   3 3 2.375 
Q3 For encouraging the VC to make an offer, the 
entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently of 
the VC is more important than the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well with the VC 
4    1  3  2.5 
Q4 The VC would demand a large ownership share to 
invest in ventures with large uncertainty 
4 1  2 1    5.25 
Q5 The VC would reduce advising/monitoring when 
the entrepreneur is paid a high base salary 
4      1 3 1.25 
Q6 The entrepreneur puts in more effort if VC-
entrepreneur teamwork is critical to the venture‘s 
success 
4   1 3    4.25 
Q7 The entrepreneur would exert best effort only when 
allocated a large ownership share (say, above 80%) 




The VC would be reluctant to make an offer when 
the investment amount is large 
4      2 2 1.5 
VCs would like entrepreneurs to ask for an 
investment amount that is only absolutely essential, 
not any more 
1   1     5 
Q9 If the VC is confident that the entrepreneur will 
work well with him/her, the VC would demand a 
larger ownership share 





The VC would increase advising/monitoring when 
the investment amount is large 
4   2   1 1 3.25 
Consider a situation where a VC may invest in a 
first-time entrepreneur‘s venture. Now assume that 
the venture requires an investment that is larger for 
its level of expected revenue. Then, the VC would 
expect to advise/monitor more if he/she were to 
invest. 










The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC 
is the most important factor influencing whether the 
VC will make an offer 
4   1  1 1 1 2.75 
Apart from the commercial potential of the venture, 
the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC 
is the most important factor influencing whether the 
VC will make an offer. 
1    1    4 
The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC 
is one of the most important factors influencing 
whether the VC will make an offer. 
1  1      6 



































































































































The VC would demand a large ownership share if 
his/her time is highly valuable 
4   1 1  1 1 3 
Consider a situation where a VC has determined the 
ownership share he/she should demand if he/she 
were to invest in a venture. Then, if the VC‘s time 
were more valuable than what it actually is, the VC 
would increase to some extent the ownership share 
demanded. 
1     1   3 
13 An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary would 
necessarily increase the entrepreneur‘s overall 
return 
4   1 1  1 1 3 
14 For VC financing to materialize, the entrepreneur‘s 
ability to work well with the VC is more important 
than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
independently of the VC   
4  1 2   1  4.5 
15 If the VC-entrepreneur teamwork is critical to the 
venture‘s success, the VC would demand a larger 
ownership share 
4   1 1 1 1  3.5 
16 The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well 
independently of the VC affects his/her return from 
the venture 
4  3    1  5 
17 An increase in the entrepreneur‘s base salary would 
necessarily decrease the VC‘s return 
4    1  3  2.5 
18 It is desirable for VCs to hold a moderate ownership 
share (say, 20% to 60%) in early-stage ventures of 
first-time entrepreneurs 
4  2 1 1    5.25 
19 VCs who specialize in the venture‘s industry are 
more likely to invest than those who do not 




VCs under greater time constraints are less likely to 
revise rejected offers 
4   1   2 1 2.5 
VCs under greater time constraints may be less 
likely to find it feasible to revise rejected offers 
though they can find the time required to revise 
such offers. 
1      1  2 
21 The VC is more likely to invest if the entrepreneur‘s 
effort is expected to be highly productive 
4 1 3      6.25 
22 The size of the base salary offered affects whether 
the deal will close 
4  2 1 1    5.25 
23 The VC would demand a larger ownership share 
when the investment amount is larger 
4  3 1     5.75 
24 If the entrepreneur works well with the VC, the VC 
would reduce advising/ monitoring 
5    1 1 3  2.6 
 
 





































































































































For encouraging the entrepreneur to exert best effort, 
the entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is 
more important than the entrepreneur‘s ability to work 
well independently of the VC 
4   1 2  1  3.75 
The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well with the VC is 
more influential than the entrepreneur‘s ability to 
work well independently of the VC in determining 
whether the entrepreneur will exert best effort. 
1     1   3 
26 A VC under greater time constraints would demand a 
smaller ownership share 
5      3 2 1.6 
27 If the VC‘s advising/monitoring is influential, the VC 
would increase advising/monitoring 
5   2 3    4.4 
28 The entrepreneur‘s performance is usually sensitive to 
the size of the base salary he/she receives 
5   1 1 1  2 2.8 
29 The VC‘s judgment, at the time of making the offer, 
about the entrepreneur‘s future performance is 
ultimately the most important factor affecting his/her 
return from the investment 
5  2 2 1    5.2 
30 If the VC is highly confident about a first-time 
entrepreneur‘s performance, it would normally work 
to the advantage of that entrepreneur 
5 1 1 2 1    5.4 
31 If the entrepreneur requires a higher base salary, the 
VC would demand a larger ownership share 




The VC would demand a large ownership share if the 
VC‘s advising/monitoring is of high quality 
4  1 2 1    5 
Consider a situation where a VC may invest but 
demand a large ownership share in a first-time 
entrepreneur‘s venture with a large uncertainty. Now 
assume that the VC‘s advising/monitoring is of high 
quality and larger revenue would be generated 
because of that high quality advising/monitoring. 
Then, that high quality would enable that VC to 
reduce to some extent the ownership share demanded. 
1       1 1 
33 The entrepreneur‘s ability to work well independently 
of the VC encourages the VC to make an offer 
5  1 3   1  4.6 
34 The entrepreneur puts in less effort if the VC‘s 
advising and monitoring is of high quality 
5    1 1 3  2.6 
35 The VC-entrepreneur teamwork highly influences the 
entrepreneur‘s return 
5 1 1 2 1    5.4 
36 A VC expecting to be influential in 
advising/monitoring would be less likely to finance 
the venture 
5    1  4  2.4 
 
 
































































































































37 Making entrepreneurial characteristics (e.g., 
commitment and competence) more transparent to 
VCs can benefit entrepreneurs 
5  3 1   1  5 
38 VCs who specialize in industries are likely to 
provide high quality advising/monitoring 
4 1 2 1     6 
39 The VC would be more inclined to revise a rejected 
offer if the VC‘s ownership share in the rejected 
offer is high 
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